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Managing Labour in Small Firms
This book explores the manner in which the size of the organisation influences the
employment relationship with a focus upon small enterprises. The majority of
organisations in the UK economy are categorised as small firms, having under 50
employees, and in 2002 such firms were found to provide 43 per cent of jobs within
the economy (DTI, 2002). Clearly these organisations make a critical contribution
to the British economy, yet – surprisingly – until quite recently very little was
known about how such firms managed their labour. Since the 1990s there has been
a growing body of evidence which has explored the employment relationship in
small firms and this book fulfils an important task by recognising the importance of
this literature, and also by moving the debate forward.
Managing Labour in Small Firms also acknowledges that size – whilst influ-
ential in shaping firm behaviour – will interact with context to create particular
employment relationships. These relationships are examined in chapters covering:
• HRM in the smaller organisation
• The challenge of undertaking research in such firms
• The impact of regulation
• The influence of social embeddedness
• The affect of the national minimum wage
• Training and development
• Pay construction
• Employee representation
These discussions link the key themes and concepts within employment relations,
and illustrate how firm size shapes their articulation and consequent management.
Written by well respected specialists in the field, this is one of the only books on
the market covering this topic, and as such it will be an essential text for
researchers and graduates studying business and management, human resource
management and industrial relations.
Susan Marlow is Reader in HRM at De Montfort University. She has extensive
experience and an international reputation in the field of small firm research,
having her work published in leading academic journals such as Entrepreneurship,
Theory and Practice. Dean Patton is Senior Enterprise Fellow at the Institute for
Entrepreneurship, University of Southampton; he has undertaken research and
consultancy within and on behalf of small firms. His current research interests
focus on the evaluation of small firm policy, and training and management devel-
opment within smaller firms. Monder Ram is Professor of Small Business, and
Director of Small Business and Enterprise Research Group, at De Montfort Uni-
versity. He has extensive experience of working in, researching, and acting as a
consultant to ethnic minority businesses. He is author of Managing to Survive –
Working Lives in Small Firms, and co-author of Ethnic Minorities in Business.
Routledge studies in small business
Edited by David J. Storey
1 Small Firm Formation and Regional Economic Development
Edited by Michael W. Danson
2 Corporate Venture Capital
Bridging the equity gap in the small business sector
Kevin McNally
3 The Quality Business
Quality issues and smaller firms
Julian North, Robert A. Blackburn and James Curran
4 Enterprise and Culture
Colin Gray
5 The Financing of Small Business
A comparative study of male and female small business owners
Lauren Read
6 Small Firms and Network Economies
Martin Perry
7 Intellectual Property and Innovation Management in Small Firms
Edited by Robert A. Blackburn
8 Understanding the Small Family Business
Edited by Denise E. Fletcher
9 Managing Labour in Small Firms
Edited by Susan Marlow, Dean Patton and Monder Ram
10 Promoting Informal Venture Capital
Learning from the UK experience
Richard Harrison and Colin Mason
Managing Labour in
Small Firms
Edited by Susan Marlow, Dean Patton
and Monder Ram
and editorial matter; individual contributors their contribution
Typeset in Times by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN 978-0-415-31285-1 (hbk)
First published 2005 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
Published 2017 by Routledge
Copyright © 2005 Susan Marlow, Dean Patton and Monder Ram for selection
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.tandfebooks.com,
has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non
Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Contents
List of tables vii
List of contributors viii
1 Introduction 1
S U S A N  M A R L O W
2 The hunting of the snark: a critical analysis of human 
resource management discourses in relation to managing 
labour in smaller organisations 18
S C O T T  T A Y L O R
3 Researching the employment relationship in small 
firms: what are the contributions from the employment 
relations and small business literatures? 43
R O B E R T  B L A C K B U R N
4 Managerial strategies in small firms 66
R I C H A R D  S C A S E
5 Training in smaller firms 83
D E A N  P A T T O N
6 Breaking out of survival businesses: managing labour, 
growth and development in the South Asian restaurant 
trade 109
M O N D E R  R A M ,  T R E V O R  J O N E S ,  T A H I R  A B B A S  A N D  S A R A
C A R T E R
7 Labour regulation and SMEs: a challenge to 
competitiveness and employability? 133
M A R K  H A R T  A N D  R O B E R T  B L A C K B U R N
8 Small firms and the National Minimum Wage 159
J I M  A R R O W S M I T H  A N D  M A R K  G I L M A N
9 Managing variable pay systems in smaller workplaces: 
the significance of employee perceptions of organisational
justice 178
A N N E T T E  C O X
10 Representation, consultation and the smaller firm 202
A L A N  R Y A N
Index 222
vi Contents
Tables
3.1 Studies of employment relations in small firms: methods 
and key points 45
3.2 Features of small business employment relations 55
3.3 Size distribution of workplace establishments, GB 56
3.4 Size distribution of enterprises in UK with employees 
(start 2002) 57
3.5 Number of articles on ‘employment relations’ and small firms 59
6.1 Composition of South Asians and total unemployment in 
the ‘Balti Quarter’ 116
6.2 Typology of break-out 118
7.1 Statutory maximum working week (2000) 136
7.2 Areas of recent legislation on employment rights in the UK 141
7.3 Summary of owner-managers awareness of IERs 144
7.4 Owner-managers’ awareness of IERs covered by legislation 145
7.5 Equation for composite awareness of individual 
employment rights 146
7.6 Constraints on business performance over last two years 148
7.7 Influence of employment rights legislation on business 
operations 149
7.8 Highest negative counts on impact of IERs by sector 151
7.9 Highest negative impact of IERs by female orientation 153
8.1 Typology of response to employment regulation 173
9.1 Firm characteristics 184
9.2 Employee perceptions of fairness of pay level 185
9.3 Percentage of employees believing that pay should be variable 186
9.4 Percentage of employees supporting each potential 
criterion for variable pay 187
9.5 Employees believing that poor performers receive less 
money than good performers 188
9.6 Earnings of case study company employees compared with 
national averages 189
9.7 Employee knowledge of better paying employers in the 
local area 190
9.8 Employee perceptions of pay system fairness 194
Contributors
Dr Tahir Abbas is Lecturer in Sociology and Director of the Centre for
the Study of Ethnicity and Culture, Department of Sociology, Univer-
sity of Birmingham, Birmingham.
Dr Jim Arrowsmith is Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer in Industrial
Relations at Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry.
Professor Robert Blackburn is Director of the Small Business Research
Centre, Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames.
Professor Sara Carter is Professor of Entrepreneurship at the Hunter
Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
Dr Annette Cox is Lecturer in Employment Studies, Manchester School
of Management UMIST, Manchester.
Dr Mark Gilman is Lecturer in Industrial Relations/HRM at Canterbury
Business School, University of Kent at Canterbury.
Professor Mark Hart is Professor of Small Business Research at Small
Business Research Centre, Kingston University, Kingston upon
Thames.
Professor Trevor Jones is Visiting Professor of Strategy and Management
at De Montfort University, Leicester.
Dr Susan Marlow is Reader in HRM, Small Business and Enterprise
Research Group, De Montfort University, Leicester.
Dr Dean Patton is Senior Enterprise Fellow, Institute for Entrepreneur-
ship, University of Southampton, Southampton.
Professor Monder Ram (OBE) is Professor of Strategy and Management,
Small Business and Enterprise Research Group, De Montfort Univer-
sity, Leicester.
Alan Ryan is Senior Lecturer in Employment Relations at De Montfort
University, Leicester.
Professor Richard Scase is Professor of Organisational Behaviour at Can-
terbury Business School, University of Kent at Canterbury.
Dr Scott Taylor is Lecturer in the Organizational Behaviour, International
Management and Organization Group, Birmingham Business School,
University of Birmingham.
Contributors ix

1 Introduction
Susan Marlow
In a recent discussion paper pertaining to theoretical shifts and challenges
in the study of the contemporary employment relationship, Edwards
(2001:3) argues that ignoring emerging sectors of the economy and associ-
ated developments in management theory is blinkered and indeed, coun-
terproductive. Whilst arguing that new areas for study and debate must be
recognised, Edwards also states that these must be seen to be part of
wider, established theoretical analyses in that, ‘tools such as the effort
wage bargain (are) equally applicable’. Hence, it was suggested that whilst
debate upon developments in labour management must have foundations
set in fundamental terms and concepts, it must also recognise how particu-
lar situations and circumstances, such as firm size, will shape and influence
the articulation of these concepts within the organisation. This book
demonstrates the manner in which the size of the organisation influences
the effort-wage bargain (Burowoy, 1979). Illustrated by the range of issues
and arguments included within this text, it is evident that organisation size
will affect the manner in which the employment relationship is managed.
However, it is also acknowledged that size, whilst influential in shaping
firm behaviour, will interact with a number of other extraneous elements
such as market constraints, sector, location, age (amongst others). These
will, in turn, interact with characteristics such as management styles,
family dynamics, skill profiles, owner gender and ethnicity; the outcome of
these complex interactions being varied and shifting employment relation-
ships.
So, whilst sensitive to heterogeneity arising from context, the under-
lying argument within this book is that it is possible to recognise and
accommodate difference within labour management in small firms whilst
identifying a number of key themes and concepts which will offer an ana-
lytical framework and foundation to this work. As such, this book differs
from others which focus on contemporary employment relations by con-
sidering the manner in which fundamental concepts pertaining to labour
management in a market economy, such as the effort-wage bargain, are
shaped particularly by the context within which the firm operates. Hence,
whilst drawing upon a number of key areas in current debate such as
human resource management (HRM) as a new managerial strategy,
employee representation and employment regulation, this collection of
essays illustrates how the size of the firm, in conjunction with other influ-
ences, such as sector, forms a lens through which specific articulations of
the effort/wage concept can be analysed.
When considering the extant literature which explores the employment
relationship in small firms, there is a growing sophistication in the material
which acknowledges heterogeneity within sector, whilst developing con-
ceptual themes drawn from accepted theory and applying this to the spe-
cific circumstance of the smaller organisation. So, whilst the current body
of evidence exploring employment relations in small firms is limited, com-
pared to that of larger firms, it is notable for its increasing complexity in
unpicking how firm size, in tandem with other contingent factors, will
influence the manner in which labour is managed. Indeed, just recently, it
has been argued that within the sociological discipline of work and organi-
sations, the growing sophistication of the literature pertaining to labour
management in small firms is, ‘a key exemplar of analytical advance …
(and) British research has made substantial empirical and analytical
progress’ (Ram and Edwards, 2003:719). This book will contribute further
to this debate through discussion and analysis of the manner in which firm
size, in accordance with other factors, impacts upon labour management.
To set these current debates in context, a critical evaluation of the extant
literature pertaining to this area of study will be briefly outlined after
which there will be a consideration of how the contributors to this text
advance this debate.
As interest in the experience of small firm ownership grew from the
mid-1970s so did a certain myth that labour management in small firms
was, in general, ‘harmonious’ with proof of this assertion evident by the
absence of collective dispute (Bolton, 1971). Although the analysis of
labour management in small firms commanded little attention during the
1980s (Matlay, 2002), the emergent debate focused largely around dis-
pelling the harmony thesis. Rather, it was argued that industrial relations
in small firms was generally defined by autocratic owner prerogative
(Rainnie, 1989) leading to highly exploitative labour relations. In his chal-
lenge to the ‘harmony’ thesis, Rainnie argued that the structure of the
market economy, founded upon the domination of large capitals ensured
that small firms were limited in their operations primarily to sub-
contracting or within niche areas where it was irrational for large firms to
operate. Such market positioning then critically affected the nature of the
employment relationship in such firms. In effect, in markets where large
organisations dictate supplier relationships small firm owners and man-
agers are largely denied choice regarding the manner in which they
manage labour as observing cost constraints and meeting quality targets
takes away options for independent decision making. For those firms who
locate in niche areas and so do not enter such supply chains, the nature of
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the market, by definition, limits their operational scope and so again, sur-
vival under such constraints will lead to specific and exploitative
approaches to labour management. This analysis broadened the debate to
locate small firms within the wider market environment, arguing that cen-
tralised and fragmented capital have a symbiotic relationship, if asymmet-
rical in terms of power. Hence, large firms dominate markets in such a way
as to essentially dictate the employment relationship in both their smaller
suppliers and those confined to niche markets.
In expounding this analysis, Rainnie used a series of taxonomies remi-
niscent of Weberian ideal types to describe how the market positioning of
smaller firms would determine their modes of operations and management
strategies. To some degree this was a useful device as it challenged the
notion of homogeneity based upon size alone. The focus upon market
determinism, however, did somewhat narrow the scope to generate further
analyses of the employment relationship in small firms whilst the use of
taxonomies is constricting. Although this device is useful in recognising
degrees of heterogeneity, the nature of the model by necessity, crudely
categorises firms on the basis of limited descriptors. In a contrasting
consideration of employment relations in small firms, whilst still favouring
the taxonomy approach, Goss (1991) based his typologies of labour man-
agement on a wider ranges of influences drawing together both market
structures and the impact of owner prerogative upon management style.
This led to a more sensitive, sociological assessment which recognised the
interplay of structure and agency in the dynamic links between the
internal and external environment of the firm (Gorton, 2000), thus
acknowledging the impact of the social relations of production upon
labour management practices.
Indeed, recent work which has advanced the analysis of the employ-
ment relationship in small firms recognises the complex interplay between
the position of the organisation in the wider economy and the components
which make up the ‘black box’ of the firm itself (Ram, 1994; Holliday,
1995; Moule, 1998). This case study material, gathered in the 1990s, proved
to be both sensitive to market constraints whilst acknowledging how the
internal dynamics within the firm led to heterogeneity within the sector.
This work illustrated how owners actually managed their employees in situ
and also, how employees experienced their work in small firms and were
in fact able, to differing degrees, to manipulate their own labour process.
Reminiscent of the classic case studies of large firms in the 1970s and 1980s
(Beynon, 1973; Nichols and Beynon, 1977; Cockburn, 1983) studies of
labour management in smaller firms echoed this approach with their intim-
ate portrayals of how the employment relationship was constructed,
changed and challenged in such firms. So for example, the study of three
small textile firms owned by members of ethnic minorities enabled Ram
(1994) to analyse the interplay between sector, ethnicity and gender and
then demonstrate how firm size was critical in deciding how these
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influences collided to generate a particular employment relationship. In
recognition of the negotiated nature of the employment relationship, Ram
(1994:150) suggests that the market-based autocracy thesis did not ade-
quately ‘convey the bargained nature of life on the shop floor, the extent
of mutual dependency between workers and management and the import-
ance of informal accommodation’.
The primary influence of market conditions upon the employment rela-
tionship was further challenged by Holliday (1995), who explored the
manner in which family ownership structures shaped this relationship and
how, in particular, paternalism pervaded labour management. The ensuing
employment relationship then developed around notions of deference and
mutual dependence, but this also acted to obscure exploitative behaviour
as notions of obligation intruded, particularly where family members were
also employees.
Developing this focus upon the dynamic interplay between the social
relations of production and market imperatives, Moule’s (1998) study of a
button factory brought together issues of firm size in a context of sub-
contracting dependence. Just as in the other cases discussed, he observed
an employment relationship which was constructed around negotiation,
toleration and occasional outbursts of employer prerogative. In this
particular study, Moule was a participant observer so was able to observe
first hand, and over some time, the manner in which the proximity
between the Directors and the employees facilitated a particular employ-
ment relationship where mutual dependence was tacitly recognised, if
unevenly applied. Within Button Co. this led to a situation where, ‘the tol-
eration of certain fiddles, practices [by employees] and unpredictable pat-
terns of behaviours by the Directors did not appear to stem from any
other motive other than ensuring workable day to day relations’ (Moule,
1998:652). Thus, it was argued that this firm had a complex approach to
labour management whereby Directors would ignore certain behaviours if
targets were met but levels and degrees of toleration were differentiated
dependent on employee status. This debate around the notion of consent
and control is well rehearsed (Burowoy, 1979) and the type of behaviour
identified by Moule in Button Co. is evident throughout the economy. But
what sets this firm and many small firms aside in this debate is that this
behaviour is not bounded or underpinned by the bureaucratic rationality
of formal management processes, a point which will be explored in more
detail below. Instead, the business was based upon an informal, tacit,
uneven managerial approach which was negotiated and renegotiated on a
frequent basis. This work, as part of the wider evidence to analyse the
complexity of employment relations in small firms which emerged in the
1990s (see also, Curran et al., 1993; Matlay, 1999; Ram, 1999) advanced the
debate by demonstrating the manner in which firm size facilitates social
negotiation between employees and employers around the labour process.
These case studies have been particularly helpful in revealing the inter-
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action between markets, firms, owners, managers and employees which
then in turn, shapes the manner in which labour is managed. The findings
support the notion that it is somewhat simplistic to argue that the employ-
ment relationship in small firms is determined solely by the market and so,
from necessity autocracy, not harmony, dominates. It would appear that
market influence is critical, but equally, the particularistic social relations
of production generated within a context of smallness and proximity will
facilitate differentiated degrees of negotiation between employers and
employees regarding the terms and conditions of employment. As such,
the form and content of the employment relationship in small firms arises
from the interplay of these factors rather than either one alone. A critical
outcome of this more complex analysis focuses around the importance of
informal management approaches in small firms. In this context, informal-
ity and formality are presented as opposing constructs where the former is
perceived to encompass an approach where labour management is largely
emergent, flexible and loosely structured. As such, in the small firm this
would appear to be an outcome from a number of factors, of importance
amongst these is the preference of owners to manage labour either them-
selves or delegate this task to a general manager. Consequently, there is an
absence of informed professional HR management, this ensures that
contemporary and appropriate HR policies and practices are unlikely to
be in place plus, management by the uninformed encourages and perhaps
even requires the intrusion of personal idiosyncrasies and priorities
(Wynarczyk et al., 1993; Marlow, 2002). Formality, however, might use-
fully be described as where:
terms and conditions of employment are formally contracted so both
labour and management have recourse to a set of rules, should they
feel it appropriate to use them. Moreover, the presence of HR profes-
sionals who can be called upon to formulate policy and apply rules
and regulations facilitates a more ‘arms length’ or anonymous applica-
tion of formality which emphasises bureaucratic rationality.
(Marlow, 2002:4)
This notion of informality in small firms is a useful construct as a
general indicator of difference between the employment relationship in
small and large enterprises with empirical evidence, drawn from both fine
grained research (Marlow and Patton, 2002) and large surveys (Matlay,
2002) supporting this notion, whilst of course, exception is recognised. So,
for example Cully et al. (1999) in WERS did find that smaller firms were
likely to have some formal policies in place – particularly regarding discip-
line issues. It is interesting to note that Marlow (2002), in a qualitative
study of labour management in manufacturing firms, also found some
degree of co-existence between formality and informality, but upon closer
analysis found that whilst policy was in place, owners were reluctant to use
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it. This occurred as the close proximity between employer and employee
generated a social relationship into which formality could not readily
intrude. This social relationship emerged in a number of ways, some of
which were highly exploitative, but whether harsh or based around friend-
ships and team working, the resort to formality was unlikely as this in fact
‘professionalised’ the employment relationship where previously there had
been no precedent for this. Matlay (2002), in his survey of 6,000 SME
owners, looked for any ‘mix’ of formality and informality but found little
evidence for this and a significant preference for informal approaches to
labour management by small firm owners.
However, it is recognised that it is overly simplistic to subscribe to a
dichotomy of formality and informality without recognising the dynamic
nature of such constructs as noted by Ram et al. (2001:846), who suggested
that ‘informality is therefore, a matter of degree and not kind’ when
arguing that the manner in which informality is articulated changes over
time and is sensitive to context. Drawing upon a study of the impact of
regulatory shock, specifically the introduction of the National Minimum
Wage (NMW), Ram et al. argued that informality was not solely an
outcome of owner prerogative but is also a necessary response to accom-
modating fluctuating product and labour market demands. In essence
firms were combining flexibility and informality to remain viable.
There can be little dissent, however, from the notion that a defining
feature of firm growth is increasing bureaucracy which will, of course, also
apply to the employment relationship (Wynarczyk et al., 1993). This is
articulated through the development of formal policy and practice admin-
istered by a personnel function subject to updating and, where trade
unions are recognised, amendment through collective bargaining. Studies
of labour management in large firms again demonstrate the co-existence of
formality and informality, indicating that whilst the former ‘bounds’ the
employment relationship, the latter underpins it (Nichols and Beynon,
1977; Westwood, 1986). Moreover, despite recent volatile markets, shifts
towards greater managerial prerogative and diminishing union power, the
informal manipulation of the labour process persists and continues to be
tolerated to a greater or less degree (Elger and Smith, 1998; Webb and
Palmer, 1998).
So, it would appear that within all firms there is a differentiated degree
of co-existence between informal and formal labour management
approaches which suggests that it is too simplistic to develop an uncritical
correlation between firm size and these concepts. Whilst recognising this,
Marlow (2002) draws attention to the fact that within larger firms, the
dynamic of control and consent is bounded by formality in that if, and
when, line managers have to overtly assert authority, they have the chan-
nels by which to do so or indeed, where necessary or preferred, they can
even delegate this task to the professional HR function. Equally, the
recourse to formal policy and practice is available to employees or their
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trade union representatives should they wish to individually, or collec-
tively, assert their rights within the employment relationship.
From this, it is argued that informality in large firms, although an
enduring if changing feature of the employment relationship, is to a
degree, a subversive activity. Whilst many informal practices are accepted
under the auspices of custom and practice, this is only ever discretionary
with both labour and management being able to challenge these practices
should the need arise. This is not the case in small firms where formality is
less likely to ‘police’ informality as, even where the former is in place,
owner/managers seem reluctant to use it. As noted above, this is sup-
ported by survey and case study evidence (Cully et al., 1999; Marlow, 2002)
regarding the presence of formal discipline/grievance policies. Yet, as
small firms are still overrepresented at Employment Tribunals (Earnshaw
et al., 1998) in unfair dismissal cases it would appear that they are either
over-selecting litigious employees or failing to apply appropriate policy in
the correct manner. The latter scenario would appear more likely. So,
whilst the constructs of informality and formality are useful in the debate
regarding the association between firm size and employment relations, this
is a complex association. Rather, it would appear that formality and infor-
mality co-exist in all firms but the degree to which this occurs and the
manner in which it emerges will be influenced by firm size. Hence, larger
firms are likely to be bounded by formality whereas their smaller counter-
parts are likely to adopt this approach as an outcome of a range of influ-
ences which include, amongst others, owner prerogative, professional
ignorance, the need to respond flexibly to market shifts and employer/
employee dynamics. Thus, some degree of difference can be identified
between the articulation of formality and informality in large and small
firms whilst still acknowledging heterogeneity and change both within
firms themselves and within their market context.
Empirical evidence relating to the manner in which regulatory com-
pliance is managed by smaller firms is a good illustration of the impact of
external change upon the articulation and accommodation of informality.
Regulating the employment relationship through the strengthening of
individual rights and, to a lesser degree, collective rights has been a critical
element of contemporary Labour government policy (Labour Party, 2001).
This has been articulated through the recognition and adoption of Euro-
pean regulation (albeit in a minimal fashion [McKay, 2001]), the enact-
ment of legislation to introduce a National Minimum Wage (NMW) in
1998, plus the Employment Relations Act (1999) and the Employment
Act (2002). Overall, the introduction of an increasing tranche of employ-
ment regulation has been seen to be particularly problematic for smaller
firms. If, as the evidence would indicate, that many such firms rely on dif-
fering degrees of informal, flexible, even idiosyncratic labour manage-
ment, adopting a regulatory approach will be challenging as it is axiomatic
that compliance is demonstrated by inclusion within existing, established
Introduction 7
policy. There has been considerable resistance to the regulation agenda by
pressure groups representing small businesses in particular (FSB, 2000)
with dire predictions made regarding the impact of increasing regulation
upon the performance of the small firm sector per se (Oldfield, 1999).
However, the empirical evidence which has emerged regarding this issue
suggests that the impact of compliance has been considerably less disas-
trous than predicted with negative perceptions outweighing ‘experiential
effects’ (Blackburn and Hart, 2001:764).
Developing an analysis of the challenges surrounding the successful
incorporation of NMW regulation into largely informal systems of labour
management enables Ram et al. (2001) and Gilman et al. (2002), to unpick
the concept of informality in more detail. It was found that whilst infor-
mality was positively advantageous in accommodating the NMW as ‘the
effort bargain was very fluid’ (Gilman et al., 2002:65), it was not an
outcome solely of owner preference and/or spatial and social proximity
with labour. Rather, it was noted in both these papers that the interaction
between labour markets, product markets and owner/employee social
dynamics generated particular and differing forms of informality which
then supported a largely indeterminate approach to pay setting whilst
prompting specific responses to pay change. For some firms this meant
ignoring the NMW, others were able to adjust fairly easily but the authors
of these studies reveal that whilst informality assisted this process, the
manner in which it was articulated adapted itself in accordance to changes
being introduced. This was in response to both external market con-
ditions and internal approaches to labour management and again, illus-
trated that informality is not just a product of owner prerogative but an
outcome of a number of influences which go beyond the whim of owner
choice alone.
This brief overview of some of the critical developments in the liter-
ature pertaining to employment relations in small firms serves to demon-
strate the growing sophistication of this analysis. Contrary to the belief of
Barrett and Rainnie (2002), the literature has moved forward from the
generalised dichotomy focused upon notions of ‘small is beautiful’ or
‘bleak house scenarios’. Rather, as evidence has accumulated around
analyses which delve into the nature of employment relations in small
firms, knowledge has become more detailed and far more sensitive to
issues of heterogeneity within the sector as well as the dynamic between
these enterprises and their larger counterparts. What has emerged is an
argument which suggests that the effort–wage bargain is an outcome of the
interaction between the external market positioning of the firm and the
internal dynamics of the enterprise. Gilman et al. (2002:54) usefully sum-
marises this commenting that, ‘the balance between some form of negotia-
tion and direct employer autocracy and the whip of the market is likely to
be determined by employee skill, scarcity value, and the extent to which
there are fraternal or familial relationships’.
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Whilst concepts of formality and informality have been applied rather
generally, in the light of recent evidence stemming largely from the regula-
tion debate, it has emerged that these constructs have a co-, rather than
counter-, existence and should not be seen as simply emerging from the
interplay of firm size and owner prerogative. Rather, there is a complex
relationship between wider issues such as contemporary market pressures
and how these are articulated within the firm. Moreover, it is simplistic to
perceive informality as irrational, inappropriate or unprofessional. Work
by Ram (1994), Marlow (2002) and Gilman et al. (2002) indicates that
informality facilitates a flexible response to changing environments and so
is positively advantageous to firm survival and stability whilst recognising
that it leaves employees vulnerable to employer prerogative. The manner
in which the study of the employment relationship in small firms is a crit-
ical element in the contemporary analysis of shifting labour management
policy and practice is now clearly acknowledged (Edwards, 2001). This
book will advance the debate further through the consideration of a range
of critical issues in employment relations and how they are articulated,
modified, understood and practised within smaller firms.
So, in chapter 2, Taylor analyses the manner in which HRM theory and
practice has been explored in relation to smaller organisations. The discus-
sion is thought provoking in that it explores Townley’s (1993) argument
which views HRM as a discourse. In so doing, it is suggested that it is
necessary to consider how this discourse is introduced into smaller organi-
sations; to undertake this task it is essential to analyse the structural and
cultural conditions that influence the introduction of HRM into smaller
firms. As such, the notion of HRM as an objective set of policies and pro-
cedures strategically linked to performance enhancement is challenged. In
many ways, the smaller firm emerges as the ‘other’ in organisational
studies as the normative model is that of the complex, hierarchical enter-
prise equipped with appropriate systems to apply new managerial strat-
egies such as HRM, to labour management. Taylor explores this notion,
critically evaluating the presumptions underpinning HRM which demand
sophisticated managerial practices combined with an ideological invest-
ment in the concept of HRM to ensure successful adoption. Taylor draws
two key conclusions: first, that the culture of the firm, of management, of
labour, of HRM and of regulation is a critical mediating influence which
must be understood to fully comprehend differing approaches to labour
management; second, Taylor draws attention to the manner in which
HRM is linked to performance enhancement as it aims to limit indetermi-
nacy between employee effort and output. This approach, however, is not
in accordance with the socially embedded and negotiated employment
relationship more likely to be found in smaller organisations and so leads
to a degree of tension as firms grow and the negotiated stance is gradually
replaced by one which is based upon more structured policy and practice.
Currently, it is argued, the theory to explore this shift is narrow and so
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should be challenged and developed to add to our conceptual knowledge
of the role of HRM.
The discussion by Taylor questions accepted theory and practice
regarding new managerial strategies and their articulation in firms of dif-
fering sizes, so the next chapter by Blackburn, focusing upon methodo-
logical approaches underpinning contemporary knowledge of the
employment relationship, complements this debate. Blackburn begins with
an exploration of the evolution of employment relations research in small
firms; during this analysis the methodological challenges of undertaking
such work are considered. Moving on from this general overview, the
chapter reviews in more depth the degree to which labour management in
small firms has been incorporated into the time series dates captured by
the Workplace Industrial Relations survey (now Employment Relations).
This survey is seen as a barometer by which labour management strat-
egies, policies and practices can be revealed and evaluated and data from
these studies informs a wide range of literatures exploring many different
facets of labour management. So in many ways, that which is included in
this survey is deemed to be the critical core of what actually constitutes the
employment relationship. Given that until the late 1990s, small businesses
were excluded from the survey suggests that, regardless of the fact that
99.1 per cent of enterprises in the UK economy are classed as such and
these firms employ 43 per cent of the private sector workforce (DTI,
2002), the conditions under which labour is managed in these organisa-
tions have only just been considered to be of consequence to the wider
debate.
Hence, whilst the survey methodology in itself has been subject to
critique (see McCarthy, 1994 for example), this discussion advances the
debate further with a consideration of how the adoption of specific
methodological parameters can effectively define that which constitutes
key issues in a field of study. This chapter reveals the growing integration
of small firm labour management research into the mainstream debate and
it is noted that the first WERs study to be published in the twenty-first
century will have again broadened this particular analysis. This chapter
argues that there is now a rich and varied body of research drawing upon
diverse methodologies which serve to illustrate the manner in which
labour is managed in small firms, and moreover this contribution is critical
to the wider understanding of the employment relationship in the
contemporary economy.
An important element of the last chapter focused upon the manner in
which large firms are taken as constituting the normative model of labour
management which leads to a focus upon such organisations to advance
developments in theory and illustrate change in practice. However, it is
argued that such bias leads to a ‘skewed’ picture of what is happening in
the contemporary employment relationship as it offers only a partial view
of events; chapter 4 supports this notion. Traditionally, strategic manage-
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ment was a set of complex practices associated with large, sophisticated
firms and so, by its very constitution, is not utilised in small firms. Despite
developments in the strategy field and particularly, the emergence of
HRM theory with its focus upon the strategic use of labour, smaller firms
have been largely excluded from this debate as it is assumed that firm size
will preclude the utilisation of such management practices which are asso-
ciated with complex, large organisations. This notion is critically evaluated
by Richard Scase through his analysis of sectoral heterogeneity which
draws comparisons between managerial strategies in the traditional manu-
facturing sector and those in the fast growing creative and professional
areas of the economy. From this analysis, it is concluded that the diverse
context within which small firms operate ensures that there can be no all-
embracing operational textbook advice which offers definitive advice upon
the ‘best’ approach to managing small firms. Consequently, strategic man-
agement of large firms is informed by very different considerations to
those of its smaller counterparts, reflecting this assertion, this discussion
draws attention to the way in which firm context shapes the manner in
which strategy is devised and articulated.
One facet of effective strategic development is to enhance opportunities
for individual and organisational learning and training. However, drawing
upon the extant literature, it would appear that smaller firm owners, in
general, invest few resources in formally developing either themselves,
their managers or employees. Empirical evidence (Patton and Marlow,
2002) would indicate that informal approaches to training and learning are
the preferred mode of development and this in itself is considered prob-
lematic. There is a presumption that an absence of formally delivered
training and development with measurable inputs and outputs will con-
tribute to a general erosion of the national skill base and prevent organisa-
tions building strategic capabilities (Harrison, 2002). In chapter 5, Patton
explores this area in more detail challenging the generalisation that ‘small
firms do not train’ with an analysis sensitive to issues of formality and
informality in issues of learning and development. It is overly simplistic to
suggest that training, development and learning which enhances key com-
petencies does not occur in smaller firms, but rather, the manner in which
these practices are articulated will be shaped by firm context and so differ
from the formal large firm model. However, in his analysis of current argu-
ments Patton considers some of the implications of trying to integrate
informal models of training into the mainstream arena, for example, how
to ‘measure’ the extent and impact of training, development and learning
upon the individual, the firm and the economy as a whole. If the aim of the
government is to improve measurably upon the level of skill and compe-
tence in the economy, assessing the contribution of informal training in
smaller firms to this agenda would be challenging. It is recognised,
however, that engaging small firms in the training agenda has proved to
be difficult; as there is little likelihood of regulation in the UK to ensure
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training becomes incorporated into firm practice and policy, alternative
routes are required to address this issue. Drawing upon the extant evidence,
this chapter argues for a more inclusive approach to training and develop-
ment that recognises the value of informal initiatives whilst sensitivity to the
diversity of sectoral needs is key to ensuring that training initiatives are per-
ceived as both relevant and able to add value to the organisation.
So, it is argued that the manner in which teaching, learning and devel-
opment emerges within firms is linked to context. Developing this concept
further, in chapter 6, Ram et al. link the notion of social embeddedness
and the employment relationship; Granovettor’s (1985) theory of mixed
embeddedness argues that economic rationale alone is not sufficient to
explain individual choices and actions, rather, action is influenced by social
and geographical environments. This thesis is particularly useful in the
analysis of the employment relationship where the penetration of the
local/social/cultural environment into labour management practices is
evident. One area of employment which reflects the mixed embeddedness
concept is that of ethnic minority labour; there are notable enclaves of
employment which are dominated by different ethnic minority groups, for
example, the Indian restaurant sector. This chapter analyses the notion of
mixed embeddedness, how this is articulated, what the consequences are
for employment issues and, critically, will draw together theories of
embeddedness and ethnicity whilst demonstrating how the context of firm
size has a fundamental affect upon this relationship. Ram et al. specifically
focus upon the notion of breakout – that is moving away from traditional
ethnic minority business niches – and the strategies firms might use to
achieve this aim. In exploring this process, the chapter finds that reliance
on social networks for key assets such as finance and employees is import-
ant at start up, but if the firm does not broaden its networks, serious
limitations will be placed upon its ability to access alternative sources of
human and social capital. Sectoral location was also found to be influential
in terms of breakout, so for example, the restaurant sector is currently
buoyant but this has attracted growing numbers of enterprises leading to
market saturation. This situation, in itself, has motivated greater creativity
in product and process differentiation, which has in turn required shifts in
labour management strategies to attract new staff with expertise in these
particular areas.
From this analysis of embeddedness it appears that a range of influ-
ences combine in a dynamic and variable fashion to shape the employment
relationship, hence efforts to formalise and regulate labour management
will be potentially disruptive to the organic and negotiated nature of this
relationship. However, successive Labour administrations, elected since
1997, have focused upon labour market regulation as the most appropriate
manner in which to restore ‘fairness at work’ whilst reflecting the social
agenda favoured by the European Union. The Employment Relations Act
(1999), which was an amalgamation of new legislation and statutory
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amendments, aimed to establish a floor of individual employment rights,
offer some limited new rights to trade unions and place ‘family friendly’
policies upon the statute book. Attempts to regulate the employment rela-
tionship have been resisted by employers’ organisations – particularly
small-firm pressure groups – who argued that compliance costs threaten
firm viability whilst stifling enterprise. Exploring such issues in more
detail, in chapter 7, Hart and Blackburn develop an analysis of the labour
regulation debate and the degree to which blanket policy imposition, pre-
suming a degree of homogeneity across the economy with a fixed notion of
universal best practice, can be effective. To add a new dimension to this
debate, the authors also place their arguments in the broader European
context of regulation to assess to what degree the UK does suffer under
any excessive regulatory burden. Drawing upon empirical evidence, the
manner in which regulation and compliance issues are dealt with by
smaller firms and consequent implications for policy development,
employee rights and firm viability are critically evaluated. From this evid-
ence the authors found that contrary to images portrayed by the media
and small business pressure groups, regulation did not emerge as the
primary constraint upon business performance. In fact, market competi-
tion was identified as the greatest challenge in this respect. What has
emerged, however, is that once again, the level of heterogeneity within the
sector is influential; so micro firms reported few negative aspects whilst
those firms who depended heavily upon female employees were more
likely to be affected by new maternity rights. Whilst acknowledging such
diversity within the sector, Hart and Blackburn did note a more generalis-
able negative predisposition regarding regulation even when owner/man-
agers professed to have very little knowledge of the details of such.
Overall however, this chapter does not support the notion that currently,
new regulation is a significant obstacle to small firm development in the
UK, but does draw attention to differences between EU member states
regarding SME perceptions and responses to regulation which reflects
both the pace and intensity of such change.
Having explored recent shifts in regulatory regimes and the manner in
which the context of the firm ensures that unproblematic, informed and
complete compliance is unlikely, the impact of a particular element of
recent regulation is analysed in more detail. The introduction of a
National Minimum Wage (NMW) stimulated wide-ranging debate regard-
ing potential damage to overall economic performance and smaller firms
in particular. It was argued that the marginal position of many smaller
organisations meant that any extra financial demands upon them would
lead to increasing and extensive levels of firm failure (FSB, 2000). Wide-
spread predictions of firm failure, downsizing and constrained perform-
ance do not appear to have been borne out in practice and in chapter 8,
Arrowsmith and Gilman analyse this issue in greater detail drawing upon
debates pertaining to theory, role, utility and impact of a national
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minimum wage across the economy. Given the level of concern articulated
by various interest and pressure groups regarding the potentially damag-
ing effect of this policy upon smaller firms in particular, this issue will be
considered in some depth utilising empirical evidence drawn from a recent
study of the impact of the NMW in such firms. The findings from this study
suggest that notions of fairness were defined using both external bench-
marks, such as local market rates, and internal values of flexibility and
‘give and take’. Whilst the NMW had raised very low wages without the
predicted growth in unemployment, there was a persistence of so called
‘stickiness’ in pay and conditions such that there appear to be relatively
few direct and determinate effects of this regulation.
Arrowsmith and Gilman demonstrate that the manner in which pay is
related to effort and productivity is highly complex and subject to a wide
range of influences and variations. In chapter 9, Cox develops this analysis
of employment reward with a particular focus upon the context of the firm
and how this fashions the construction and perception of payment. Analy-
ses of variable pay systems in the UK are mostly dominated by investiga-
tions of individual performance-related pay. There is very little work
which compares the process of design, implementation and outcomes
across different kinds of variable pay systems and even less into the way
pay and pay systems are managed in smaller organisations. This chapter is
grounded in well established theory pertaining to the significance of
employee involvement and consultation practices and the role of pro-
cedural and distributive justice perceptions in introducing variable pay
schemes.
Drawing from empirical evidence, the debate examines the application
of differing types of variable pay systems. Attention is drawn to the way in
which the design of pay systems is influenced by the nature and size of the
organisations with perceptions of distributive and procedural justice
shaping employee responses to the schemes. The chapter concludes by
assessing how far the management of variable pay systems is typical of,
and dependent upon, the methods used to manage other aspects of the
employment relationship in such firms. The implications for the applica-
tion of organisational justice theory to the study of pay systems within
smaller firms are also assessed.
As noted above, employee involvement and consultation are highly
significant in the determination and perception of payment. In this final
chapter these key elements within the employment relationship are con-
sidered at greater length. Until fairly recently there was a presumption
that smaller firms were more likely to enjoy close, harmonious employ-
ment relations. As noted in this chapter, this thesis has been effectively
challenged with evidence indicating that a complex and shifting range of
influences will impact upon labour management in small firms leading to
varying outcomes (Rainnie, 1989; Ram, 1994; Moule, 1998). Simplistic cor-
relations between size and labour management style have been exposed as
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both inappropriate and inaccurate. However, one area which has
remained rather closed – in terms of evidence and investigation – is that of
employee representation in small firms. A number of presumptions under-
pin this stance; trade unions, as the ‘norm’ of representation are rarely
present; firm owners are hostile to union organising; representation is,
therefore, fragmented and ineffective leaving many small firm employees
without an effective voice.
In this chapter Ryan explores such notions in greater detail. It is cer-
tainly true that unions are no longer synonymous with employee voice in
the UK economy per se (Towers, 1997) so, as suggested by other contribu-
tors, it is no longer appropriate to see small firms as the ‘other’ as union
representation is unusual in this particular area. This chapter explores
issues of voice, communication, consultation and representation and how
these concepts are articulated in smaller firms. Evidence would indicate
that employees in small non-union firms do have informal and negotiated
channels by which they can, to differing and varying degrees, influence
their conditions of employment (Ram, 1994; Marlow, 2002). Such channels
are created and managed by employers and employees reflecting a range
of often disparate influences from the market position of the firm to the
nature of social and personal relationships and so are potentially discrimi-
natory and do not challenge underlying power disparities dependent as
they are upon social ties. Thus, forthcoming regulation – the Information
and Consultation Directive – has some potential to challenge this prefer-
ence and the implications of this are considered in some detail. Hence, this
chapter draws out a range of issues around employee voice and
representation in small organisations to demonstrate that this situation is
not static and can by no means be presumed to be simply atomised and
fragmented.
This collection of essays draws upon a number of key elements in the
contemporary labour management field and illustrates how the context of
the organisation will shape the manner in which they are articulated.
Using a ‘lens’ of firm size, whilst recognising how other variables also
intrude into labour management policy and practice, demonstrates how
core concepts underpinning employment relations are sensitive to context
and so emerge in a shifting and fluid manner.
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2 The hunting of the snark1
A critical analysis of human
resource management discourses in
relation to managing labour in
smaller organisations
Scott Taylor
Introduction: universal labour management systems and
local order
Sometimes when I’m with people who are in equivalent positions to
me you hear views like, ‘well, they’re just cheap labour’… they really
don’t give a shit about the people. They look at a person as, how much
have you turned over for me, how much profit, how little can I keep
you for, and how bad can I make your conditions before the Health
and Safety walk in? The sadness is, bastards often do make a lot of
money. I sat recently with [the owner-manager of a] company, a well-
known company, with 1400 employees – and their [staff] turnover in
the year is 600. One of my girls who [worked] there, she said, ‘I felt as
if I had a job. I walked in and I walked out, and there was nothing in
between’. I’ve had people come to work for me who’ve come up in
that sort of environment, and I’ve had a terrible job breaking through
– if you go up and say good morning you almost see them cower in
front of you, it takes quite a bit of bringing them out, because they
would feel exposed, they’re suspicious. When they’ve been in the
hands of these people, and they’re totally helpless to do anything
about it because they need the money – that really sickens me. I think
they should clear the bloody boardrooms out, because it’s not often
the people.
(Director and department manager, Zincpipe)
As outlined in chapter 1, Edwards (2001) argues that there is a continu-
ally adapting but fundamentally consistent basis for analysing industrial
relations (IR) in work organisations, whatever the sector or context. He
suggests that while managerial labels may change and employment envi-
ronments can be differentiated, a core of critical analytical concepts
endures, amongst which we find the notions of conflict, uncertainty and
tension. Central to this understanding of IR is the pursuit of interests by
groups of employees and managers, and the structured antagonism that
results. In this chapter, it is argued that we can better understand this
dynamic through analysis of the enactment of labour management prac-
tices in the context of human resource management (HRM); that is, the
accomplishment of people management through recruitment, appraisal
and training, within the particular ‘way of ordering’ (Townley, 1993) that
HRM provides. Following Townley, particular attention is paid to the
actions of managing labour within the HRM framework. This approach is
taken to throw light on the management of indeterminacy in work con-
tracts through changing definitions of formality (Ram et al., 2001; see also
chapter 1). In particular, the analysis examines the interstices of organising
people management, where managers and employees must negotiate an
order that both can work with. ‘All activities that affect the provision or
utilisation of human resources within the business unit’ (Arthur and
Hendry, 1990: 233) are open to analysis; however, the symbolism and legit-
imacy associated with HRM are crucial to understanding people manage-
ment (Ferris et al., 1999). This chapter develops an analysis that integrates
the practical working reality with less visible aspects of the discourse. This
approach contrasts with the more common focus on either the individual
or organisation in analysing HRM, wherein priority is given to assessing
goal achievement and efficiency (Wright and Boswell, 2002). The chapter
is informed empirically by a qualitative study of people management prac-
tices in four smaller organisations.2
The chapter begins with a brief review of the historical development of
HRM and its application in British organisational contexts, with a focus on
the ideological nature of the discourse. The descriptive nature of main-
stream HRM research is noted, and it is argued that this approach has sub-
sequently been adopted in research into HRM in the small business
context. The chapter then moves on to consider current research into
HRM and performance; it is argued that this strand of research forms the
basis of exhortations to small business managers to adopt HRM as a prac-
tice and as an ideology in managing people. This dynamic can be seen in a
number of studies that seek to apply HRM or test for its existence in
smaller organisations, and is further manifest in recommendations to
owner-managers to adopt voluntarist state frameworks for people man-
agement, such as Investors in People (IiP), that are informed by the HRM
discourse.3 Recognition of the role of state agencies in legitimating certain
practices, and stimulating managerial adoption of them, is often absent
from research into HRM (de Kok and Uhlaner, 2001). A number of prob-
lematic aspects of the movement of ‘HRM-ism’ (Keenoy, 1999) are out-
lined, and the economic basis of the calls to adopt the discourse is noted.
The chapter then presents managerial and employee experiences of
people management in four smaller organisations, focusing especially on
the nature of formality and the changing basis of enactment over time.
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This serves to provide a contrast to surveys that provide a momentary
picture of intent (Ram et al., 2001), and to highlight the iterative process of
people management enactment and formalisation. It is argued that the
HRM discourse is not adopted in the organisations; rather, it forms one
aspect of people management processes that are in continual flux and
under constant contestation.
Thus, the rationale of this chapter is in part to question the association
of smaller organisations and HRM in two contexts. First, the academic, in
which HRM practices are presented as the answer to managerial dif-
ficulties, particularly during expansion. Second, in the policy area, where
the ideology of HRM informs legislation and state sponsored initiatives.
The approach taken enables the analysis of both the practices within the
HRM discourse, and the ideological underpinnings. It is not the aim of the
chapter to simply argue against either the practices or the theory of HRM;
rather, the intent is to question the unproblematic application of the dis-
course to smaller organisations. The chapter is intended as a counterpoint
to the numerous calls for managers in smaller organisations to adopt an
HRM approach to managing people.
As part of this, two alternative means of understanding the relation
between discourses of HRM and labour management in smaller organisa-
tions, other than the functionalist or positivist, are explored. First, it is
argued that more attention should be given to the role of HRM discourses
in seeking to minimise indeterminacy in the management of the labour
process (Townley, 1993) in smaller organisations. Such an approach would
enable a conceptualisation of power relations within people management
processes, and provide an alternative to functionalist studies of
HRM–performance links. In addition, it would focus attention on how,
why and with what effects people management frameworks are enacted,
moving away from mock scientific (Van Maanen, 1995) analyses of the
efficiency or effectiveness of techniques and procedures. Second, relatedly,
it is suggested that people management practices in smaller, non-
mainstream4 organisations may be conditioned more by cultural contexts
than formalised economic considerations, and that analyses of people
management in smaller organisations should recognise this more than cur-
rently is the case (de Kok and Uhlaner, 2001). This contributes to the
argument that adoption of individual practices and adherence to dis-
courses such as HRM are complex and conditioned by a wider variety of
dynamics beyond the economic or functional.
Developing HRM: practice and ideology
Exploring the nature of HRM can take a number of empirical or theo-
retical forms. This chapter takes the approach that investigation of how a
discourse of HRM emerged and has been legitimated is of more interest
than assuming that it reflects an ‘external facticity’ (Townley, 1994:22) of
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managerial practice. Such an analysis takes into account the many stake-
holders involved in developing ‘HRM-ism’: personnel managers, acade-
mics, consultants, professional bodies and state agencies (Keenoy, 1999).
Our understanding of HRM as a discourse is thus seen as a complex inter-
play of practitioner, academic, policymaker and student.5 It is also relevant
to note at this point that managers in smaller organisations are often
argued to be excluded from such processes of discourse formation (Gibb,
1987).
Academically, HRM as a clearly articulated approach to managing
labour is rooted in a series of publications emanating from Harvard and
Michigan universities (Tichy et al., 1982; Beer et al., 1984; Fombrun et al.,
1984). An extended treatment of the shift from labelling people manage-
ment as ‘personnel’ to the discourse of HRM was set out by Lundy (1994)
where she argues that incorporation of strategy, either as a language or as
a practice, is the key indicator in assessing any purported move away from
personnel to HRM. Such an understanding of people management empha-
sises the developing professionalism of both HR managers and labour
management itself. Linkages with organisational performance are also
central to this process, expanding the managerial role beyond basic func-
tional tasks (Ferris et al., 1999). This argument has been used many times
to support the claim that HRM provides an approach to managing labour
in large companies that is significantly different from the old personnel
approach (Guest, 1987; Boxall, 1992).
In contrast, it is easy to find arguments that support the ‘old wine in
new bottles’ (Armstrong, 1987) criticism that is applied to HRM; the
primary contention here is that HRM may be seen as a re-labelling of per-
sonnel management more than anything else, as part of the ongoing
process of professionalisation that personnel managers are caught up in
(Lupton, 1964; Bell et al., 2001). Survey evidence appears to support the
contention that personnel managers in the UK have mutated only very
slowly into HR managers (Cully et al., 1999), and a number of best-selling
textbooks continue to juxtapose personnel management with HRM (e.g.
Torrington and Hall, 1995; Bach and Sisson, 2000). Wright (1994) provides
a systematic analysis of textbooks under both flags, concluding that there
is a clear focus on the same subjects in terms of practical action, while Tor-
rington (1989) argued at length that the concept of HRM was merely per-
sonnel management ‘moved on a bit’. The newly constituted HR manager
does, however, take on a role defined by service to the organisational
bottom line, moving away from welfarist roots and the old organisational
identity as a social reformer or humane bureaucrat. Responsibility for
design and implementation of recruitment and selection, appraisal,
payment systems and training is retained, but the ideology underpinning
the actions has changed.
This distinction between the practices that HR managers are respons-
ible for, and the linguistic changes that becoming an HR manager rather
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than a personnel manager involves, is central to understanding the con-
struction of HRM as a discourse. The dichotomous representation of the
practical ‘essences’ (Eccles and Nohria, 1992) of people management, and
the ideology of HRM, is however only a heuristic to come to an under-
standing of both sides of the HRM coin. In practice, the two are insep-
arable (Townley, 1993). At the broadest level, personnel management is
traditionally concerned with four basic realms of organising labour: bring-
ing in new staff (recruitment and selection), methods of paying staff
(payment systems), performance appraisal (or management), and training
or development. It is unlikely that an HRM textbook could be found that
would not include substantial sections on each. Clearly, a wide variety of
managerial and organisational dynamics can be chosen through which to
illustrate and theorise the basic action.
This approach, according to Legge (1995), can be seen as the normative
or aspirational model of personnel.6 Personnel managers are explicitly
advised of the best way to maximise production through efficient use of
human resources, in contrast with the descriptive-functional model, in
which the regulation of employment relations and discipline are emphas-
ised. This second framework recognises that people, managers and capital
owners may not share the same, or even similar, goals. Personnel man-
agers in this perspective are also acknowledged as working within organi-
sational power relations, at a micro-political between-managers level, and
at a collective level.
Beyond this is the critical-evaluative model, within which Legge’s (1978,
1989, 1995) own work falls. This understanding of the activities of person-
nel management seeks to incorporate the inequality and power relations
that characterise ‘working for capital’, and to assess activities and associ-
ated languages as discourses. This is the rarest analytical perspective taken
in seeking to understand personnel management, yet potentially one of
the most theoretically fruitful. Townley (1989, 1994), for example,
explores the ways in which everyday personnel management activities may
be seen as means of constituting subjectivity at work. These analyses
locate personnel management as just one aspect of the development of a
disciplinary society, in which employees may find themselves working
within a matrix of power that seeks to define them as individuals to be
‘produced’ through personnel practices. HRM may thus be seen as provid-
ing means to measure the many tangible and subjective dimensions of
labour, with the promise of rendering individual behaviours predictable
and individual labour calculable (Townley, 1993).
The final category of Legge’s (1995) typology is termed the descriptive-
behavioural model of personnel. This thread of research takes as its focus
the status and role of personnel professionals within large and complex
work organisations. As Legge outlines, key issues here include the gen-
dered nature of the personnel profession (which has arguably changed
significantly since the advent of HRM), and a number of connotations
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attaching to the function that personnel managers have long sought to
discard; bureaucratic, interfering, ineffectual and out of touch with busi-
ness reality (i.e. not always focused on economic outcomes), for example.
This approach to understanding HRM is an enduring concern of practi-
tioners and the professional body that regulates personnel and HR man-
agement, the Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development (CIPD),
and it is a dynamic that will be echoed later in this chapter.
The next section assesses a recent development in the discourse of
HRM that provides a category on its own: the performative model. The
academic study of HRM is currently much concerned with attempting to
construct models of labour management that show causal (or at least cor-
relative) relations between individual or bundled people management
practices and performance. The section focuses on two issues: first,
whether the proxy measures that are used to indicate whether an ‘HRM
approach’ is being enacted are appropriate to smaller organisations, and
second, the ideological aims of this strand of labour management research.
It is argued that this conceptualisation of labour management practices is
more appropriate in a large firm context both in terms of practice, and in
relation to the discourse employed to legitimate it. The defining feature of
this project, it is suggested, relates to supporting HR managers in contexts
where micro-political battles must be fought to ensure their own and the
department’s status.
HRM and performance: individual and collective
In addition to seeking to link personnel management with organisational
strategy and corporate performance, the systematic focus within HRM dis-
course on individual performance, on exploiting the labour resource more
fully (Storey, 1992), distinguishes it from previous ideas of people manage-
ment. This emphasis was embedded within HRM from the outset, and has
provided academics and consultants with a research agenda since; to
prove, using positivist methods, what is an article of faith within the pro-
fession and aspirational how-to books. This section explores the progress
so far in this endeavour, and questions whether this approach to HRM
research should also inform analysis of people management practices in
smaller organisations in the manner in which it has done so.
Studies in the area of HRM and performance have become so numer-
ous, particularly in the UK and the US, that it is more practical to review
summary articles that gauge progress towards demonstrating correlations
between HRM and performance (see, for example, Paauwe and Richard-
son, 1997; Guest, 2001; Wright and Boswell, 2002). It has proven consis-
tently difficult to show clear causal relations between HR practices and
corporate performance; hence, more effort is currently being expended on
classifying HR practices under broader categories that summarise an
organisation’s approach to labour management (Wright and Boswell,
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2002). Thus, we find the ‘skills’ approach that focuses on attracting and
developing highly skilled employees, the ‘motivational’ approach with
emphasis on stimulating performance, and the ‘empowerment’ category,
that seeks to enable employee voice and influence.
Studies seeking to demonstrate causal links7 between managerial prac-
tice and performance are being conducted with increasing frequency.
However, despite the breadth of empirical data and the range of proposi-
tions that are emerging from this work, linkages remain stubbornly diffi-
cult to demonstrate. Certainty or even reliability is elusive, and
conclusions continue to be highly contingent or tentative. In a recent effort
to dispel the fog and confusion around this area, Guest (2001) assesses the
state of the field in depth from a methodological perspective. The recogni-
tion that ‘abstracted empiricism’ may be the result of too little theory
development and too much emphasis on collecting data is central to this
review. This extended reflection is worth examining in detail, as Guest
(1997, 1999; see also Guest and Conway, 1999; Guest et al., 2000a) is a
leading exponent of empirical research in the UK assessing relations
between HRM and performance, and as such is a key figure in the con-
struction of the discourse of HRM that is being applied to or recom-
mended for managers in smaller organisations.
Guest (2001) argues that three conceptual areas remain unclear in
seeking to assess relations between labour management practices and
performance: the relationship between HRM and performance, what
performance measures are to be used, and the nature of HRM itself. For
the nature of HRM, it is argued that researchers should make use of one
of two strategies: either adopt one of the normative ‘listing’ models pro-
posed (e.g. Storey, 1992; Pfeffer, 1998), or adapt the high-commitment or
high-performance models of HRM. In order to measure the implementa-
tion of the practices, Guest acknowledges that relatively crude proxies to
indicate managerial uptake of practices are used.
This approach has been taken by studies that test for HRM in smaller
organisations (e.g. Duberley and Walley, 1995; Bacon et al., 1996).
Although these studies take a more sensitive approach, engaging more
with the world and interpretations of the owner-manager, extensive use
is still made of indicators of people management ‘sophistication’ such as
psychometric testing, delayering or culture change programmes. As might
be expected in organisations employing fewer than 200 people, with three
or perhaps four hierarchical levels and an approach to recruitment and
selection that relies on friends and family, scores on such measures are
often low. Such results would suggest that an alternative approach to
understanding the people management policies or practices in smaller
organisations might be more meaningful, both academically and in
practice.
The relevance of such research can also be questioned at other levels.
Ferris et al. (1999) argue that researchers are no longer driven by the con-
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cerns or problems of managers. Instead, the primary concern appears to be
the development of a scientifically robust or respectable theory of HRM,
becoming more methodology or data driven, and ultimately lacking prac-
tical implications or even meaningfulness for those working in organisations.
Research becomes relevant only to the academic community producing it –
‘academic’ in the worst sense. In addition to this criticism, it might be argued
that the scientific approach also lacks relevance in seeking to understand the
fundamental terms and concepts of the labour management debate (see
chapter 1). The implications of such ‘disconnects’ (Buckley et al., 1998) are
varied, and explored further in the final section of this chapter.
In addition, Guest (2001) seeks to take the analysis of the HRM-
performance literature further through exploring the measurement of out-
comes which are examined for reliability and objectivity. Unfortunately,
little evidence of either is found; nor can subjective measures (such as self-
reporting – managers estimating organisational performance according to
their perceptions) be relied upon. Guest acknowledges that access to
outcome measures (such as absence or turnover) is often problematic at
two levels: in deciding which metric to use, and in gauging the relationship
between measures. As Shenhav et al. (1994) note, the notion of perform-
ance is characterised by conceptual confusion and operational pragma-
tism. They suggest that this undermines the claims of positivistic
management research to ‘normal science’ status, casting doubt on the
potential of the HRM-performance research to make sense to either acad-
emics or practitioners even on its own terms.
Finally, Guest (2001) also suggests that the involvement of economists
in researching the linkage of people management techniques and perform-
ance is a positive and key theoretical development. This is reflected in the
work of US-based HRM researchers, such as Ulrich (1997), who argues
that HRM must respond to a ‘new mandate’ that is defined quantitatively,
using econometric measurement techniques. It is this core contention that
this chapter seeks to question. It underlies the discourse of HRM as
represented by the professional body of personnel managers, the Char-
tered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD),8 and the promotion
of HRM-related state initiatives such as Investors in People (Bell et al.,
2001). This area of research seeks above all to prove the intuitive feeling
of personnel professionals – that people management practices can make a
difference to measurable organisational outcomes. The approach taken by
studies that take practices such as psychometric testing as indicative of
HRM sophistication, or define organisational performance through vari-
ables such as absence, however, may not be the best means through which
to understand managerial practice or approach in smaller organisations.
Notwithstanding, empirical research into HRM in smaller firms has often
taken this approach, and managers in such enterprises are encouraged to
implement HRM practices as a route to improved performance; the next
section provides a brief review of research that adopts this approach.
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Bringing smaller organisations in: seeking HRM in smaller
organisations
A number of studies focusing on growth in smaller organisations propose
adoption of professionally legitimated HRM frameworks as the answer to
problems in managing people. Amba-Roe and Pendse (1985), for example,
argue that if managers fail to formalise personnel management procedures
as employee numbers increase, the number of personnel-related problems
will increase; in a similar vein, Mazzarol (2003) presents a model in which
formalisation of HRM policy and practice is located as an integral aspect
of growth. In contrast to these prescriptive recommendations, descriptive
research has consistently found that owner-managers in smaller organisa-
tions retain personal control over HR planning and implementation for
longer than most other managerial functions (Ardichvili et al., 1998).
Accounting functions, for example, are released to other staff at a much
earlier point. This paradox highlights two aspects of people management
that are central to the analysis presented in this chapter: control and inde-
terminacy. It might be argued that owner-managers retain control over
personnel or HR issues for longer due to a perception of control over
employees, or perhaps that control is only reluctantly released as a result
of the inherent indeterminacy of managing people – better to have that
indeterminacy on one’s own desk where it can be seen. The overall picture
is of owner-managers who find it at best difficult to address HR issues
(Wilkinson, 1999), expressing scepticism about formalising methods of
managing labour (Carroll et al., 1999) and reluctant to employ people
management professionals (de Kok and Uhlaner, 2001). Thus, it is fre-
quently argued that the implementation or avoidance of HR policies in
smaller organisations is dependent on the personal attitude or beliefs of
the owner-manager (Matlay, 1999; Mazzarol, 2003). Such a finding is
wholly consistent with understandings of larger organisations, where the
relevance of the values, beliefs and personal approach of the dominant
coalition of managers to strategic decision-making is well established
(Child, 1972).
This area of research focuses on managerial agency within the smaller
organisation, and how actions might be influenced by encouraging the
introduction of more formal policies or practices. A crucial omission,
however, is the lack of recognition of the nature of culture in managerial
decision-making (de Kok and Uhlaner, 2001). In common with other areas
of social science (Archer, 1988), debates on the nature of employment
relations in smaller organisations have focused on the interplay of agency
and structure (e.g. Rainnie, 1989; Ram, 1994; Barrett and Rainnie, 2002).
However, the notion of small business culture invoked as a backdrop to
analysis is often homogenising, not least in defining the field as different
from large organisation research. As Archer (1988) argues, the notion of
culture in social research has traditionally prioritised two strands of analy-
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sis: the idea of a unified, coherent patterning of meaning, and uniformity
of activity within the cultural context. These can exist independently of
each other; thus, meaning may be patterned across contexts, but this may
not always be accompanied by uniformity of action (cf. Ram et al., 2001).
Approaches to understanding the management of people that are based
on ‘size determinism’, underpinned by an assumption of integration of
action within a unified cultural system of small business management, may
underestimate the range and diversity of practice and experience.
Elements of this homogenising approach are evident in UK-based
studies of HRM in smaller organisations, such as Bacon et al. (1996) and
Duberley and Walley (1995). These studies are sensitive to incorporating
the ideological elements of HRM analytically; however, they also repro-
duce the approach of studies from the US that seek normative HRM.
Thus, Duberley and Walley (1995) sought evidence of HRM in small and
medium sized business units (i.e. not all independent companies). The
research was conducted in 16 organisations employing between 120 and
425 people; interviews were conducted with a selection of managers and
employees to gauge the presence of Storey’s (1992) 27 indicators of HRM.
A number of features of this study are worth noting. First, the definition of
what constitutes a small firm is flexible, to the point of losing meaning,
both in terms of number of employees and in relation to more qualitative
aspects of definition (such as ownership). Second, the application of a
framework developed through research in very large organisations in the
expectation that comparisons can be drawn to ‘the small business sector’ is
problematic.
A second study conducted at a similar time (Bacon et al., 1996) investi-
gated ‘independent’ organisations (i.e. not subsidiary business units),
employing fewer than 200 people; almost half of the sample consists of
companies that fall into the 15 to 24 employees category. In this study,
eleven indicators of the ‘new management agenda’ were tested for through
telephone surveys with managers, and 13 companies were chosen for
follow-up visits to interview the owner-managers. A number of conclu-
sions from this study further illustrate the difficulty of using this approach.
First, it is suggested that the standard of management, measured against
the HRM norms being tested, is ‘higher’ than might be expected. It is
further noted that managers interviewed were often unaware of the exist-
ence of HRM as a ‘management theory’, while simultaneously implement-
ing many of its practical components. This is taken to indicate that small
business managers may not be as far behind as is sometimes presumed.
However, this argument implies that HRM is much more than a set of new
practices within a changing discourse of people management; it suggests
that it is an aspiration, something that should be aimed for. This in turn
assumes that managers in smaller organisations need the legitimated
version of HRM in order to manage effectively and efficiently. This is, to
say the least, questionable. As noted above, the ability of HRM as practice
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or ideology to improve either individual or organisational performance
remains in question (Dyer and Reeves, 1995; Becker and Gerhart, 1996).
Second, this study works with an understanding of employment relations
in small firms that focuses exclusively on the ‘bleak house’ scenario
advanced by Rainnie (1989). This ignores more sophisticated under-
standings of the negotiated order that characterises management–labour
relations (Ram, 1994; Holliday, 1995). Incorporation of these conceptuali-
sations of employment relations in small firms might aid in understanding
the nature of people management practices, as less emphasis is placed on
formal procedures and processes, while more insight is gained into the
everyday working reality of managers and employees.
In sum, while such studies increase our understanding of managerial
attitudes and the implementation of specific practices from within the
HRM discourse, a number of difficulties exist with drawing conclusions
about a homogeneous ‘small firm sector’ from them. HRM is a profoundly
influential discourse that conditions the management of employment rela-
tions, academically, in practice, and ideologically. It has both stimulated
and reflected attitudes towards management and the experience of being
managed. Previous studies that report on the incidence of HRM in smaller
firms have not, however, reflected the complexity of employment relations
within the context. In addition, hunting for ‘the HRM’ through testing for
the existence of codified practices, as indicators of adherence to
contemporary discourses of employment relations, without incorporating
analysis of the structural or cultural conditions of labour management,
provides only a small part of the picture.
The next section consists of an empirically informed outline of
employee management practices in four smaller organisations. The analyt-
ical focus centres on the practical actions that managers and employees
experience in managing and being managed, in relation to recruitment and
selection, training and development, and performance appraisal. The
effort–wage bargain in the form of payment systems forms a thread that
runs through the experience of people management, conditioning the
employment relationship as formulated through the managerial practices.
Finally, this next section provides further discussion of the potential that
the HRM discourse and people management activities in smaller organisa-
tions have to inform each other.
Making context concrete: tensions between HRM and
managing labour in smaller organisations
This empirical section focuses then on the management of labour in four
smaller organisations in the northwest of England. Each firm employs
around 50 people; two are in the light manufacturing sector, two in busi-
ness services. Of the four firms, three are independently owned and one is
a wholly owned subsidiary of a Danish parent. In total, more than 60 inter-
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views were conducted across the four organisations; data were also col-
lected through periods of non-participant observation, from firm docu-
mentation, and through unrecorded conversations.
The four enterprises represented here are Diamondcom, Bodywork,
Zincpipe and Gearbox. Diamondcom provides telecommunications ser-
vices to organisations and individuals, and is the second firm founded by
the four friends who own it; they decided to found the business after
selling their first business when it became too big (at around 200
employees) to manage between them. Diamondcom has been trading for
around eight years. The three main departments are sales, customer rela-
tions and technology development. Bodywork also provides a service, pro-
viding temporary workers to larger organisations. The enterprise was
founded in the late 1980s by two friends, one of whom subsequently left
‘to spend more time on the golf course’ (as one of the current owner-
managers put it). The firm is now owned by the remaining founder and his
wife, the finance manager. Zincpipe is a light engineering firm, supplying
parts to the chemical and drug industries. Again, it was founded in the late
1980s, as a result of one of the founders developing and patenting an inno-
vative method of extruding plastic. Since then, the organisation has
changed hands numerous times, sometimes being independently owned,
sometimes owned by a larger parent; at the time of the empirical work, it
had recently been the subject of a management buy-out led by four people
external to the firm, funded by venture capitalists. Finally, Gearbox pro-
vides gearing parts to the motor manufacturing industry; at the time of the
research process, it was in the process of being sold by a German parent to
a Danish multinational. This sample of organisations provided a means of
exploring people management practices in three structural contexts: inde-
pendently owned, independently managed but owned by venture capital-
ists, and owned by a parent company. The enactment and experience of
the core activities of personnel management was however broadly compa-
rable across the four firms.
As Curran and Blackburn (2001) note, and as is explored in depth else-
where in this collection, issues of definition are central to much research
that is located within the ‘small business’ field. It is important to recognise
that this research is located within a size band (20–49 employees) that
constitutes only 1.3 per cent of the total number of businesses in the UK
and 6.9 per cent of employment. Thus, the analysis presented here does
not claim to represent managerial dynamics in all small and medium-sized
enterprises; rather, it is intended to provide a picture of the everyday
experience of management and being managed within organisations that
are neither very small nor very large (cf. Bresnen and Fowler, 1996). The
empirical work presented here was guided by a number of methodological
dynamics and primary amongst these was the need to gain access to gather
qualitative data through a slow, relatively long process. This involved
extensive negotiation with individuals, both before data collection
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(organisational access) and during it (permission to interview employees
and maintain a presence in work areas). This, in turn, generated an oppor-
tunistic approach to selecting the organisations to be studied (cf. Holliday,
1995); ultimately, analytical insight rather than statistical representative-
ness was sought. A commitment to represent the many voices within the
organisations was maintained throughout. Thus, the organisations selected
for study share some characteristics, and in other respects may be differen-
tiated. More importance is placed on contextualisation and complexity of
representation (Mead, 1953), to provide a rich description of practice and
meaning, from which to extract analytical commonalities.
Knowledgeable recruitment
Recruitment and selection is the HRM activity most highly regulated by
the state; it is also commonly represented as crucial to firms, the first step
in constructing a useful employee (Jacques, 1996). As such, it is also
central to the employee experience of work organisations, as the first
impressions and initial contact with ‘how things are done’ can be part of
the mutual selection process. Analysis of recruitment and selection in
smaller organisations tends to focus on the role of friends and family
and the social embeddedness of the process (Holliday and Letherby,
1993; Ram and Holliday, 1993), and this is a prominent aspect of the
processes at the four case study companies. However, this section also
explores the power relations of such recruitment and selection procedures,
and the tensions between the empirical evidence presented here and
normative HRM.
Both employees and managers play an active part in the recruitment
process, suggesting family and acquaintances for vacancies, or sometimes
canvassing for a vacancy to be created for an unemployed friend. Many
relate their application to domestic circumstances; some were born and
brought up in the area of the organisation, others had moved to the area
to join a partner. Such stories demonstrate the importance of real and
‘fictive’ kin (Rose-Ebaugh and Curry, 2000), and the rights that attach to
membership of such a network. Responsibilities also attach to member-
ship; however, those recruited through this method often go on to recom-
mend friends and family for recruitment, and the proposer takes some
responsibility for the recruited. Managers at the firms recognise that this
could place employees in an invidious position, making the sponsor
responsible for the performance and behaviour of the kin recruit. Another
aspect of these highly effective networks of recruiters and prospective
recruits is the speed with which people could be found and put to work.
Many spoke of coming in to see either the owner-managers or departmen-
tal manager, filling out a short application form, and starting work days
later.
This results in highly localised employee populations; one manager at
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Zincpipe travels forty miles to work there, a distance seen by colleagues as
exceptional. The three independently owned companies are located within
a short distance of the locale where the owners grew up and live. Man-
agers recognise this as problematic when they speak of being ‘in the
sticks’; the location of the four firms is seen as restrictive in relation to the
pool of potential employees. However, they also emphasised the discipli-
nary advantages of employing people who are less likely to ‘rip us off’
(owner-manager, Diamondcom) because they and the firm are an integral
part of the local economic community.
This also means that siblings, parents and children, and close friends
work together, a dynamic that affects the employment relationship. At a
basic level, managers and employees are able to make recruitment and
selection decisions on the basis of high levels of knowledge, unmediated
by scientific selection tools such as psychometric tests. Information is col-
lected from friends and family, within the firm and in the local community,
to inform the decision. However, once the local person has been recruited,
this information network continues, according to one employee at
Zincpipe, to operate in local pubs, clubs and other ‘non-work’ social
locales, where behaviour may be monitored and reported back to man-
agers – effectively, an informal appraisal network that extends beyond the
workplace and job tasks to include normative judgements of character.
However, managerial reliance on these methods may also be seen as
fragile. All four businesses are on the edge of the accepted definition of
small, and employees recognise this as making a difference to the
experience of work. The firms are perceived to be less embedded in local
communities than previously, during start-up, and less rewarding to work
in. This process of ‘estrangement’ from the local community is reflected in
the introduction of more formal, rational methods of managing labour
(Taylor, 2003), generating tensions in how work and the role of the organi-
sation are understood. A number of employees told how they no longer
recommend kith and kin to managers, as the organisations are either no
longer secure or ‘family-ish’ any more.
These processes can be contrasted with managerial accounts of recruit-
ment and selection. Managerial interviewees describe this aspect of HRM
in quite different terms to their employees. In particular, a manager at
Bodywork presented a highly formalised, complex process involving
adverts in newspapers, repeated visits to the firm by the prospective
employee, and a series of selection exercises such as role-playing and intel-
ligence testing. This narrative was not supported by accounts of the
process from employees in his department. In addition, an owner-manager
at Diamondcom objected strongly to a question relating to recruitment of
employees through kinship networks, arguing that such practices may have
been used during the start-up phase but had since been replaced by a more
formal selection procedure. She went on to describe this process, reflecting
both formalisation and the retention of social embeddedness:
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I had to bring in half a dozen people like that [snaps fingers]. I asked
Harry [to help] – we always have Harry, he’s like a consultant – suits
him, suits us, works fine. I like to interview my own people, I hand-
pick them, and I’m an unorthodox interviewer as well, which will go
down like a ton of bricks [laughs and points to tape recorder].
Anyway, Harry did all the legwork, sifted [the applications], listed
them with attributes. I told him the sort of person I was looking for –
women have got to have balls, they’ve got to be over twenty or at least
mature in outlook, because they’re dealing with our customers and I
can’t afford any slip-ups. If they can’t use a computer I can teach them
that, but they’ve got to be the right sort of character – I’m going for
personality. I sat there for two days [in the hotel where interviews
were conducted], came down the morning after with the photographs
and how the analysis of the very simple test came out … and they’re
all sat out there now, all happy. And it’s a tough job to learn, it’s a
hard slog and it was hard on the original ones ’cause they had to keep
the work moving plus teach someone else.
Here, limited formalisation is combined with ‘finger in the air’
decisions, personal control of the process is retained at all stages (through
the use of a friendly ‘outsider’), and objective methods such as testing are
used alongside a judgement as to whether candidates have ‘balls’. Such
combinations of method and process are common across the four firms;
candidates either walk in speculatively or come through recommendation
from an existing employee, some testing or interviewing is done (primarily
to ensure that the candidate will ‘get on’ with the existing employees), and
the person is taken on. When such rituals are not followed, however, con-
flict can be the result. Employees at Gearbox spoke without enthusiasm of
how the site manager brought both of his sons into the factory as summer
holiday trainees without any due process at all.
It may be that these contradictory accounts reflect a desire on the part
of managers not to be seen as recruiting through informal methods. A
number of reasons might underpin this: the legal implications of managing
in this way, the interview situation itself in which managers perceive them-
selves being ‘tested’ as to their managerial competence, or perhaps a
desire to provide an account that conforms to ‘good practice’ as represen-
ted in managerial frameworks. Whatever the reason, such contradictions
and tensions are indicative of the tensions inherent to managing people in
such organisations, and the variety of discourses that affect managerial
decisions.
Developing appraisal: watching and learning
If recruitment and selection are seen as the managed processes that bring
new employees into the organisation, training and development is the
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means through which the individual is made into a useful, productive
member. It is cited as the part of labour management in small firms that is
most problematic, particularly during expansion (Greening et al., 1996),
yet paradoxically it is traditionally the area about which we know least,
qualitatively (Pettigrew et al., 1990).
Training and development in all four firms begins with induction,
usually by the individual with nominal responsibility for ‘personnel’, focus-
ing on health and safety, buildings layout, use of machinery or computers,
and any quality management procedures – as an employee at Bodywork
put it: ‘You don’t just put your bum on a seat, there’s a certain way of
doing it and you have to meet certain standards in doing it.’ Beyond this,
many employees experience an ‘in at the deep end’ initial period in the
firms, as managers are out of the office or off ill – perhaps indicating that
the speed of the recruitment process may also be related to a need for
someone to fill in quickly.
After induction, employees are expected to pick up both job tasks and
enterprise norms from watching and learning in the environment. Man-
agers emphasised that the physically small nature of the enterprises
enables this process, particularly at Bodywork. The finance manager there
noted that if her department takes on more staff, desks would have to be
hanging from the ceiling; even the toilet on that floor of the building is
converted to house filing cabinets. However, as well as employees picking
up technical skills and behavioural norms from each other, this method of
localised training enables managers to keep an eye on new employees.
Performance appraisal is not difficult, as managers noted, if the person is
sitting in the same room as you or even across a shared deskspace. Identi-
fying training needs is also less subject to formal procedures in this
context, as managers observe working practices and form assessments of
performance.
These methods of training are presented as ‘first-class’ (owner-manager,
Bodywork) or ‘highly effective’ (owner-manager, Diamondcom);
employees however, can find them more problematic. Responsibility for
transferring skills and knowledge is placed on the individual employee
seeking training, and his/her colleagues with the knowledge. This results in
continual negotiation between employees, often over-ridden by demands
of customers or production. Trainers express frustration at being ‘landed’
with someone to teach, and employees express unhappiness with the lack
of formal qualifications available. Training is presented as the first casualty
when there is a need to ‘get stuff out the door’ (employee, Gearbox). In
addition, the introduction of a formal timesheet system (at Zincpipe) to
inform performance appraisal means that there is even less incentive to
take time out of productive work to train employees. Finally, payment
systems based on employee skills levels measured by the range of func-
tions that can be performed are undermined by lack of formal training
procedures, and the ad-hoc provision of skills development.
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It has been argued that owner-managers may be reluctant both to
support training financially and to release employees during work time, as
there is a fear that the newly skilled employee will leave for another
organisation. This has been related to the lack of ‘vertical complexity’
(Daft, 1986) within smaller organisations, as employees are unable to
move up through a status and financial hierarchy. This lack of a ‘bureau-
cratic climbing-frame’ to symbolise progression (Scarbrough and Burrell,
1996) stimulated a number of employees in the four firms to leave for local
competitors (many of whom subsequently returned), and one outlined
how he became active in the trade union as a result of frustration at lack of
progression.9
The final aspect of training and development relates to managerial com-
petence. This is treated in more detail elsewhere as part of negotiating
managerial legitimacy (Taylor et al., 2002), but it may also be seen as a
means of understanding power relations through personnel procedures.
Within all four firms, four levels of hierarchy were clearly defined: lower
level employees, supervisors, departmental managers, and senior or
owner-managers. A high proportion of the departmental and senior man-
agers interviewed had little or no managerial training, often having
‘become’ managers through length of service. Others, however, are new to
the organisation, and this group may be split into two categories: skilled
and unskilled. Skilled managers are perceived by employees as having the
ability to do the jobs employees do, while unskilled have come from other
industries or sectors. Employees are not slow to remind managers that
they have less understanding of production processes, often through
‘banter’ with a sharp edge to it. In return, managers deride the level of
skill needed to perform basic job tasks such as metal cutting or customer
cold calling, telling employees that ‘monkeys’ (production manager,
Zincpipe) could be taken on to replace them. Ultimately, however, man-
agers retain the prerogative to set payment levels, performance targets, or
enable more formal training, demonstrating that the labour management
process, formalised or not, will be conditioned by power relations.
HRM in smaller organisations: organisational and cultural
barriers
This brief exploration of some aspects of labour management in four
smaller organisations is intended to illustrate the arguments of the
chapter. These arguments are founded on approaching HRM from a dif-
ferent perspective to that previously taken in studies of personnel manage-
ment in small firms. It is of crucial importance that HRM is understood
not only as a set of codified practices, a basis for professional managerial
practice, or as an aspiration that might lead to improved performance.
Rather, the analysis presented in this chapter suggests that in order to
understand the dynamics of managing employees in smaller organisations,
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and the interplay of managerial agency, legislative structure and culture
that surrounds the employment relationship in smaller organisations,
HRM must be treated as a discursive formation that rests on concepts of
(economic) rationality, measurement and assessment (Townley, 1993).
The employment relationship also exists within structural and cultural
frameworks. Managers in smaller firms are notoriously resistant to regula-
tion, valuing their own agency above wider social ideals represented in
such legislation as the National Minimum Wage Agreement (see chapter
8) or the Employment Relations Act (Atkinson and Taylor, 2003). If man-
agers in smaller firms are able to resist both voluntarist initiatives (such as
Investors in People) and state labour regulation, then there can be little
hope that they will take up HRM good practice, no matter how much they
are exhorted to by the CIPD or business advisors. This potentially leaves
firms to fall into the ‘black hole’ of labour management unmediated by
trade unions, legislation or cultural norms. A number of cultural barriers
are also cited when commentators suggest how to ‘improve’ managerial
practice within smaller organisations. Lack of resources to train specialists,
lack of complexity to employ specific functional managers, lack of famil-
iarity with management theory, disinclination to seek or take advice on
management – all are raised as issues that mitigate against the adoption of
modern best practice in analysing why managerial practice in smaller
organisations remains stubbornly rooted in an alternative way of thinking
and acting. This chapter is concerned to question such analysis, for a
number of reasons.
First, the smaller organisation is cast as lacking. Whether the lack is
financial or in expertise, managers of smaller firms are presented as not
doing enough or trying hard enough to catch up with cutting edge practice.
This fails to acknowledge the difference in context and aims that smaller
organisations embody. Second, a significant proportion of the proxy mea-
surement of whether HRM is being practised (such as psychometric
testing for selection, culture change programmes or delayering) are either
inappropriate or highly problematic to implement in smaller organisations.
The inflexibility of the hunt for HRM in smaller organisations is
demonstrated by implying that directly transferred practices are indicative
of sophistication in people management. Third, the dynamic process of
managerial adoption of new practices (or new discursive formations) is
absent from such a mode of analysis, something which is more evident in
smaller organisations where managers may have little contact with the
institutions that produce such discourses as HRM. Practices and ideologies
may be partially understood or applied, rather than firmly implemented
and adhered to. Finally, the construction of HRM as something that can
be hunted for and found in smaller organisations leaves our understanding
of employment relations as the ‘black box of production’ (Townley, 1993).
Inside the box, personnel management is conceptualised as a set of tools
that enables managers to select, train, pay and appraise employees more
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effectively in the service of maximising labour efficiency. The alternative
means of conceptualising HRM presented in this chapter, and the outline
of practice in four smaller organisations, serves to support the argument
that managerial practice and HRM in smaller organisations exist within a
complex set of dynamics that are not all reducible to a simple hunt for a
recognisable and easily identified animal.
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to provide an analysis of the relationship between
the contemporary discourse of HRM and the management of employees
in smaller organisations in the UK. Following Townley’s (1993) suggestion
to treat HRM as a discourse constituted through micro-technologies of
practice and language, the chapter has focused on a number of aspects of
HRM that are rarely raised in assessing its relevance to, and impact on,
managers in smaller organisations. In particular, the structural and cultural
conditions that surround the introduction of the HRM discourse into
smaller organisations, the consequences of implementing the discourse,
the institutional sites from which legitimacy is drawn, and the position in
which it places subjects (both managers and others), have all been raised
as worthy of analysis. It has been argued that HRM should not be seen as
a stable and scientifically established set of procedures that must be imple-
mented in response to economic conditions or changing institutional con-
ditions, which will inexorably lead to higher levels of individual and
organisational performance.
HRM has long been recognised as a significant managerial and cultural
discourse, it is increasingly manifest in state regulation of the employment
relationship (Bacon and Storey, 2000), and, through Investors in People
(Bell et al., 2001) and the Employment Relations Act (Atkinson and
Taylor, 2003), the language and ideology of HRM are further promoted
within frameworks for practice in smaller organisations. However, this
chapter has questioned the relevance and appropriateness of the HRM
discourse and such frameworks to order employee relations in smaller
organisations. If, as this chapter contends, the discourse of HRM is poten-
tially neither appropriate nor meaningful in smaller organisations, how
should the employment relationship be mediated? A number of potential
routes have been suggested. Gibb (1983, 1997) repeatedly argues for man-
agement development that is more relevant, informed by research that
engages more fully with the lived experience of managing smaller organi-
sations. Rainnie (1989), in contrast, calls for more legislation that can be
implemented in a directive way. The CIPD calls for more management
education, while IiP UK suggests quality initiatives in people management
that are minimally bureaucratic. All of these proposals are potentially
worthwhile; however, this chapter has sought to provide two more that
relate specifically to labour management dynamics and the context of the
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smaller organisation as defined in this collection. They involve going
beyond the profit calculation, to a more rounded culturally informed
understanding of people management practices.
The first is based on the notion of culture. Debates around the role of
small business managers in defining people management strategies have
emphasised the amount of employee and manager agency in shaping
employment relations, but perhaps a wider question relates to the culture
of small business management as it is currently understood. Both analysis
of the labour process and policy formation might be informed by theory
that conceptualises the interplay of the cultures of smaller organisation
management and labour, and the cultures of HRM and regulation of the
employment relationship. These dynamics are enacted within structures,
undoubtedly, but the ability and will of managers in smaller organisations
to resist such structural imposition is well established. An understanding
of the mediating role of cultures might enable a more informed approach
to understanding approaches to labour management in this area.
The second is concerned with the notion of HRM as a system of power–
knowledge based on producing individual employees, a system that claims
to be accurate and objective (Townley, 1993). Because of the inherent
indeterminacy of the employment contract underpinning the labour
exchange process, there is a managerial need to reduce indeterminacy
between promise and performance. Thus, we might also see individuals as
produced by HRM through the construction of knowledge (mainly psy-
chological), whereas the more common approach in smaller organisations
is to see labour management as socially embedded. The two approaches to
labour management may be seen as existing in tension, so the analytical
interest lies in the shift from one to the other. As enterprises grow or pass
from one owner to another, from socially ordered to more ‘scientifically’
or psychologically ordered, an information gap may arise; more formal
people management processes seek to fill or bridge this gap, in part
through redefining power relations between managers and managed, and
in part through providing a more scientific, more systematic knowledge
base. This shift is little understood, and will not be made clearer by recom-
mending that managers in smaller organisations adopt pre-existing frame-
works, that are then researched from within an academic context that
over-emphasises the development of a very narrow kind of theory.
Notes
1 This chapter is in part guided by a conceit, referred to in the title, that searching
for HRM in smaller organisations is analogous to hunting the snark. In Lewis
Carroll’s poem (Carroll, 2000), the Bellman leads a diverse crew in the search
for a mysterious animal, the snark. Each crew member brings his own particular
set of doubts and distractions that hinder the hunt; in particular, the Baker
brings the knowledge that while snarks are harmless, some of their number
transform into boojums, an altogether more dangerous animal. If the snark turns
HRM in small firms: hunting the snark? 37
out to be a boojum, then the hunter is likely to vanish and ‘never be met with
again’. This chapter might be seen in part as an assessment of how the hunt for
the HRM-snark in smaller organisations has progressed, and in part as an analy-
sis of the potential that the HRM discourse has to become a boojum for man-
agers and employees.
2 See Taylor (2001), Taylor et al. (2002), Atkinson and Taylor (2003) and Taylor
(2003) for more details.
3 IiP is an initiative that was developed initially in the UK, financially and ideolog-
ically supported by successive governments. However, the initiative structure is
now being licensed to a number of European countries, as well as further afield
in South Africa, Australia and Canada.
4 Non-mainstream in terms of academic research discourse; as Bresnen and
Fowler (1996) point out, it might be argued that the large, prestigious organisa-
tions that form the core of much academic research are non-mainstream, and
that smaller or medium sized companies are the context in which most people
experience work and management. 
5 As Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) note, researchers must acknowledge the
notion that research subjects read and interpret research, which in turn informs
practice, which is then in turn researched to inform the production of further
texts … and so on.
6 Storey (1992) uses the label ‘prescriptive’ to map the same territory, which is
essentially ‘universalistic’ (Ferris et al., 1999) – no matter what the organisational
context, there are certain practices or combinations of practice that will produce
improved individual and company performance.
7 The term most often used is ‘positive association’, to define results from statisti-
cal tests that indicate that use of a technique is positively associated with, for
example, an increase in productivity. However, presentation of research results,
in the academic forum and in practitioner-oriented publications such as People
Management, often elide the distinction between positive associations and causal
relations. For this reason, in this chapter the term causal relations is preferred as
it is more widely used in constructing the discourse of HRM.
8 The CIPD funds a significant amount of academic research into HRM and
performance (see, for example, Guest et al., 2000b).
9 At Gearbox, the only company of the four with collective union representation.
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3 Researching the employment
relationship in small firms
What are the contributions from the
employment relations and small
business literatures?
Robert Blackburn
Introduction
This chapter will discuss the evolution of knowledge on employment in
small firms by exploring both the employment relations and small firms’
literatures. The discussion will also examine the methodological and prac-
tical issues facing those seeking to collect and analyse data and provide
interpretations of labour management and employment relations in the
small enterprise. Overall, it will demonstrate that although researching the
employment relationship in small firms is not easy, there has been steady
progress in our understanding of this relationship. Some of the reasons for
this progress will be explored.
From a researcher’s perspective, one of the perennial challenges in
small business research is the absence of a rigorous or comprehensive
empirical foundation to provide a sound basis for knowledge building,
conceptualisation and theory development. Most government sponsored
surveys, for example, have tended to avoid small firms on the grounds of
expense and the bureaucratic burden this places on owner-managers. As a
result, the small business literature is littered with piecemeal surveys, and
the occasional secondary analyses of existing data sets, seeking to answer
specific questions, some of them having statistical validity, others not, but
generally tending to be distinctive by their methodological inadequacies
rather than rigour. Of course, not all data sets are appropriate for helping
answer some of the research avenues we seek to pursue. Yet, this absence
of either appropriate sampling frames, or data sets for secondary analyses,
does mean that small business researchers have additional challenges to
those studying larger organisations. It also underlines the need to engage
with the methodological debates within business and management and the
social sciences more broadly (see Curran and Blackburn, 2001; Grant and
Perren, 2002 for further discussion). Serious investigations of the employ-
ment relationship in small firms are no exception to this challenge.
Ostensibly, one of the fundamental weaknesses in the study of labour
management in small firms is the lack of attention paid to small firms by
mainstream employment relations specialists. All disciplines and areas for
study have their own methodological approaches, disciplinary origins,
subject inclinations and agenda ‘baggage’. Yet, for some time it appeared
that the recognition of small firms as key employers was denied by the
corpus of mainstream industrial relations which, throughout the latter part
of the twentieth century, continued to focus on formality, the industrial
relations framework, trade unions, collective bargaining and conflict at
work. This has led to expressions of frustration by small business
researchers and was evidenced in numerous introductions to articles
seeking to analyse the employment relationship and is one of the major
reasons for this book (see, for example, Marlow, 2002).
A key argument in this chapter will be that whilst there has been a
growing understanding of the employment relationship in small firms, a
great deal remains to be understood. Early analyses of labour manage-
ment approaches in small firms tended to draw from established analyses
of large organisations rather than construct appropriate concepts based
upon evidence drawn from smaller enterprises themselves. These
approaches also failed to question dominant institutional approaches,
leading to a diversion from the richness of issues which could be investi-
gated (such as the role of the family home as a workplace, e.g. Baines et
al., 1997; Baines and Wheelock, 1998). Instead, for decades this potential
was swamped with a relatively sterile agenda obsessed with comparing
employment conditions by workplace size, based on measurable factors
such as the existence of formal systems and trade union density. With
time, the situation has improved but much remains to be done if we are to
understand the employment relationship in small firms. This chapter sug-
gests that although there is scope for more baseline data on small firms,
including contributions from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey
(WERS),1 this should not be to the detriment of more exploratory
approaches and further qualitative research. Indeed, it is argued that our
knowledge levels on the process of employment relations in small firms
has developed irrespective of WIRS (Workplace Industrial Relations
Survey) or WERS. The need for case study approaches, it is argued, will
greatly add to our growing body of knowledge and theorisation on the
employment relationship in small enterprises.
Employment relations in the small firms’ literature
As background to understanding our knowledge base on the employment
relationship in small firms, it is important to recognise the cumulative
development of research in both the employment relations and small firms’
literatures. In addition to the chapters in this book, a summary of some of
the significant research studies on small firms is shown in Table 3.1. As can
44 R. Blackburn
T
ab
le
 3
.1
St
ud
ie
s 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
 in
 s
m
al
l fi
rm
s:
 m
et
ho
ds
 a
nd
 k
ey
 p
oi
nt
s
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
M
et
ho
ds
M
ai
n 
po
in
ts
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
In
gh
am
 (
19
70
)
•
F
ac
e-
to
-f
ac
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
47
 s
ki
lle
d 
an
d 
•
D
if
fe
re
nc
es
 e
xi
st
 b
et
w
ee
n 
la
rg
e 
an
d 
sm
al
l 
se
m
i-
sk
ill
ed
 w
or
ke
rs
 in
 s
ix
 s
m
al
l fi
rm
s 
an
d 
fir
m
s’
 w
or
ki
ng
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ts
69
 w
or
ke
rs
 in
 la
rg
e 
fir
m
s
•
F
oc
us
 o
n 
th
e 
en
gi
ne
er
in
g 
in
du
st
ry
 in
 B
ra
df
or
d
•
Sm
al
l fi
rm
s 
of
fe
r 
a 
m
or
e 
ha
rm
on
io
us
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
•
E
m
pl
oy
er
s 
se
lf
-s
el
ec
t s
iz
e 
of
 w
or
kp
la
ce
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
ei
r 
‘o
ri
en
ta
ti
on
 to
 w
or
k’
B
ol
to
n 
(1
97
1)
•
P
os
ta
l q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 to
 1
6,
00
0 
sm
al
l b
us
in
es
se
s
•
Sm
al
l fi
rm
s 
as
 h
ar
m
on
io
us
 w
or
ki
ng
 
•
18
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
un
it
 r
ep
or
ts
 c
ov
er
in
g 
ke
y 
ar
ea
s 
of
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ts
ac
ti
vi
ty
•
M
at
er
ia
l c
on
di
ti
on
s 
of
 w
or
k 
m
ay
 b
e
in
fe
ri
or
 b
ut
 n
on
-p
ec
un
ia
ry
 r
ew
ar
ds
 m
ay
be
 h
ig
he
r 
in
 s
m
al
l fi
rm
s
C
ur
ra
n 
an
d 
St
an
w
or
th
 (
19
81
a,
 b
)
•
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
14
5 
m
al
e 
sh
op
-fl
oo
r 
an
d 
•
Im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f i
nd
us
tr
y 
su
b-
cu
lt
ur
e 
as
 a
n 
su
pe
rv
is
or
y 
w
or
ke
rs
 in
 e
ig
ht
 s
m
al
l fi
rm
s 
in
 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
 
pr
in
ti
ng
 a
nd
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
 (
19
81
a)
em
ph
as
is
ed
•
C
on
tr
ol
 s
am
pl
e 
of
 8
8 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 w
or
ke
rs
 in
 
•
Sm
al
l fi
rm
 w
or
ke
rs
 n
o 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 v
ie
w
 
tw
o 
la
rg
e 
fir
m
s 
an
d 
40
 e
xe
cu
ti
ve
s
re
la
ti
on
s 
w
it
h 
m
an
ag
em
en
t i
n 
•
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
w
or
ke
rs
 a
nd
 s
up
er
vi
so
rs
 
ha
rm
on
io
us
 te
rm
s 
th
an
 w
or
ke
rs
 in
 
ca
rr
ie
d 
ou
t a
w
ay
 fr
om
 th
e 
w
or
kp
la
ce
 to
 a
vo
id
 
la
rg
e 
fir
m
s
w
or
kp
la
ce
 in
flu
en
ce
•
Si
m
pl
e 
in
ve
rs
e 
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
si
ze
 
of
 fi
rm
 a
nd
 jo
b 
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
on
 r
ej
ec
te
d
R
ai
nn
ie
 (
19
89
)
•
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
m
at
er
ia
ls
•
In
te
rn
al
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t c
on
di
ti
on
s 
•
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
ke
y 
in
fo
rm
an
ts
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
sh
op
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 b
y 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
tr
uc
tu
ra
l 
st
ew
ar
ds
 a
nd
 e
m
pl
oy
er
s
co
nd
it
io
ns
 o
f w
or
kp
la
ce
•
F
oc
us
es
 o
n 
pr
in
ti
ng
 a
nd
 c
lo
th
in
g 
in
du
st
ri
es
•
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
 in
 s
m
al
l fi
rm
s 
in
fe
ri
or
 to
 la
rg
e 
fir
m
s
co
nt
in
ue
d
T
ab
le
 3
.1
co
nt
in
ue
d
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
M
et
ho
ds
M
ai
n 
po
in
ts
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
Sc
ot
t e
t a
l.
(1
98
9)
•
T
el
ep
ho
ne
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
39
7 
m
an
ag
er
s
•
O
w
ne
r-
m
an
ag
er
s 
ho
ld
 a
 u
ni
ta
ri
st
 v
ie
w
 o
f 
•
So
m
e 
se
gm
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f s
am
pl
e 
by
 b
us
in
es
s 
se
ct
or
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
•
C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
of
 3
0 
fir
m
s 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
re
pe
at
 v
is
it
s
•
E
m
ph
as
is
 o
n 
in
fo
rm
al
it
y 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 
in
co
ns
is
te
nc
ie
s 
in
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
•
E
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
va
ry
 in
 th
ei
r 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
to
w
or
k
•
Su
gg
es
ts
 th
e 
ne
ed
 fo
r 
gr
ea
te
r
em
pl
oy
m
en
t p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n
G
os
s 
(1
98
8,
 1
99
1)
•
F
ac
e-
to
-f
ac
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
pr
op
ri
et
or
s 
an
d 
•
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
el
at
io
ns
 in
 s
m
al
l fi
rm
s 
no
t 
‘c
ra
ft
sm
en
’ i
n 
th
e 
pr
in
ti
ng
 in
du
st
ry
ha
rm
on
io
us
•
A
pp
ar
en
t ‘
ha
rm
on
y’
 b
el
ie
s 
co
nfl
ic
t
•
P
ow
er
 r
el
at
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
em
pl
oy
er
s 
an
d
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
va
ry
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 m
ar
ke
t
co
nd
it
io
n
C
ur
ra
n 
et
 a
l.
(1
99
3)
•
81
 fo
llo
w
-u
p 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
fr
om
 o
ri
gi
na
l f
ac
e-
to
-f
ac
e 
•
E
m
ph
as
is
 o
n 
in
fo
rm
al
it
y 
al
th
ou
gh
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
of
 3
50
 e
m
pl
oy
er
s
m
aj
or
it
y 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
ha
d 
a 
w
ri
tt
en
 
•
F
ac
e-
to
-f
ac
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
17
5 
em
pl
oy
ee
s
st
at
em
en
t o
f t
er
m
s 
an
d 
co
nd
it
io
ns
•
F
oc
us
 o
n 
se
rv
ic
e 
se
ct
or
 o
nl
y 
an
d 
in
 fi
ve
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 
•
60
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
no
t i
nt
er
es
te
d 
in
 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
 lo
ca
ti
on
s
jo
in
in
g 
a 
tr
ad
e 
un
io
n
•
F
ri
ng
e 
be
ne
fit
s 
te
nd
ed
 to
 b
e 
fe
w
er
 th
an
 in
th
e 
na
ti
on
al
 a
ve
ra
ge
•
C
us
to
m
er
 p
re
se
nc
e 
in
flu
en
ce
d 
th
e 
w
ay
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
ar
e 
m
an
ag
ed
R
am
 (
19
91
, 1
99
4)
•
St
ru
ct
ur
ed
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
w
it
h 
16
 o
w
ne
r-
m
an
ag
er
s
•
E
m
ph
as
is
es
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ex
, i
nf
or
m
al
 a
nd
 
•
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
 in
 th
re
e 
cl
ot
hi
ng
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 to
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
fo
rm
 c
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
•
St
ud
y 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
W
es
t M
id
la
nd
s 
cl
ot
hi
ng
 s
ec
to
r
•
A
 ‘n
eg
ot
ia
te
d 
or
de
r’
 e
xi
st
s 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 
•
C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
ba
se
d 
in
 ‘A
si
an
’ b
us
in
es
se
s 
se
t i
n 
si
m
pl
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
ut
oc
ra
cy
co
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ts
•
R
ol
e 
of
 e
th
ni
ci
ty
 a
s 
a 
re
so
ur
ce
 fo
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t i
de
nt
ifi
ed
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s
in
flu
en
ci
ng
 th
e 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 s
ty
le
 o
f
w
or
kp
la
ce
 r
el
at
io
ns
H
ol
lid
ay
 (
19
95
)
•
E
th
no
gr
ap
hi
c 
st
ud
y 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t 
•
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t i
n 
sm
al
l fi
rm
s 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
m
ay
 a
pp
ea
r 
ir
ra
ti
on
al
 to
 o
ut
si
de
rs
 b
ut
 is
 
•
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f t
hr
ee
 d
et
ai
le
d 
ca
se
 s
tu
di
es
 
ra
ti
on
al
 w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f t
he
 s
m
al
l 
ba
se
d 
on
 o
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
fir
m
•
D
ra
w
s 
on
 c
as
es
 in
 c
lo
th
in
g,
 m
ec
ha
ni
ca
l a
nd
 
•
L
ab
ou
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t i
s 
co
m
pl
ex
, i
nf
or
m
al
 
el
ec
tr
ic
al
 a
nd
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
 b
us
in
es
se
s
an
d 
do
es
 n
ot
 ‘fi
t’
 e
it
he
r 
‘s
m
al
l i
s 
be
au
ti
fu
l’ 
or
 ‘s
m
al
l i
sn
’t
 b
ea
ut
if
ul
’
ap
ho
ri
sm
s
•
T
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d
pe
op
le
 n
ee
ds
 to
 ta
ke
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 s
oc
ia
l,
fin
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 c
on
tr
ac
tu
al
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
•
Q
ua
lit
y 
sy
st
em
s 
in
 s
m
al
l fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
no
t
ne
ce
ss
ar
ily
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ec
on
om
ic
 o
r 
gl
ob
al
ra
ti
on
al
it
ie
s
•
M
oc
k 
bu
re
au
cr
ac
y 
m
ay
 e
xi
st
 w
he
n
ex
te
rn
al
 a
cc
re
di
ta
ti
on
 is
 b
ei
ng
 s
ou
gh
t
be seen, this is not a new area of research within the field of small business
studies although it could be argued that the area itself is relatively new
compared with the study of the employment relationship.2
A key foundation stone for the study of smaller firms in the UK was the
Bolton Report (1971). The Committee commissioned a main report plus
18 research reports focusing on different aspects of activity. Employment
relations were considered significant enough only to merit attention in the
main report. Its position on employment relations was, with the benefit of
hindsight and subsequent research, rather naïve and tended to fit into a
recurring, if not tedious, theme of comparing small firms with large firms.
In many respects the small firm provides a better environment for the
employee than is possible in most large firms. Although physical
working conditions may sometimes be inferior in small firms, most
people prefer to work in a small group where communication presents
few problems. The employee in a small firm can more easily see the
relation between what he (sic) is doing and the objectives and
performance of the firm as a whole.
(Bolton Report, 1971:21)
This rosy view of employment relations in small firms tended to be the
prevailing position of early studies. Ingham (1970) had also offered a more
theoretically sophisticated explanation for the apparent relatively harmo-
nious employment relationship in small firms. His theory suggested that
employees in small firms held a ‘non-economistic expressive orientation’
to work and instead were more interested in the intrinsic aspects of work
and the social relations within the workplace. In contrast, workers in large
firms were more likely to hold an ‘economistic instrumental orientation’ to
work, with an emphasis on material rewards. The thesis inferred that
employees actually self-select whether they want to work in a large or
small firm depending on their work orientation.3
This early view of the employment relationship was developed in a
series of research projects and publications, many critical of Ingham and
the Bolton Report’s ‘harmony’ thesis. Sociologists in the small business
field, Curran and Stanworth (1979, 1981a, 1981b) pioneered what was to
become a steady deconstruction of the harmony view.4 In essence, the
position advocated by Curran and Stanworth was one based on the hetero-
geneity of small firms emanating from their economic market context
which would, as a consequence, lead to variations in employment con-
ditions, social relations and labour stability within small firms. By implica-
tion, Curran and Stanworth suggested that it was too simplistic to pursue a
generalised picture of employment conditions in small firms. Methodologi-
cally, they also pointed out that the overwhelming bulk of research on
employment in small firms had, in fact, been undertaken using evidence
from employers, rather than employees giving a rather one-sided view of
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accounts of the employment relationship. Subsequent studies built on the
notion of heterogeneity, unpacking the management styles of owner-
managers (Goffee and Scase, 1982), linking what goes on within the enter-
prise explicitly with the external environment (Rainnie, 1989) and
developing a typology of employers’ control strategies (Goss, 1991).
Using case study material from printing and electronics it was Rainnie
who argued most forcefully against the ‘harmony view’ (see also Barrett
and Rainnie, 2002). Rainnie attempted to position his argument within a
broader Marxist framework of combined and uneven development.
Within this, it was argued that small firms play different roles within the
economy (dependent, dominated, isolated and innovative) with implica-
tions for different employment relations and conditions within the enter-
prise. In his argument, Rainnie offered a ‘bleak house’ picture of
employment relations in small firms as hosts of an autocratic management
style and poor terms and conditions. This emanated from their sub-
contract relations with larger firms or the occupation of low-wage, low
profitability industry sectors. Although criticised for suffering from struc-
tural determinism and an unclear research methodology (see Ram and
Edwards, 2003), the work did represent an attempt to link the position of
small firms within a broader theoretical context and pave the way for sub-
sequent conceptual development.
Scott et al. (1989) provided one of the first major empirical studies
focused on labour management in small firms. The research comprised a
mixed method approach, with interviews of almost 400 owner-managers
and three follow-up interviews with employers and employees for the
development of 30 case studies. The follow-up visits allowed the eliciting
of material not normally found in previous ‘snapshot’ approaches of
employment relations. The advantage of this approach was that it allowed
a focus on the processes of employment relations rather than mere out-
comes. This study was also significant in that it tried to break away from
the comparisons and agendas found in the study of large organisations and
sought to build-up a picture of the employment relationship in small firms.
The study emphasised the role of informality and the importance of per-
sonal relations as a means of managing labour within the enterprise.
Employers, it was argued, held a unitarist view of the enterprise, and they
pursued various non-bureaucratic strategies to achieve their objectives. It
was argued that the absence of formality can have costs and benefits but
caused particular problems when disciplinary matters arose.
Goss (1988, 1991) building on earlier classifications of employment rela-
tions typologies proposing that three employers’ strategies were possible in
small firms: fraternalism, paternalism, benevolent autocracy. These were
contingent on the external conditions of the enterprise and internally, the
bargaining power of employers and employees. Goss sought to explore
why, on the assumption that there is disagreement between employers and
their employees, there is a perception of harmony. Drawing on data from
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the general printing industry, he argued that there is a power asymmetry
between labour and capital with employers having the upper hand. This
relationship is also influenced by the external conditions within which the
business operates and under favourable market conditions, employees will
be in a stronger negotiation position. This study continued the theme that
small businesses do not necessarily have a harmonious employment rela-
tionship but also that the social relations of production change and are influ-
enced by the structural conditions within which the enterprise operates.
Hence, the apparent harmony in small firms concealed the unitary perspect-
ive of owner-managers and in times of conflict it was the employee who had
to accept the perspective of the owner-manager rather than vice versa.
A significant event in small business as a field of research enquiry was
an initiative sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC) in 1990 (for overview see Storey, 1994). This initiative spawned
three research centres of excellence as well as 16 projects on small firms.
The study of employment in small firms formed an important component
of the initiative and the main contributions were reported in an edited
volume (Atkinson and Storey, 1994). The methodologies utilised in the
volume were diverse, ranging from quantitative analyses of secondary data
(Rees and Shah, 1994) to the analysis of primary data collected in inter-
views (Curran et al., 1991; Kitching, 1997). Probably because of the pre-
vailing agendas of the time, the nature of the projects and the expertise of
the researchers involved, there was little explicit link with the employment
relations literature. Curran et al.’s (1993) analysis of the workforce con-
struction policies of employers, their use of part-time, temporary, self-
employed and freelance workers, provided significant insights into the
recruitment practices of employers and of all the ESRC’s initiative
research has the closest links with the mainstream employment relations
literature. Atkinson and Meager’s (1994) commentary, on the small firm in
the labour market, highlighted the changes in small firms as they expanded
and used the then popular notions of functional and numerical flexibility.
What the book tended to confirm was that the employment relations
agendas and literatures of interest to researchers in small firms were
generally remote from mainstream debate.
Subsequent studies from the small business literature have become
more conceptually sophisticated emphasising the diversity of employment
conditions, unpacking notions of ‘informality’ and taking us away from the
overly structural determinist positions in earlier studies (Ram, 1994). Here
it is argued, the employment relationship is dynamic, fluid and often
contradictory, rather than following any owner-managers’ strategic posi-
tion. Ram’s contribution shows that the external structural conditions of
an enterprise will not determine actual internal employment relationships.
The latter, it is shown, goes beyond the material, cash nexus (which had
been the focus of attention for so many previous studies) and often
requires mutual dependency between employer and employees for sur-
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vival and involved social mores. One significant argument here was that
informality was not necessarily an inferior form of employment relation-
ship but was often necessary and advantageous for the prosperity of the
enterprise and those engaged within it.
Holliday’s (1995) ethnographic study of manufacturing in clothing,
mechanical and electrical and electronics businesses has contributed to
opening up what has been described as the ‘black box’ of the employment
relationship: that is the precise types of employment relations in smaller
firms and the factors influencing the relationship. Holliday shows that the
logic of production organisation and the accompanying employment rela-
tions are influenced by familial ties. To the ‘objective’ outsider, these may
appear unjustifiable on ‘business rationality’ grounds, but for the business
owner they were eminently sensible, the strength of this argument is based
on the soundness of her methodological approach and ability to unearth
the multifaceted influences on the employment relationship. Holliday
(1995:174) concludes with a critique of quantitative studies:
The emphasis on multiple rationalities at work in small firms mitigates
against the positivistic reasoning of much production research, which
places all its emphasis on an unproblematic rationality.
Clearly, for Holliday (1995:174) the search for generalisable statements
about small firms and the use of quantitative approaches to verify these
‘truths’ is highly problematic:
Only a qualitative approach responds to the differences within and
between firms with the necessary sophistication to begin the task of
helping us understand exactly how these rationalities are played out to
create the organisations which we study.
This case-study approach has been employed elsewhere highlighting
that even within a close sub-contracting relationship, employment rela-
tions within the enterprise cannot merely be ‘read-off’ from the external
conditions of the business:
if Button Co.’s relationship with M&S (Marks and Spencer), and the
need to complete orders quickly in general impacted upon life on the
shopfloor, it did so not in a static way which implies the imposition of
control, but through a dynamic (socio-political) process which ren-
dered control a more fluid outcome. For the emphasis on completing
orders quickly, especially in the case of M&S, meant that directors
were to some extent dependent on workers. This, in turn, created
space for workers to re-interpret, or modify, control through the
process of negotiation.
(Moule, 1998:642)
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These more recent qualitative approaches to understanding the
employment relationship in small firms have the advantage of seeing how
workplace norms and practices are executed rather than relying on second
hand accounts of what happens from key informants. These methodo-
logical approaches, it could be argued, are also much more appropriate
when studying small firms because of the informal, contradictory and ad
hoc nature of the employment relationships reported in macro-surveys.
Of course, not all the key studies of employment relations in small firms
deriving from the small business literature are able to be covered in one
chapter. Yet, this short, overview has revealed that this area of the liter-
ature is making serious attempts at understanding the employment rela-
tionship in small firms. It reveals a shift from structurally deterministic
approaches (Ingham, 1970; Rainnie, 1989; Barrett and Rainnie, 2002) to
more complex attempts to embrace in-firm factors such as owner-
managerial style and family and kinship ties. What is also noticeable in this
short review is the variety of methodological approaches used by small
firms researchers: statistical analyses of primary data, case studies, per-
sonal interviews and work shadowing.
Small firms in the employment relations’ literature
If the development of an understanding of the employment relationship in
small firms within the ‘small firms literature’ can best be described as expe-
riencing a steady evolution, that within the mainstream literature may be
depicted as coming from a position of absence, to marginal interest and
more recently, growing awareness. An examination of the industrial rela-
tions literature of the 1970s and 1980s reveals a poverty of studies on small
firms, much to the exasperation of some small business researchers (see
Marlow, 2002; Matlay, 2002; Scase, 2003). Marlow sums this up quite suc-
cinctly ‘Labour management practices and policies in smaller firms have
been somewhat ignored by mainstream industrial relations academics and
those with an interest in the sector as a discrete area of study’ (2002:39).
Indeed, it could be argued that it was researchers from other disciplinary
areas – industrial sociology, economics, geography and small firms
researchers themselves – who were carrying the mantle of this area of
investigation within the traditional field of industrial relations.
Although the reasons for this are debatable, it could be argued that this
was a result of the attraction of other major topics of interest for
researchers in the field of industrial relations (industrial conflict, trades
unions, the wage-effort bargain and institutional approaches). These
interests were also reflected in the prevailing broader mass media and ana-
lytical discourse on industry and commerce by industrial correspondents.
Marlow (2002) suggests that this heightened in the 1980s because of the
sustained attack on collective institutions and processes that were the very
basis of the academic industry and corpus of knowledge of the employ-
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ment relationship. For academics in this field, studying employment rela-
tions in small firms may simply not have had the intellectual appeal of
building on previous studies of workplace relations in large firms. To this
is the added difficulty of conducting research in small firms: business
owners are often antithetical to academics undertaking research in their
enterprise, a position which may be hardened further when this comes to
investigating employment relations. For many business owners employing
people constitutes a problematic exercise on which they may have diffi-
culty in volunteering to be researched.
A dominance of large-scale surveys?
In addition to the above disincentives to studying small firms, it has been
argued that the absence of serious analyses of the employment relation-
ship in small firms is a consequence of the predominant methodological
paradigms of the mainstream employment relations’ literature: sometimes
called the ‘Donovan legacy’. As Marginson suggests ‘WIRS and other
large-scale employer-based surveys now constitute a distinctive and
important strand in the tradition of industrial relations’ (1998:362). Analy-
ses of the methodological approaches of studying employment relations
suggested, at first sight, that there has been a shift away from case study,
inductive methods, towards multivariate, deductive approaches (Whitfield
and Strauss, 2000). Given the absence of readily available data sets on
small firms, perhaps the study of employment relations in small firms was
one of the casualties in this move.
From WIRS to WERS: The role of small firms?
One of the touchstones of the study of the contemporary employment
relationship in Britain is undoubtedly the Workforce Industrial Relations
Surveys (WIRS) and from 1998, renamed the Workforce Employee Rela-
tions Surveys (WERS).5 Students of employment relations, lecturers,
researchers, post-graduates and undergraduates, analysts in the private
sector, trade unions and government bodies will be aware of, if not influ-
enced by, the surveys and their results.
It has been argued that the introduction of the WIRS (subsequently
WERS) series demonstrated the rise of large-scale variable-centred
surveys and the need to consider sampling methods and appropriate ana-
lytical techniques. Although these surveys were complex, and collected
material from managers and employee representatives in telephone inter-
views, the criticism levelled at the outputs was profound (McCarthy,
1994). In his blistering criticism of WIRS, McCarthy argued that macro-
surveys of this kind cannot capture the essence of labour management in
the workplace. Not only are such research approaches, with a reliance on
closed and standardised questions amenable to statistical manipulation,
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flawed, they failed to pick-up on the causes of the patterns found in the
results. Some of the findings from WIRS were regarded as obvious: the
decline in trade union membership and collective bargaining for example.
Moreover, WIRS was criticised for influencing the research agenda
because of its ease of access and analysis by other senior researchers and
academics. Thus McCarthy (1994:319) pointed out:
It seemed a way of providing standardised and easily processed
responses, delivered by respondents themselves, a part-time labour
force from commercial agencies. Armed with the results desk-based
academics could feed them into their newly acquired terminals,
running them against a wide variety of readily available statistical
series.
What followed, it is argued, was an avalanche of material using the data
set and similar surveys in other countries (Millward et al., 2002).6 In his
disquiet, although McCarthy did not argue for the total abandoning of
WIRS, it was argued quite forcefully that there needed to be a shift away
from this ‘. . . flight towards what is often nothing more than second-order
desk-top research’ (1994:312). Such a dominant methodology, it was
argued, displaces the efforts of researchers from undertaking research of a
kind which would generate ‘. . . imaginative insights with possible practical
consequences’ (1994:321). WIRS it was argued, was not only influencing
the employment relations literature through the publication of the results,
it was also considered significant as setting subsequent research agendas
and methodological approaches.
Millward and Hawes (1995) provided a robust response to McCarthy’s
critique of WIRS (see also Marginson, 1998). In relation to the research
methods appropriate to understanding the employment relationship they
accepted the relevance of ‘the full range of social science research
methods as appropriate to the subject’ (Millward and Hawes, 1995:71).
WIRS, it was argued, had a variety of roles to play including mapping
changes, comparing matched units, the exploration of relationships
between variables, the generation and testing of hypotheses both within
the survey and for other research projects, and the derivation of implica-
tions for individuals and interest groups (see Millward and Hawes,
1995:71–2). It was argued that WIRS was not taking over the dominant
methodology for studying employment relations, citing numerous altern-
ative paradigms evident in the literature and that anyway they, as the ori-
ginal authors, could not be held responsible for those who had misused the
data set, in secondary analyses. The defence of WIRS was concluded with
an acceptance that ‘. . . the survey design must move on to reflect the
changing realities of employment relationship’ (1995:72). Of particular
interest here is the growing non-union ‘sector’ and the authors accepted the
need for both analyses of existing data sets as well as intensive case studies.
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The debate between McCarthy and Millward and Hawes was as reveal-
ing for what was omitted as much as what was included. Clearly, the
debate shows evidence of concerns regarding what is meant by employ-
ment relations, the appropriate methodologies to investigate the field of
study and who are the audiences for the research results. Yet, in the whole
discussion there was little mention of the need to include smaller enter-
prises and whilst it was noted that newer businesses tended to be less
unionised, even the reflective critical debates around WIRS appeared to
be fixed in an historical time warp of the industrial framework and
agendas of the 1960s and 1970s.
As WIRS developed into WERS, a number of areas were identified for
development (Cully, 1998; Cully et al., 1999). Amongst these was an accep-
tance of the need to include smaller workplaces in recognition of their
significance (as well as a separate employee questionnaire). As a result,
WERS98 lowered the minimum size threshold of establishments for inclu-
sion in the survey from 25 to 10 employees and included 250 ‘stand alone’
businesses in this size band.7 The results were reported on specific vari-
ables which allowed a depiction of what employment conditions were
like in small firms, also enabling comparison with larger and multi-
establishment organisations. Table 3.2 shows some of the baseline
characteristics of employment in small firms (employing between 25 and
100 people). The survey found that although employees had relatively
high levels of job satisfaction, low pay and industrial tribunal applications
were high (see Cully et al., 1998:26–7).
The results on small firms were also discussed elsewhere and presented
similar comparative analyses. In one of the main outputs of WERS98, a
chapter was dedicated to small firms (Cully et al., 1999). Here comparisons
were made between small workplaces and larger organisations as well as
stand-alone small firms and small organisations (i.e. establishments of
10–99 employees which are part of a larger organisation). The chapter
concluded:
Organisation size and patterns of ownership proved to be clearly asso-
ciated with the incidence of formal structures and practices within
small workplaces. Overall, small businesses – especially those with
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Table 3.2 Features of small business employment relations
Small businesses Workplaces (%)
No ‘new’ management practices of employee involvement 
schemes 8
Five or more of these practices and schemes 28
Joint consultative committee at workplace 17
One or more equal treatment practices 24
working owners – had a less formal approach than small multiples to
regulation of employment relationship. Compared to other small
workplaces, they were less likely to have significant personnel exper-
tise in-house or the more sophisticated personnel systems such as
performance appraisal, incentive pay systems, or family friendly
working practices.
(Cully et al., 1999:273)
There was, unfortunately, no disaggregated analyses within the 10–99 size
band category even though most official classifications of small firms use a
49 employee upper size band cut-off. A major problem here was the low
number of single plant small firms available for analysis. Thus, although the
inclusion of firms employing 10 to 24 people did represent something of a
breakthrough in bringing the survey in line with changes in the economy,
the outcome was somewhat disappointing. The actual research-based output
appears to have added very little if anything to existing knowledge on
smaller firms. The bulk of publications reported, for example, in Millward et
al. (2002) shows a continued focus in the literature on the effects of trade
union membership on performance and workforce representation.
Despite the reduction of the size threshold, the inclusion of smaller
establishments (i.e. those employing 10–24 people) however, still meant
that the largest and most expensive investigation of employment relations
in Britain has missed out on the biggest employer size band (Table 3.3). A
review of WERS98 highlighted this weakness:
larger organisations (25 or more employees) were given a markedly
greater chance of selection than their smaller counterparts because of
a preponderance of the latter. This represents a slight qualification to
claim the WERS is a nationally representative sample of workplaces.
(Lorretto, 2001:87)
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Table 3.3 Size distribution of workplace establishments, GB
Establishment size Population numbers (%) Initial sample numbers
WERS98 sample (%)
5–9 311,360 43.5 0
10–24 233,150 32.6 362 11.3
25–49 91,250 12.8 603 18.9
50–99 44,135 6.2 566 17.7
100–199 20,435 2.9 562 17.6
200–499 11,260 1.6 626 19.6
500 3,840 0.5 473 14.8
Total 715,430 100.0 3,192 100.0
Source: National Centre for Social Research (2002).
This weakness is made even more stark when set against the back-
ground of the size distribution of enterprises in the UK economy (Table
3.4) of those with employees, 64.9 per cent employ less than 5 people and
82.5 per cent less than 20 people. Given that the number of establishments
in the economy is higher than the number of enterprises and a proportion
of the establishments employing less than 25 people will be part of larger
organisations, the bias against studying small firms is reinforced. On the
other hand, the majority of employees are in firms of 500 or more (53.4 per
cent), offering some justification for the focus on larger enterprises.
An often cited defence for continuing to omit smaller firms is made on
the grounds of the ‘original purpose’ of WIRS in 1980 (Millward and
Hawes, 1995). The WIRS surveys were a response to the demise of
‘. . . national agreements and procedural arrangements of the kind given to
the then standard sources. There was a clear consequential need for sys-
tematic and extensive data describing arrangements at workplace level’
(Millward and Hawes, 1995:69–70). As a result, the surveys were commis-
sioned to ‘. . . focus on the structures and practices of management trade
union relationships and their outcomes’ (1995:70). In other words, WIRS
sought to understand formal industrial relations between management and
workers at the level of the workplace rather than at the national level.
However, the world of work by the turn of the century had changed
dramatically and, in 2002, only 26.6 per cent of the workforce are trade
union members and 35.6 per cent of employees are considered to be
covered by collective agreements (Labour Market Trends, 2003). The
composition of industry has also changed significantly with a continued
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Table 3.4 Size distribution of enterprises in UK with employees (start 2002)
Size banda Number (%)
Enterprises Employment     

Enterprises Employment
(000’s)
1–4 796,880 2,332 64.9 9.4
5–9 215,855 1,537 17.6 6.2
10–19 119,145 1,660 9.7 6.7
20–49 56,515 1,746 4.6 7.1
50–99 19,255 1,340 1.6 5.4
100–199 8,370 1,181 0.7 4.7
200–249 1,845 411 0.2 1.6
250–499 3,740 1,310 0.3 5.3
500 or more 4,470 13,178 0.4 53.4
All enterprisesa 1,226,075 24,695 100.0 100.0
Source: adapted from SBS (2003) Table 1.
Note
a Tables excludes ‘with no employees’ which comprise sole proprietorships, partnerships
comprising only the self-employed owner-manager(s), and companies comprising only an
employee director. 
decline in manufacturing employment and a shift to the non-unionised
service sector. The defence of continuing to exclude smaller enterprises of
establishment on the grounds of continuity and facilitating comparison
appeared very weak indeed.
As well as offering only confirmation of what is already known it could
also be argued that WERS has intrinsic limitations on helping develop an
understanding of the employment relationship, let alone those in small
firms. Methodologically, such large-scale, deductive approaches tend to
offer descriptions of situations based on ‘facts’, with clear-cut patterns and
associations within the data all lending themselves to researcher assess-
ments for their clients seeking to grasp the ‘bottom-line’ and develop key
action points. At best, survey-based approaches, such as WERS, provide
high quality baseline data drawn from a range of key ‘actors’ in the work-
place. At worst, such surveys are methodologically inadequate to unearth
the real nature and processes of employment relations in the workplace.
By offering ‘bottom-line’ assessments of certain spheres of work activities,
it may be argued that such surveys offer an overly-simplistic picture of the
complexities of employment relations in the workplace.
If we set aside the inherent limitations of the research methodology of
WERS98, there remains fundamental weakness in its contribution to the
knowledge-base of employment relations in small firms. First, the vari-
ables for analysis continue to be driven by a ‘formal’ employment relations
framework which simply does not encapsulate the bulk of employment
practices in small firms. It could be argued further that the WERS
approach is even less amenable to understanding the employment rela-
tionship in small firms. The small firm has less bureaucratic and ‘recorded’
information than larger firms and thus ‘ready-made’ data sources are much
less likely to be available. Nor are the ready-made contacts (trades union
representatives, personnel managers etc.) often available in large firms
evident in smaller enterprises, thus rendering the research approach
unsuitable. Second, there appears to be an underlying, related, assumption
that ‘formality’ is the norm, the benchmark against which specific groups
of organisations, large–small, sector by sector are analysed. This adds very
little to our appreciation of the types of informality so prominent in small
firms and the potential benefits or drawbacks which informality may
embrace to the employment relationship. Finally, the simple comparison
with larger organisations approach provides little opportunity for compar-
isons between small firms and reinforces an already discredited stereotype
(see earlier discussion of for example Holliday, 1995) of the type of
employment relations in small firms.
Inasmuch as the original WIRS was a response to the deficiencies of
relying on descriptions of national agreements, which were declining in the
1970s and 1980s, there needs to be a response on the relevance, or other-
wise, of the WERS research approach to contemporary employment prac-
tices. This is particularly so when the shift from collectivism to
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individualism in the employment relationship (Brown et al., 2000) and the
dominance of smaller workplaces is now so clearly obvious. In sum, whilst
a further reduction in the size-band of workplaces (to five employees) to
be included in WERS2006 is to be welcomed, this should not be taken as a
panacea for understanding the employment relationship in small firms.
Divergence or fusion?
One possible barrier to the development of a more direct connection
between the employment relations and small firms literatures is that they
are both applied areas of study drawing on core disciplines such as eco-
nomics, psychology and sociology. The study of small firms, as a discrete
area, is relatively new compared with that of employment relations which
has developed from the early part of the twentieth century (Edwards,
2002). This relative newness and accompanying lower levels of academic
esteem may have not been attractive research territory for the more able
researchers seeking to raise their academic profile. Whitfield and Strauss
(2000) for example suggest that the shift towards quantitative and deduc-
tive approaches may be attributed to ‘. . . a desire among some employ-
ment relations researchers to gain greater respectability among their
academic peers’ (2000:147). Similarly, debates within the small business
literature have suggested that the small business domain is only recently
proving itself to rank with other applied areas of study. A survey of small
business researchers showed that they perceived their area of study to
have relatively low academic esteem and, within this, qualitative research
is regarded as having the lowest academic status (Perren et al., 2001).
More recently, the small firms literature has been influenced by the ‘entre-
preneurship’ literature, which does not appear to consider the employ-
ment relationship at all. Instead, new agendas have been injected into the
literature with an underlying advocacy and accompanying absence of crit-
ical approach to studying small firms.8
Is there a division in the mainstream employment relations and small
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Table 3.5 Number of articles on ‘employment relations’ and small firms
British Journal of Industrial Relations (1997–2003) 1
Industrial Relations Journal (1997–2003) 3
Employee Relations (1992–2003) 7
Journal of Enterprise and Small Business Development (1997–2003) 6
International Small Business Journal (1997–2003) 2
Note
The words ‘small firms’ or ‘small establishments’ were used in this search and had to appear
in the title of the paper in the IR journals. The word ‘employment’ was used in the search of
the small business journals. Papers included focused on industrial or employment relations,
HR strategy and procedures. Papers covering state regulation and the evaluation of govern-
ment initiatives were not included.
business literature? At first sight, it may appear that the literatures study-
ing labour management in the employment relations and small business
literatures operate in isolation. Each literature has its own diverse origins,
epistemological foundations, audiences and objectives. In reality, however,
research is undertaken by individuals and groups of researchers who span
disciplinary boundaries.
A summary of the articles on employment relations in key employment
relations and small business journals (Table 3.5) reveals that there has
been a similar number of published papers in the two academic domains.
This could be taken to infer that mainstream employment researchers do
pay some attention to small firms and journal editors are prepared to
publish papers in this field of study. However, a more detailed investiga-
tion reveals that in both domains, where the numbers of papers are high
these are a result of ‘special editions’ rather than a steady flow of papers
over the time period investigated. The papers are also dominated by
researchers deriving from a small business rather than an employment
relations background, partly justifying the allegations of some researchers
that small firms have been ignored by employment relations researchers.
Yet, there does appear to be a core of researchers in this area, as in 2001,
the register of BUIRA members, for example, shows that 17 (out of
around 500) record an interest in small firms (BUIRA, 2001). Similarly, a
database of abstracts compiled by ISBA and the SBRT for the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry had a specific section on Employment Rela-
tions in the Small Firm, showing a body of interest from the small business
researchers’ perspectives.
More recently, there has been a new vibrancy in the area with interdis-
ciplinary researchers studying, for example, the effects of government
interventions, such as individual employment rights (Blackburn and Hart,
2002; Marlow, 2002; Ram and Edwards, 2003) and the impact of the
minimum wage (e.g. Gilman et al., 2002; Arrowsmith et al., 2003). These
studies have also utilised a variety of methodological approaches demon-
strating that the study of the employment relationship in smaller firms is
attracting attention from researchers across the social sciences.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to explore our understanding of the employment
relationship in small firms, the contributions from the small firms and
employment relations literatures and the methodological approaches used
by researchers. It is crucial that an understanding of labour management
in small firms is advanced if we are to raise our knowledge levels on the
world of work in the bulk of the economy. This has both theoretical and
practical implications.
The analysis has revealed a number of significant issues. First, research
on small business has often been described as a ‘cinderella activity’ –
60 R. Blackburn
coming late to the study of business and management in the social sci-
ences. This view could not be more salient when examining the study of
small firms by mainstream employment relations’ researchers. It may be
argued that the contribution to understanding the process of employment
relations in small firms by the mainstream researchers in the past 30 years
has been negligible. The focus of these researchers on formal labour man-
agement institutions, industrial conflict and collective bargaining has
meant that our understanding of employment relations in small firms has
been underdeveloped. Instead, the most significant contributions to know-
ledge have derived from small business researchers linking into the
employment relations literature. More recently, however, the two domains
have undergone some ‘fusion’ and within the employment relations liter-
ature itself the study of smaller firms is now more mainstream.
Second, within the small business literature there appears to have been
a steady accumulation of knowledge on the employment relationship. This
has moved from a strongly general, structural determinist approach to a
more sensitised understanding which takes into account both structural
and agency perspectives. Early structural analyses vacillated between
‘small is beautiful’ to ‘small is ugly’ positions offering little room for
varying depictions of employment relations within small firms. With time
this structural-determinist perspective has been steadily dismantled and it
is now recognised that there is a diversity of employment relations
between and within small firms. There also appears to have been a recog-
nition that comparing large and small firms’ employment practices by the
same ‘yardstick’ can be misleading. The informality inherent in the small
business employment relationship is now recognised as worth investigation
as a process per se rather than a mere ‘variable’ for comparison with large
organisations.
Third, the methodologies used for studying both smaller firms and the
employment relationship have continued to excite controversy and debate.
WERS, for example, has the strength of being longitudinal, capturing
views of employers, managers and employees and covers a broad range of
locations and industry sectors. However, from the small business research
perspective, WERS has two broad limitations. First, the scale of the survey
is inadequate to draw meaningful investigations. Even the reduction in the
lower size threshold of WERS to establishments of 10 employees (and as
proposed to five in WERS, 2006) has contributed little to what is already
known. The statistical approach and limitations in the sample base of
WERS to date renders its contribution to little more than a poor baseline.
Whether or not the inclusion of firms employing 5–9 employees will help
overcome the statistical deficiencies outlined remain to be seen. Second,
WERS has its own limitations, intrinsic to most quantitative studies, but
these are amplified when it comes to the study of smaller firms. The statis-
tical analyses and subsequent interpretations of such large-scale data sets
lend themselves to misleading generalisations on small firms, which appear
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to be more appropriate to government bodies seeking to monitor and
design policy, rather than raise our appreciation of the processes within
the employment relationship in small firms.
More recently, however, the literature appears to offer a richness of
diversity in the methodologies adopted. As a corollary, accounts of the
employment relationship show diversity not only between firms but within
enterprises having similar external structural and market conditions. The
recent emphasis on case study approaches is to be welcomed (Perren and
Ram, 2004) and, from the evidence presented here, provides a way
forward for developing further our understanding of the employment rela-
tionship in small firms. At the same time it is important that there needs to
be a greater transference of ideas between ‘small business’ and ‘employ-
ment relations’ researchers. In short, the literature on the employment
relationship in small firms, therefore, has moved slowly forward over the
past 30 years. If this progress is to continue, it is important that a diversity
of research approaches is embraced.
Notes
1 Formerly the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) (see Marginson
and Wood, 2000).
2 When an area of study ‘began’ is of course open to debate and the small business
area is no exception. There are some studies which are tangential to the area
under study but did influence some of the early studies on small firms (e.g.
Newby, 1977).
3 Ingham’s thesis focused on male employees in the engineering industry.
4 It is notable that in this series of articles, they were able to publish in the British
Journal of Industrial Relations (Curran and Stanworth, 1981a), one of the main-
stream industrial relations journals.
5 Formerly the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS). This was changed
in 1998 to WERS.
6 Millward et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive list of books, book chapters, art-
icles and other media deriving from WERS from 1983 to 2002. For example in
2001, there was 39 publications based on WERS material. WERS has also
formed the basis for 10 doctoral theses (between 1985 and 1997).
7 This doubled the number of workplaces covered to over 3,000 and increased the
proportion of employees covered by 15 per cent to 30,000 (see Marginson and
Wood, 2000).
8 Take, for example, The Blackwell Handbook of Entrepreneurship (Sexton and
Landström, 2000) and Advances in Entrepreneurship (Westhead and Wright,
2000) which provide key readings for many undergraduate and postgraduate
courses but do not embrace any of the literature seeking to explore the employ-
ment relationship in small firms.
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4 Managerial strategies in small
firms
Richard Scase
Introduction
Studies of the employment relationship in small firms have tended to
explore the work orientations of those employed in small firms and draw
comparisons between these and their colleagues in larger corporations
(Marlow, 2002). This has also been the basis for comparisons in terms of
employee motivation and moral as well as for explanations of differences
in rates of absenteeism and industrial unrest. This was very much the focus
of small business research more than thirty years ago and this has, in many
ways, set the agenda for large areas of academic debate ever since
(Ingham, 1970). Indeed, the preponderance of discussion continues to sur-
round issues of the small industrial or manufacturing enterprise rather
than ‘knowledge-based’, professional service businesses that make up a
growing percentage of the small business sector.
In this chapter, the emphasis is rather different. It is to discuss the manage-
rial strategies found in different types of small firm and to make rather more
explicit some of the differences that exist in these strategies in those busi-
nesses trading in the traditional manufacturing sector compared to those in
the fast growing ‘creative’ and professional areas of the economy. It goes
without saying that it is conceptually simplistic to collapse a diversity of pro-
prietorial and managerial styles into a single generic category of ‘small busi-
ness’. The characteristics of skill, product and market are inevitably
determining factors that shape features of the management process within any
firm. ‘Low-skill’, ‘manual’, or ‘craft’ enterprises will be organised according to
different principles compared to those prevailing in the professional services,
high technology and science sectors of the economy. In order to highlight
these, strategies in ‘traditional’ small firms are first discussed, followed by an
exploration of management processes in ‘knowledge-based’ businesses.
Management processes in traditional small firms
In these firms, it is possible to distinguish between the self-employed, craft
employers and entrepreneurs (Scase and Goffee, 1987). For many, self-
employment is the ultimate goal of business proprietorship and, essen-
tially, the self-employed undertake all tasks. They may make use of unpaid
family labour or, at best, others on a part-time basis, but they employ no
staff on a regular basis. Such businesses are usually set up on the basis of
specific craft skills which are then used for the purposes of trading in a
particular local market niche. These are the carpenters, plumbers, hair-
dressers, electricians, window cleaners, secretaries, car mechanics and
many others who sell to customers their personal skills of one kind or
another. It is their detailed knowledge of trading opportunities within a
particular locality that often motivates craft workers to start on their own.
Their enterprises are based upon the delivery of goods and services to cus-
tomers on a regular and personal basis. In this way, they have immediate
feedback from the market in terms of response both to the quality of their
services and to the prices which they charge.
Such traditional traders, however, often lack basic business manage-
ment skills, since their overriding goal is to provide services to customers
on the basis of their craft skills. For this reason they may under-charge,
confuse turnover with profits, have high but hidden overheads and gener-
ally neglect the book-keeping and general administration of the business.
It is weaknesses in these areas that lead to their high failure rates, particu-
larly during recession as in the 1990s, rather than deterioration in the
quality of services or products.
Self-employed enterprises often have precarious futures because they
are entirely dependent upon the talents and energies of their proprietors, a
feature which is reinforced by their reluctance to employ others. The latter
is a function of their lack of management skills and training and also
because of their underlying motive for business start-up – the need for per-
sonal independence (Goffee and Scase, 1995).
Craft employers
The self-employed often find that they are unable to meet the demands of
their customers on the basis solely of their own skills, resources and time.
It is necessary for them to hire employees on a more-or-less regular basis.
Normally only two or three staff are employed, but it can be as many as
twenty, depending upon the ability of the proprietor to manage as well as
to work alongside them as a team member. In these businesses there is the
emergence of a management function, since their proprietors have to
organise the work process so that there are regular cash flows to pay wages
and other costs associated with the employment of staff.
It is in businesses of this kind that the two basic principles of any organ-
isation become apparent; those of integration and differentiation. For self-
employed proprietors the integration and division of work tasks is
undertaken within the context of their own time management. Craft
employers, by contrast, are faced with the need to break down and to
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differentiate business activities into specific job tasks and then integrate
these through modes of personal supervision and control. How is this
undertaken within businesses which employ no more than five or six
people? If in large organisations some type of division of labour is more-
or-less taken for granted, and is embedded within structures of authority
and responsibility, this is less so in small businesses, with the result that the
allocation of duties is always more uncertain, variable and problematic.
Accordingly, the division of tasks and the specification of jobs is the
outcome of a process of mutual adjustment (Goffee and Scase, 1995). The
division and integration of the work process is based upon the interdepen-
dence of employees undertaking duties in a flexible and broadly defined
manner. This can be a source of employee work satisfaction because the
delineation of job duties through mutual adjustment offers task variety
which may not be available within the more bureaucratised structures of
many large organisations. Mutual adjustment also binds individuals into
teams, with the result that a high premium is attached to personal compat-
ibilities between employer and employees as well as among employees
themselves. Equally, there is the need for high-trust relations since,
without these, mutual adjustment as an organising process is unlikely to
generate productive and profitable business performance. Recruitment is
often a compromise between competence and compatibility and it can be a
source of considerable tension within many small businesses. Rarely are
personal compatibilities and expert skills perfectly matched and the
former may be given priority over the latter in the small business propri-
etor’s recruitment process.
A feature of traditional craft-based enterprises managed on the basis of
mutual adjustment is the absence of a distinctively separate management
function and the exercise of authority through formal hierarchical control.
Relatively low profit margins prevent proprietors withdrawing from the
performance of productive work tasks and becoming full-time managers
and supervisors of others. They, themselves, are part of the process of
mutual adjustment and as such, they are members of teams working along-
side their employees. It is through this involvement that they fulfil the
managerial function. Instead of issuing instructions, they determine the
criteria for quality and quantity of employee performance through per-
sonal example. As such, proprietorial authority is exercised within rather
than superimposed upon the work process. This reaffirms the need for per-
sonal compatibility between employers and employees and the vital
importance of high-trust relationships. Within these, proprietors have to
maintain a delicate balance between their identification with employees’
interests, and the distance needed to fulfil the proprietorial function.
Small businesses, organised on a basis of such informal mechanisms,
have to undergo a process of organisational restructuring if they are to
grow. It is generally necessary for proprietors to cease working alongside
their staff and instead to become more fully occupied with the administra-
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tion of their businesses. As a result, the management function is under-
taken by proprietors through various face-to-face mechanisms of direct
control.
Entrepreneurs
These owner-managers exercise control over their businesses through
directly imposed but mostly unwritten guidelines and instructions. They
may employ up to fifty or sixty staff, but it can be far more, depending on
the ability of proprietors to exercise control through informal, face-to-face
processes rather than according to formalised structures and job descrip-
tions. Unlike craft employers, they do not rely upon establishing perform-
ance criteria through personal example. Although in the larger of these
enterprises there may be supervisors and managers, the exercise of author-
ity and responsibility is concentrated in their proprietorial hands. By dint
of ownership, proprietors possess legitimacy to impose business decisions,
often in a more-or-less arbitrary manner. They may consult with key
employees, but typically they retain almost total control and remain at the
centre of the decision-making web (Churchill and Lewis, 1983).
In these enterprises a high premium is attached to nurturing strong but
informal cultures and employee integration tends to be on the basis of per-
sonal allegiance to proprietors. Such enterprises are, generally, structured
around the ‘personalities’ of their owner-managers and their growth
potential is highly dependent upon proprietors’ preferences, energies and
plans. Accordingly, rational decision-making within entrepreneurial enter-
prises is often bounded by, or contingent upon, a range of sentimental and
pesonal factors (Birley, 1989).
Within the context of direct, face-to-face relations with staff and in the
absence of formalised rules and procedures, owner-managers develop a
number of strategies for cultivating employee commitment. The most
common of these is the appeal of charisma. Some proprietors nurture busi-
ness cultures which serve to exaggerate their own extraordinary qualities
and, through this, they link their own achievements with those of their
business and, equally important, with their employees. In this way, propri-
etors appeal to their staff to exercise exceptional commitment and output
in return for generous financial rewards. Sometimes this can be in the form
of overtime or, more usually, through year-end bonuses, sales commis-
sions, and profit-related payment systems. Since these rewards are offered
within the context of highly personalised, informal face-to-face relations –
in sharp contrast to the working procedures of large bureaucratic organisa-
tions – they serve to reinforce employee allegiance to, and their depend-
ency upon, their employers. In the deliberate absence of formalised rules
and guidelines, such rewards are always discretionary and may be seen as
an attempt by proprietors to legitimate their control through the mainte-
nance of dependency relations. This can be particularly effective if
Managerial strategies in small firms 69
employees are low skilled and have competences which are only relevant
within the context of their proprietors’ enterprises. In lacking transferable
skills, they become excessively dependent upon their continuing personal
compatibility with their employers.
An alternative for proprietors is to exercise control through more pater-
nalistic methods. As such, they attach considerable importance to the
social as well as the economic responsibilities of being ‘local’ employers
who share the long-term interests of their staff. As with charismatic strat-
egies, the intended outcome is a high level of employee dependency,
underwritten by employers’ discretionary use of material rewards and
fringe benefits.
Alongside these two proprietorial styles, there is the classic autocratic
approach, whereby entrepreneurs manage their staff in a more imper-
sonal, calculative and instrumental manner. Owners stress the purely eco-
nomic character of their businesses and the fact that, in order to survive,
and for jobs to be preserved, wage costs must be kept to a minimum. As a
result, working conditions are often poor, rates of pay are low and there is
a high level of staff turnover. This autocratic style tends to be found where
the nature of the product or service requires very low employee skills and
where labour market conditions enable staff to be readily hired and fired
as well as being employed irregularly or on a part-time basis. It is a
method of management which leads to low employee trust and which
exploits and reinforces the vulnerability and dependence of unskilled
labour. Such a proprietorial style is often found in the hotel and catering,
cleaning, textile and clothing, and subcontracted low-skill, machine tool
industries (Scase, 2003).
Although the above styles – charismatic, paternalistic and autocratic –
can be considered as distinctive, they are often juxtaposed with each other
within the same small business. Proprietors will often use a variety of
interpersonal techniques, drawing upon each of them in relation to differ-
ent categories of employees. For example, the paternalistic style may be
applied to long-term, relatively indispensable employees, whilst the auto-
cratic approach may be reserved for temporary, less skilled workers.
Within such enterprises, there is often greater clarity and specification
of work tasks than is found within smaller craft employer businesses. If in
the latter, processes of mutual adjustment determine the allocation of job
duties, the proprietors of entrepreneurial firms manage through mechan-
isms of direct control, devoting more attention to setting up explicit
systems of responsibility and control (Moule, 1998). Even so, the division
of work and associated job descriptions remain relatively loose compared
with those found in many larger organisations. Further, by managing
through direct face-to-face supervision, owners are able to monitor
employee performance closely, and to exercise tight controls over operat-
ing costs. However, the potential of these strengths can be untapped
because of other inherent weaknesses associated with the indispensable
70 R. Scase
roles of their proprietors. Even if there are managers and others who
undertake some of the supervisory tasks, systems of delegation in terms of
responsibility, authority and decision-making usually remain underdevel-
oped. This is often because of the predominant power cultures of these
businesses (Goss, 1991). In the absence of formalised systems, the man-
agement function is exercised by owners developing networks of personal
allegiance. Within cultures which stress the importance of employee com-
pliance, decision-making is rarely queried or subject to detailed employee
scrutiny. Employees may be powerless as their employers take decisions
which can jeopardise the future viability of the business. Proprietors’
reluctance to delegate may lead to the under-development of management
skills among staff and the under-utilisation of their talents and skills. This
can be a deliberate strategy which facilitates the retention of tight control
over business operations with little challenge to proprietorial authority.
However, businesses become over-dependent upon proprietors and, at the
same time, staff may become disaffected and de-motivated. Further, little
attention is often given to management succession, with the effect that the
longer-term future of such businesses is uncertain (Aston Business School,
1991).
Creative and professional small firms
Growing numbers of managers, technologists, highly qualified specialists
and professionals are leaving the relative security of the corporation to
risk starting up their own businesses (Scase, 2002). Many of them feel that
their personal talents and skills are not being fully utilised. Middle-aged
managers often accept redundancy and experiment with entrepreneurship,
often with initial financial support from their previous employers (ibid.).
Younger managers, on the other hand, who have been encouraged to
expect opportunities for creativity, challenge and self-fulfilment in their
jobs, are often disappointed. Consequently, they are increasingly con-
vinced that entrepreneurship may offer an alternative route for the
achievement of such goals (Scase and Goffee, 1989).
What kinds of businesses do former corporate managers set up? It is
often in their capacity as corporate specialists of one kind or another that
they have been able to identify market trends and to determine, within
these, niches for trading opportunities. It is not unusual for managers to
negotiate deals with their previous employers’ customers to give them
their first trading opportunities and with these, to raise finance. In
common with traditional craft entrepreneurs, their businesses are often
highly dependent upon their own particular talents and skills. It is with
these that products and services are traded.
The growth of these businesses has been most pronounced in those eco-
nomic sectors where there has been corporate fragmentation, down-sizing
and associated processes of outsourcing (Scase, 2002). The media offer
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many examples of these trends, with more than one half of those working
in this sector being freelance, self-employed or the proprietors and part-
ners of small business enterprises. Television broadcasting companies, for
example, now purchase programmes from producers and directors who in
turn hire, on a project and temporary basis, freelance sound engineers,
camera crews and other staff. The television industry, once integrated on
the basis of large corporations with both in-house production and broad-
casting functions, has become an example of the ‘virtual’ corporation, frag-
mented around a network of broadcasters who are little more than
commissioning agents of programmes made by small-scale enterprises
(Davis and Scase, 2000).
A similar process is occurring within other media sectors such as news-
paper, magazine and book publishing, advertising and the performing arts.
Out-of-house freelance specialists are commissioned to contribute to spe-
cific projects which are co-ordinated by their clients. Areas of London,
New York, Paris and other capital cities are taking on the features of
closely knit occupational districts where networks of independent special-
ists are constantly grouping and re-grouping to offer contractual services
to commissioning clients. Equally, the financial services sector has become
fragmented around a core of major insurance companies, finance houses
and other banking institutions. Self-employed consultants and advisers,
operating from home-based work stations, increasingly ‘interface’ between
the purchasers and suppliers of corporate services and establish partner-
ships and small limited companies, offering specialist financial services
within precisely-designated market niches (Castells, 1996).
Increasing affluence and the greater disposable income of the middle
classes in Europe and the United States offer opportunities for business
start-up among corporate managers and others with specialist skills in
finance, investment and accountancy (Scase, 2000). There are also growing
business opportunities for those occupying middle-level management posi-
tions possessing specialist skills associated with new technology, telecom-
munications and information systems. Demands for software and
computer packages have generated a sector of small-scale providers who
prefer to be self-employed rather than to work in large corporations.
Many university graduates with such skills obtain work experience in large
companies (ibid.) before moving on to smaller software houses or setting
up their own businesses, often in partnership with like-minded others.
Similarly, more sophisticated consumer markets have led to the growth of
public relations, promotion and marketing functions which, instead of
being undertaken in-house, are outsourced to freelance specialists who
often pool their personal talents (Scase, 2002). What are the management
characteristics of these businesses?
The organisation of work on the basis of specialist and changing cus-
tomer needs tends to produce ‘flexible’ work roles, duties and responsibil-
ities. Instead of the performance of routine tasks, adaptiveness and job
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variety are the predominant characteristics of these enterprises. Equally,
their small-scale nature means that little can be offered to employees in
the form of conventional promotion prospects. If these are important
sources of motivation for managers in large organisations, they are gener-
ally absent within small firms. In the latter, psychological rewards are
obtained through personal self-fulfilment and individual recognition (Davis
and Scase, 2000). This has ramifications for management styles, interper-
sonal relations between proprietors and employees, business cultures and
structures, and growth strategies. Work roles tend to be broadly defined
with high levels of discretion and responsibility. Professional employees
working in these small businesses are assumed to prefer personal auto-
nomy, responsibility and recognition and, indeed, these are typically their
motives for moving from employment in large organisations. Staff are
encouraged to develop close working relationships with clients so that, in a
relatively autonomous manner, they can exercise particular expert, cre-
ative and technical skills.
Personal recognition is also an important reward because of the signific-
ance of broader ‘professional’ reference groups. In advertising, television,
film, the performing arts and public relations, there are numerous rewards
and other tokens of recognition that constitute important motivators for
those working in these industries (Fletcher, 1990). Equally, professional
bodies stipulate standards of conduct and criteria for terms of trade which
shape relationships between the buyers and sellers of services. It is only in
the consideration of these factors that it is possible to understand the
internal dynamics and the management processes of these creative and
professional businesses.
Even though the creative energies of employees are the major asset of
such businesses, and the need for self-fulfilment must be addressed, there
must also be suitable financial rewards. However, the discretionary nature
of work means that pay and performance can rarely be precisely measured
(Fletcher, 1990). Further, the organisation of work activities around client-
determined projects can entail the cultivation of long-term relationships
with financial returns accruing over relatively lengthy periods of time.
Employees, then, often expect to have a financial stake in the future of
their businesses, since the assets are largely comprised of their own and
their colleagues’ expert skills. Hence, enterprises that trade with creative
and expert skills are often set up as partnerships rather than as sole propri-
etorships. A further reason for the partnership form is that previously dis-
affected colleagues may, together, possess complementary skills for
start-up. Similarly, partnerships offer support systems and shared compe-
tences which reduce the risks inherent in business start-up. But more
important is the fact that such partnerships enable individuals whose skills
are indispensable for business success to have a stake in ownership.
Although partners may pay themselves relatively low wages in the short
term, they enjoy longer-term benefits in the incremental increases in the
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value of their businesses. Ownership stakes are often extended to those
employees who demonstrate high commitment and performance; equally,
new staff are often attracted by this promise (Scase, 2002). In these ways
participation in ownership is a means for incentivising colleagues in enter-
prises where staff skills provide the basis for value-added trading. Without
such arrangements, tensions can easily emerge, leading to staff resenting
the fact that their talents and skills are being exploited by others for per-
sonal gain.
If the underlying principles of any organisation, whether large or small,
are those of integration and differentiation, within these businesses tend-
encies to differentiation can dominate. Again, partnerships offer an appro-
priate solution, since sources of individualism, division and segmentation
within work processes are compensated by the integrative mechanism of
joint ownership. But the tendency to differentiation makes these busi-
nesses prone to break-up, with partners selling their stakes to set up their
own ventures, often with some of their colleagues. ‘Spin-offs’ of this kind
account for the growing proliferation of small businesses in the media and
creative sectors (Granger et al., 1995). In the absence of methods of direct
managerial control, of the kind found in some traditional craft enterprises,
there is little in the form of explicit control mechanisms which function to
integrate work processes. Even methods of supervision whereby propri-
etors work alongside their staff may be inappropriate, since they offend
‘professional’ notions of personal autonomy and discretion. Further, the
exercise of proprietorial control through the adoption of various charis-
matic, paternalistic or autocratic management styles is of limited value.
Highly motivated employees are likely to feel patronised rather than
motivated by such managerial appeals.
In creative, professional and high technology small businesses, the work
process is broken down into ‘projects’, ‘jobs’ and ‘accounts’. In this way,
activities are organised according to client needs, for which particular indi-
viduals or groups within the enterprise will be responsible. Partners and
employees organise their own and colleagues’ work tasks according to the
job requirements of their own projects, leading to an overall work process
which, although highly fragmented, is dependent upon partners’ relation-
ships with clients (Davis and Scase, 2000).
There is little need for more direct forms of management control since
workflows are constantly adapted according to client preferences. In this
sense clients manage the work process and as such, there is little need for
explicit management control. Just as the division between owners and
employees is dissolved through the setting-up of these businesses as part-
nerships, any distinction between managerial and non-managerial func-
tions is virtually non-existent. There are no managers and rarely are there
partners with solely managerial responsibilities; it is unnecessary when the
management of work is built into the professional–client relationship.
A further reason why the management function lacks specificity in
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these firms is because of the nature of their core competences. Creative,
expert and professional employees obtain qualifications, training and work
experiences that inculcate them with codes of practice and ethics which
are designed to control standards and shape the nature of
professional–client relations. As such, these function as modes of inter-
nalised control, rendering redundant the need for external managerial
controls. Insofar as behaviour is regulated, it tends to be built into collegial
relationships and expressed as professional ethics within ‘training’, ‘induc-
tion’ and ‘shared experiences’. If there are explicit managerial controls
these are applied to support staff such as secretaries, technicians, book-
keepers and other assistants. It is in handling these relationships that there
are likely to be more workplace tensions, since hierarchical controls are
contrary to the predominant culture of these enterprises. Attempts to
exercise formal management over support staff may cause resentment
because this contrasts vividly with the apparently ill-defined interpersonal
relations between experts and professionals within the ‘operating core’.
Such divisions may be compensated by various office rituals; for example,
the celebration of birthdays, office parties and after working hours drinks,
when all employees are invited to socialise. Although embedded in per-
sonal networks, support staff are not partners and rarely have a stake in
the wealth-creation potential of the business. Their jobs offer only limited
opportunities for personal discretion and there are few other rewards in
the form of personal recognition, challenge or self-fulfilment. They have
few chances of promotion as they lack the professional qualifications
and/or creative, technical or expert skills necessary to become members of
the operating core. The absence of formalised management can also create
job dissatisfaction since the work process is organised around specific pro-
jects, support staff are often subject to conflicting demands, yet are rarely
trained to handle such interpersonal relations. For some, then, loosely
structured organisations may be a source of frustration and friction rather
than job satisfaction.
If the cultures of traditional small firms are strongly shaped by their
proprietors, this is less likely to be found in professional and creative small
businesses. The ethos of these reflects a strong ‘individualism’ and the pro-
fessional desire for personal autonomy. As a result, business-based cul-
tures tend to be less influential than the ethos of the profession. To
compensate for this, proprietors and/or senior partners often give explicit
attention to the development of business-based shared values. This may be
achieved through appeals to ‘customer service’, the ‘traditions’ of the busi-
ness and ‘pride in the product’. Such values are inculcated through induc-
tion programmes, socialising, and various in-house rituals and ceremonies
which reinforce ‘core’ attitudes, beliefs and practices. But despite such
attempts, the work process fundamentally orientates staff towards clients,
an attitude which is reinforced by their identification with broader refer-
ence groups such as professional associations. As a result, professionals
Managerial strategies in small firms 75
tend to view their employing organisations as resources which can be used
for delivering services to clients and for enhancing personal reputations
(Davis and Scase, 2000). How, then, can commitment to the business be
obtained?
Essentially, such enterprises are integrated on the basis of informal
social networks and work teams. In staff recruitment, it is often difficult to
assess in any precise manner a person’s skills because of the indeterminate
nature of creative, expert and professional tasks. Alongside references and
job histories, knowledge of job applicants through networks of personal
contacts is often considered important in the recruitment process. Since
work activities are project-driven, as in television production or advert-
ising campaigns, it is important that specialists are able to work together,
pooling their talents and skills in a creative and productive manner.
Hence, trust relations are important, and ever-forming and temporary
work teams are the chief means whereby these can be nurtured. In these
teams, work roles are often stretched beyond specific personal, technical
and creative competences and, hence, colleagues become interdependent
upon each other for the success of their own goals. It is this interdepen-
dence of skills that is the key integrative mechanism which – because of
their external client and professional orientations – might otherwise be
excessively fragmented (Mintzberg, 1983).
A key managerial issue for these enterprises is how to build teams and
recruit colleagues who can fill appropriate team-member and leadership
roles. Team leadership requires the exercise of delicate interpersonal skills
because of the ‘professional sensitivities’ of colleagues. The ability to be
both a team or project leader and a close working colleague is an essential
component of successful organisational integration. Without this, individu-
alism, division and segmentation can become pronounced as colleagues
refuse to work together, withhold ideas and ‘role play’, with the effect that
the potential for creative synergy is lost. Clearly, project teams which
consist of highly talented but often individualistic members may be reluct-
ant to share and build upon each other’s ideas (Belbin, 1986).
Growth and management control
Among traditional craft employers there is a reluctance to move beyond
the size at which it is possible to manage employees on a face-to-face basis
by working alongside them within a process of mutual adjustment. In such
working relations they can remain in control of staff by managing through
example. To shift from this to a management style that requires the ability
to trust staff in a hands-off manner so that systems of delegation can be
established requires a fundamental change in proprietorial attitude and
competence. Equally, the ability to manage according to rules, procedures
and impersonal monitoring mechanisms requires entrepreneurs to develop
management competences. This is particularly the case for those who have
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started their businesses on the basis of specific manual and technical craft
skills. This can also apply to those who have managerial experience in
large organisations since their skills are usually associated with specialist
functional competences rather than more general, all-round abilities. It is
such factors which are likely to hinder business growth, rather than lack of
market opportunity or the inability to raise additional finance (Scase and
Goffee, 1987).
A major constraint limiting small business growth is the process of
mutual adjustment which characterises the work processes of small busi-
nesses. The organisation of duties on this basis incorporates both propri-
etors and their employees within an interdependent division of tasks, out
of which individual skills and competences become defined. Although staff
may be recruited according to their own particular specialist skills, these
do not constitute the sole basis upon which work tasks are performed. By
working closely with others, individuals develop flexible and more broadly
defined skills which enhance the overall performance of the business. But
business growth can destroy this process and therefore the motivation,
morale and the competitive advantage committed staff give to an enter-
prise. Business expansion can lead to the restructuring of relationships,
both between the employer and employees as well as among work col-
leagues. It is often necessary for proprietors to withdraw from their direct
involvement in work processes and, instead of exercising managerial
control through working alongside employees, to exercise authority in a
much more hierarchical manner. A dimension of managerial control is
introduced whereby there is a separation between managerial and opera-
tional activities. As proprietors become less involved in day-to-day opera-
tional matters, more of their time is devoted to negotiation with
customers, suppliers, financial backers and other external agents. In this
way, strategic and operational decision-making becomes separated from
the execution of work tasks. If, at an earlier stage of the business, propri-
etors discuss business plans with their employees, this now becomes less
evident, and with hierarchical control there can be the emergence of staff
resentment as they perceive their employers to be ‘non-productive’. This
may threaten processes of mutual adjustment because employees become
preoccupied with their own duties and thereby reduce the operational flex-
ibility of the business as a whole. There can also be the deterioration of
trust relations between employer and employees, and among work col-
leagues. As a result, forces emerge within the business whereby work pro-
cedures become more formalised according to rules, regulations, job
descriptions, duties and responsibilities. This, in turn, reinforces the need
for a separate management function with proprietors devoting more time
to staff supervision or to their appointing managers, chargehands and
others who can perform this task. Either way, there is generally an
increase in management overheads, with ramifications for the competitive
advantage of the business.
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Because of these internal organisational forces, associated as they are
with the dynamics of business growth, many proprietors choose not to
expand. Growth requires such a fundamental shift in the nature of their
businesses, and of their own managerial role within them, that many pro-
prietors often feel unable to handle expansion. This is certainly the case
with many manual craft owners who, for reasons of work experience and
business background, do not possess the skills for setting up effective man-
agement systems. Equally, they are unlikely to possess the required
competences for appointing staff who could take on managerial
responsibilities required of a growing business.
The problems of growth associated with creative and professional small
businesses can be even more complex and difficult to overcome. Again,
these often arise from a lack of expert management competence but they
can also be related to the job needs and work aspirations of employees.
People with creative talents usually have little desire to exercise manager-
ial control over others. They are more inclined to be interested in exercis-
ing their personal talents, to deliver professionally-determined quality
services to their clients and to enjoy personal recognition (Davis and
Scase, 2000).
Of course, there are a variety of management functions to be under-
taken within professional-based small businesses; tasks have to be super-
vised, co-ordinated and controlled. But this leads to the emergence of a
management process without specialist management roles. In other words,
professional and other highly qualified staff undertake managerial tasks as
part and parcel of their particular competences. Managerial identities
remain latent to those of a more professional or technical kind and the
only explicit management functions which they perform are undertaken in
relation to support staff that provide administrative back-up.
Those businesses which do grow may do so in a variety of ways. Some
do so by what may be described as ‘confederate’ structures. Such firms
operate on the basis of a number of separate profit centres, each focused
upon a particular service, geographical location or market sector. Col-
leagues are designated with responsibilities for each of these and when the
point is reached at which the volume of trade requires the input of a spe-
cialist management function, a part of the growing business is hived off as
a newly created profit centre that again becomes the responsibility of a
colleague. In this way, not only do these businesses reduce the need for a
formalised full-time management function and associated overheads, but
they also meet the personal autonomous work needs of colleagues. They
are able to enjoy continuing self-development through new challenges,
enhancing their specialist and technical competences without increasing
excessively the burden of managerial and administrative responsibilities.
In a sense, then, these businesses achieve growth without managers; the
managerial function is incorporated within the day-to-day exercise of pro-
fessional, technical and specialist skills (Slatter, 1992).
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Confederate structures often have tensions associated with forces of
centralisation and decentralisation. Although these may not be evident
within each of the operating units – functioning as separate profit and loss
centres – they can be apparent within the business as a whole. How and
according to what procedures is performance of the separate units to be
monitored? How much autonomy are they to have in the pursuit of their
own growth strategies? To what extent are the separate strategies likely to
weaken the synergy of the business as a whole? Decisions about these
issues have to be taken, but by whom? In owner-managed businesses this
is likely to be less of a problem, bearing in mind the legitimacy which the
ownership function bestows upon proprietors’ decision-making. But even
so, there are severe constraints on the decision-making autonomy of
owner-managers because of the quality of information that is available to
them. Operational competences are located within the separate business
units and information to proprietors is often ‘filtered’ by those who are
responsible for these units and who are stakeholders in decision-making
processes. As a result, proprietors are likely to rely excessively upon their
own judgement and have insufficient consultation with their senior staff
about strategic issues. There can, in other words, be problems of commu-
nication, information flows and decision-making within confederate struc-
tures (Scase, 2002).
In professional partnerships there are similar problems in strategy
formulation. Decision-making for the business as a whole will often be
subordinated to the interests of the separate operating units because each
professional colleague’s primary interest is directed towards the needs of
their own particular clients. Overall strategy will be decided at infrequent
meetings of those responsible for each of the profit centres. They may be
concerned to protect their own vested interests, rather than to consider the
overall interests of the business. Strategy formulation will be the outcome
of bargaining between interested parties and there will be little in the form
of a coherent ‘core’ which can integrate these into a long-term business
plan. The outcome is for professional-based small businesses to be reactive
to market demands, rather than to have explicit business strategies derived
from detailed analyses of market forecasts and longer-term economic
trends. Only after significant growth is it usually possible for such busi-
nesses to devote the resources necessary for strategic planning. If there is
the nurturing of management skills associated with business growth, these
are more likely to be in operational rather than strategic planning, derived
from their own and their colleagues’ technical capabilities.
The precise organisational characteristics of small-scale confederate
structures are variable; some are extremely loose-knit, with the operating
units trading in a very autonomous manner, others will be more tightly
integrated through a variety of mechanisms. Sometimes these will be to do
with the management or leadership styles of senior partners who may
choose to ‘arbitrarily’ intervene in the decision-making processes of the
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separate operating units. In this way, the business is integrated by shared
values expressed and embodied by the attitudes and behaviour of senior
partners or owner-managers. This is particularly likely to be the case in
those businesses in which there are founder-owners who are able to
impose their opinions upon all aspects of their businesses, ranging from
acceptable standards of performance, to preferences of personality ‘types’
in staff selection, to day-to-day working procedures. This is less likely in
professional small businesses where highly qualified staff are more
inclined to shape the culture of their enterprises according to criteria of
professionalism. Such businesses may grow through the generation of
autonomous operating units, the control of which is more likely to be exer-
cised through financial rather than managerial processes. Monitoring of
performance will be undertaken mainly through standardised output
measures – such as monthly management accounts – rather than according
to forms of direct supervisory control.
Despite the tendency to achieve growth through decentralisation and
fragmentation, some professional and high-tech small businesses are com-
pelled to develop more clearly defined management functions. The need
to integrate the day-to-day activities of professional colleagues and to co-
ordinate these within strategic business plans becomes more explicitly
acknowledged. How, then, is growth to be managed so that professionals
continue to feel in control and yet, at the same time, are prepared to
accept the need for separate managerial mechanisms that will integrate
and co-ordinate their different activities? (Gibb and Scott, 1985). This is a
key issue, the resolution of which will shape the direction of business
growth. Increasingly, it seems, those enterprises producing high value-
added products and services take the view that growth through frag-
mented and confederate devolved structures is the more preferable
option.
It is not only in ‘high value-added’ businesses that growth is managed
through the development of decentralised structures. In those firms
trading in more traditional sectors, the approach to growth through sus-
taining highly centralised entrepreneurial forms is also under review. The
outcome may be reflected in the setting-up of functional structures accord-
ing to which businesses are organised on the basis of a number of specialist
spheres of responsibility. But staff can resent the imposition of procedures
through which they are then compelled to communicate with managers
and/or proprietors. As they perceive it, hierarchical and impersonal
systems erect boundaries between the managerial and operational func-
tions of the business. The imposition of rational monitoring mechanisms
designed to measure output and productivity may, in fact, lead to demoti-
vation. Cultures of ‘informality’ and ‘indulgence’ become superseded by
those characterised by suspicion, resent and interpersonal friction. But
even so, the setting-up of more formalised functional structures can fail to
tackle the central issue facing these businesses: namely, the exercise of
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proprietorial authority. In practice, the imposition of functional structures
can reinforce the highly centralised nature of these businesses, with
owner-managers continuing to be overburdened with operational and stra-
tegic responsibilities and with managerial staff remaining underdeveloped
(Joyce et al., 1996).
To develop organisational structures and managerial strategies con-
tinues to be a major challenge for both traditional and knowledge-based
small firms. To resolve the tensions between the ‘need’ for formal control
mechanisms and employee expectations for ‘autonomy’ produces negoti-
ated outcomes that are both the defining and distinctive features of each
and every small firm. This is why there can be no operational textbooks for
small business management of the kind that shape the philosophies and
practices of the managers of large, bureaucratised organisations. Equally,
from an academic point-of-view, it is difficult to envisage the development
of an all-embracing theory that focuses on the management of the small
firm. The cluster of both internal and external variables that impinge upon
their characteristics is too diverse, particularly bearing in mind the role of
the founding partners or entrepreneurs. Their personal agendas, motives
and philosophies of how ‘businesses should be run’ are bound to be major
determinants of management practices in their businesses and how they
treat their staff. Indeed, as research has shown, whether or not owners
have children that want to come into the business can have strategic
significance for the future of the business. By comparison, the strategies of
large publicly quoted corporations are shaped by rather different consider-
ations.
References
Aston Business School (1991) Constraints on the Growth of Small Firms, Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, London: HMSO.
Belbin, M. (1986) Management Teams. Why they Succeed or Fail, London:
Heinemann.
Birley, S. (1989) ‘Corporate strategy and the small firm’, in Bowman, C. and Asch,
D. (eds) Readings in Strategic Management, London: Macmillan.
Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell.
Churchill, N. C. and Lewis, V. L. (1983) ‘The five stages of small business growth’,
Harvard Business Review, 61(1).
Davis, H. and Scase, R. (2000) Managing Creativity: The Dynamics of Work and
Organisations, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Fletcher, W. (1990) Creative People: How to Manage Them and Maximise Their
Creativity, London: Century Hutchinson.
Gibb, A. and Scott, M. (1985) ‘Strategic awareness, personal commitment and the
process of planning in the small business’, Journal of Management Studies, 22(6).
Goffee, R. and Scase, R. (1995) Corporate Realities: The Dynamics of Organisa-
tions Large and Small, London: Routledge.
Goss, D. (1991) Small Business and Society, London: Routledge.
Managerial strategies in small firms 81
Granger, B., Stanworth, J. and Stanworth, C. (1995) ‘Self-employment career
dynamics: the case of “unemployment push” in UK book publishing’, in Work,
Employment and Society, 9(3).
Ingham, G. (1970) Size of Industrial Organisation and Worker Behaviour, London:
Cambridge University Press.
Joyce, P., Seaman, C. and Woods, A. (1996) ‘The strategic management styles of
small businesses’, in Blackburn, R. and Jennings, P. (eds) Small Firms’ Contribu-
tions to Economic Regeneration, London: Paul Chapman Publishing.
Marlow, S. (2003) ‘Formality and informality in employment relations: the implica-
tions for regulatory compliance by smaller firms’, Government and Policy,
21:531–47.
Mintzberg, H. (1983) Structures in Fives: Designing Effective Organisations, Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Moule, C. (1998) ‘The regulation of work in small firms’, Work, Employment and
Society, 12(4).
Scase, R. (2000) Britain in 2010: The Changing Business Landscape, Oxford: Cap-
stone Publishing.
Scase, R. (2002) Living in the Corporate Zoo, Oxford: Capstone Publishing.
Scase, R. (2003) ‘Industrial relations in small firms’, in Edwards, P. (ed.) Industrial
Relations in Britain, 2nd edn, London: Macmillan.
Scase, R. and Goffee, R. (1987) The Real World of the Small Business Owner,
London: Croom Helm.
Scase, R. and Goffee, R. (1989) Reluctant Managers, London: Routledge.
Slatter, S. (1992) Gambling on Growth, Chichester: Wiley.
82 R. Scase
5 Training in smaller firms
Dean Patton
Introduction
A critical element of the contemporary employment relationship is train-
ing, learning and development. This activity is vital to improve the general
stock of skills within an economy but also forms a key part of the ‘employ-
ment package’ for individuals. The opportunity to engage with appropriate
and effective training and development not only enables employees to add
value to their own stock of human capital, it also contributes to the notion
of being valued by the organisation. Consequently, firms which offer
employees opportunities to develop themselves, their skills and compe-
tences are more likely to retain key workers, be more attractive as
employers and become more productive (Harrison, 2002).
Hence, as is argued by the CBI (2003), a skilled and adaptable work-
force for firms of all sizes is an essential ingredient in the competitiveness
of UK business. A view supported by the Small Business Council (SBC,
2003) in a recent report which highlighted that Britain has relatively poor
labour productivity and low economic performance which can be attri-
buted to a low skills base. These two reports do not identify anything new;
the link between training and competitiveness has been made several
times in the literature (see for example Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Keep
and Mayhew, 1999) and successive governments have sought means by
which the take-up of training by UK business could be more effectively
facilitated. In particular, there has been a focus upon smaller firms because
the evidence indicates that they provide less training than larger firms (see
Blackburn and Hankinson, 1989; Cambridge Small Business Research
Centre, 1992; Curran et al., 1997) and are reluctant to engage with training
and development initiatives instigated by governments, regardless of the
incentives offered (Stanworth and Gray, 1992; Jennings and Hawley, 1996;
Maton, 1999; Matlay, 2000). A number of critical issues have been sug-
gested that limit smaller firm engagement in training and development
initiatives, in particular a lack of time, inadequate finance, and ignorance
of benefits and/or available schemes (Westhead and Storey, 1997; Marlow,
1998).
This is not to suggest that training does not take place in smaller firms,
the extant literature indicates (Hendry et al., 1995; Curran et al., 1997) that
the owners of smaller firms rely upon more informal approaches to train-
ing and development and appear more sceptical of the formal training
process and its presumed benefits (Atkinson and Meager, 1994; Curran et
al., 1997; Matlay, 1999). The reliance upon informal training within the
smaller firm makes the documentation and analysis of such activity more
problematical and issues related to the timing, duration, frequency,
numbers involved, and quality of training provider are all more ambiguous
within the remit of an informal training intervention. Such activity may
also be under-reported as owner-managers, governments and researchers
often adopt very narrow definitions when documenting the training provi-
sion within a firm (Ross, 1993; Kitching and Blackburn, 2002). This does
not necessarily mean that such training is of less value, only that it is more
difficult to track the process and consequences of any intervention.
Curran et al. (1997) point out that research on training has led to the
inference that smaller firms, for whatever reason, require special assis-
tance in raising the skill levels of their workforce. In order to address this
problem, successive UK governments have invested considerable
resources in attempting to encourage greater take up of mainly formal
training and development initiatives which lead to some recognised quali-
fication. Policies thus far have sought to broaden the range and scope of
agencies offering training schemes and develop new standards to recognise
both corporate and individual achievement, such as the National Voca-
tional Qualifications (NVQs) and Investors in People (IiP) awards. In
addition, firms have been encouraged to develop support structures for
those employees who seek external training opportunities, whilst
employees themselves have been offered incentives to develop skills, for
example from the now defunct Individual Learning Accounts initiative.
Furthermore, the structure through which such initiatives are imple-
mented has undergone significant change. National Training Organisations
(NTOs), the successor to Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), are
themselves now to be replaced by Sector Skills Councils (SSCs). The
speed with which NTOs, designed to impose some coherence upon a
chaotic structure of skills training, have been discarded does not engender
a great deal of confidence, especially in the aftermath of the discredited
Individual Learning Accounts. The network of 23 SSCs, as opposed to 73
NTOs, is expected to provide employers with greater influence in their
dealings with government and the improvement in budget from £8m for
NTOs to £40m for SSCs should also provide the resource to help drive the
initiative forward (Guardian, 2003).
As noted above, despite the efforts made by government to date, the
general take-up of training and development initiatives remains low,
particularly in smaller firms, and it is not possible to overestimate the dif-
ficulties in developing a set of policies and structures that could improve
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the current situation. There is clearly no shortage of advice and the subject
has recently been the recipient of a number of reports, two reports from
DfES (Kitching and Blackburn, 2002 and IFF Research, 2002), a report
from the SBC (2003) and finally the CBI (2003). The IFF (2002) report is
the third annual report on learning and training at work which suggests
that the generic provision of training by businesses of all categories had
changed very little since 1999 and, if anything, has slightly declined. The
need to improve the propensity to train would still appear to be an import-
ant issue. As indicated, the UK government has, to date, continued to
focus upon the provision of subsidised formal training initiatives that are
linked to some external verification/qualification supported by campaigns
to persuade smaller firms, in particular, of the benefits of training. The
CBI (2003) and the SBC (2003), taking their lead from the Kitching and
Blackburn (2002) report, both promote the suitability and benefits of a
more informal approach to the training process in the smaller firm
community and identify the limited relevance and disproportionate cost of
more formal initiatives to the smaller business. This chapter investigates
the role of training in smaller firms and provides a review of the extant
literature to highlight a number of salient issues relating to the take up of
training initiatives, the barriers and motivations that exist, the role and
importance of informal and formal practices, the influence of size, sector
and structure, and the implications of these issues for policy.
Training take-up rates in smaller firms
Training activity within smaller firms will almost certainly be influenced by
the owner-manager; writers have indicated that there are differences in
the performance of smaller firms that relate to the characteristics of the
owner (Birley and Westhead, 1990; Ram and Sparrow, 1993; Marlow,
1998; Moran, 1998). It has also been suggested that the business strategy of
a firm is often intimately linked to the personality of the owner-manager
reflecting their priorities and characteristics (Welch, 1996; Moran, 1998;
Perry et al., 1998) and again, it is not untenable to suppose that an element
of strategy would be the employment of training to develop strengths and
reduce perceived weaknesses in the firm. Matlay (1997) and Watson et al.
(1998) indicate that the background, experience, growth orientation and
motivation of the owner are critical when making decisions to commission
training and also in the way in which it is used and disseminated through-
out the organisation. The characteristics of the owners and their percep-
tions of the value of training are clearly important to the decision to train,
the areas in which training will be undertaken and how the training is then
deployed within the firm.
Research evidence has also consistently shown that the take up of train-
ing is strongly associated with employer size (Blackburn and Hankinson,
1989; Cambridge Small Business Research Centre, 1992; Storey, 1994), but
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in reaching this conclusion the emphasis inevitably falls, as a consequence
of government predisposition, upon more formal training practices. This
evidence is clearly borne out in the IFF survey (2002) which indicates that
SMEs are less likely to undertake training than larger firms; a trend which
is more evident for off-the-job training, especially that type which leads to
qualifications. However, they also indicate that some 75 per cent of firms
employing 5–24 employees provide on-the-job training and 57 per cent
provide off-the-job training, indicating that those smaller firms that do not
train are in a minority and showing a smaller firm preference for more
informal approaches to training. The report by Kitching and Blackburn
(2002) also identifies the limited take up of formal training by smaller firms
and highlights that this is more so when government training initiatives are
involved; excluding NVQs only 13 per cent of responding businesses
reported current involvement in government training initiatives. NVQs
were slightly more popular with some 11 per cent of firms reporting that at
least one worker had achieved an NVQ during the year prior to interview
and a further 13 per cent reporting that someone was currently working
towards an NVQ. The popularity of NVQs may be related to the increased
awareness of the initiative relative to other government schemes as identi-
fied in reports by both the IFF (2002) and Kitching and Blackburn (2002).
The above, while supporting the fact that smaller firms are less likely to
train than larger firms, also highlight that other underlying trends within
the sector could be obscured by such a generic statement. For example,
Deloitte et al. (1989:25) indicated that ‘when smaller establishments train
they provide as many, and often more, days of training per employee as
larger establishments’, signifying that not all smaller firms are poor train-
ers. Furthermore, the CBI’s Employment Trends Survey (2002) indicates
that SMEs are more likely than larger firms to rate workforce skills as a
major factor in their competitiveness, refuting the suggestion that SMEs
do not value their staff and offering a compelling reason for smaller firms
to undertake training. Similarly, it says little about the qualitative reasons
for variations in the training provision between firms of different sizes, in
particular the significance which employers attach to training, motives for
providing (or not providing) training, and the type of training they con-
sider relevant to their needs. Questions of this nature are important if a
realistic attempt is to be made to improve the level of training provision
among smaller businesses. Cosh et al. (1998) indicate that there are
significant differences in the characteristics of firms which provide training
compared to those which do not and that the determinants of training
could include industrial sector, past innovation, size, growth, skill ratio and
recruitment problems.
The general conclusion from the literature investigating the training
needs of small business owners (see Stanworth and Curran, 1989; Goss and
Jones, 1992; Curran et al., 1997) would seem to indicate that such needs are
highly variable, and reflect the diversity of background and experience pos-
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sessed by individuals in this field. It seems likely therefore, that understand-
ing the training provision in smaller firms, and avenues to improve it, will
need to recognise diversity such that future research needs to draw firmer
conclusions on the influence of variables, including size, sector and growth
patterns on the decision to train. Those responsible for policy must also be
familiar with and understand the diversity of needs among small firms and
be able to match this to training initiatives if smaller firms are to increase
their training provision. The next sections will, therefore, review the liter-
ature that has investigated the barriers to training in smaller firms and the
motivations that exist for those firms that do undertake training.
Motivations to train
In discussing training in smaller firms the actual motivations that underpin
the decision to train are often overlooked; the axiomatic argument that
training per se is beneficial to the business is assumed to be enough justifi-
cation to develop initiatives and expect firms to adopt them. As indicated
in the next section, since evidence identifying such benefits is limited, the
decision by smaller firms to engage in limited formal training may be
derived from sound reasoning. It should also be noted that the motivation
to train will also be dependent upon the type of training being offered and
the position of the recipient within the firm. Motivations to offer induction
training to new staff may be very different from those motivations that
lead to investments in continuous training by owner-managers or man-
agers. Some generic statements on the motivations to train are, however,
offered in the literature.
The Nottinghamshire Research Observatory (2002) identified three
main factors which motivated the decision to train in smaller businesses.
First, firms were motivated to train because they viewed such activity as
good for business through the improvement of customer service, company
standards and supporting competitiveness. Second, it was thought to keep
staff motivated and made them more productive through improvements in
flexibility and professionalism. Finally, training was undertaken as a result
of legislative requirements.
Kitching and Blackburn (2002) in their study indicated that workforce
training had two purposes: technical, to equip new recruits with sufficient
knowledge and skills to enable them to perform their new work roles to
some minimum standard; and social, to secure new recruits’ co-operation
with the employer’s aims and the working relations into which they enter.
This latter objective was particularly important for new recruits. In
summary, employers provided workforce training to provide workers with
skills required in their current jobs and to improve business performance.
Within the Kitching and Blackburn study these two motives accounted for
71 per cent of the most important reasons for respondents undertaking
training activity. Goals such as training in order to introduce new equipment
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or software, or to meet legal obligations such as health and safety regula-
tions, were also perceived as important. Other objectives such as providing
workers with skills required in future jobs or to provide qualifications were
much less important and approximately 10 per cent of employers felt that
training offered no benefits whatsoever.
In discussing motivations to undertake training, the SBC report
(2003:4) suggests that there is a clear link between such activities and busi-
ness strategy, they go on to state, ‘employers do not train for the sake of it,
or for paper qualifications, but because there is a business need; skills are a
means to an end, rather than an end in themselves’. The report then iden-
tifies the key drivers for investment in training as recruitment of staff, new
products and services, changes in technology and work organisation, and
new regulation.
Barriers to training in smaller firms
There are a number of supply and demand factors that could limit the take
up of training in smaller firms and this section will review these factors and
then interrogate the empirical evidence to look at their perceived impact
on smaller firms. In their review of the literature on barriers to training
take-up by SMEs, Westhead and Storey (1997) identify two explanations,
‘market forces’ and ‘ignorance’. The market forces explanation refers to
the different factors that influence the supply and demand of training and
rests on the view that smaller businesses offer a less than optimal level of
training due to their expectations that the returns to training will not
exceed the costs of its provision. Market forces explanations highlight the
problems of organisational constraints such as lack of time, costs of train-
ing and the dominance of short-term survival issues, the limited internal
labour market and the geographical location of the business. In essence, it
is suggested that the market context in which firms are embedded would
affect their skill needs. On the supply side, there are also a number of
issues pertaining to the delivery of programmes to a heterogeneous sector
that have their decision-making processes compromised by a variety of
factors as identified above. Ignorance explanations refer to a lack of
awareness by small business owners of the importance of training for skills
development and indicate that smaller firms are less likely to provide
training because owner-managers are unaware of training initiatives
and/or the benefits that such training can provide.
Issues linked to market forces
Greater uncertainty
Westhead and Storey (1997:18) indicate that the ‘small firm experiences
considerably greater external uncertainty than a large firm, primarily
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because of its lack of power in the market place’. As a consequence of
greater external uncertainty and lower survival rates smaller firms are
more inclined to take a short-term view of investment decisions and this
will include training decisions. Therefore smaller firms, because of the
context in which they operate, may be acting more rationally by undertak-
ing proportionately less training than that undertaken by larger firms.
Mobility/poaching of trained employees
It would normally be expected that training would enhance the human
capital of those involved. Human capital theory argues that individuals
will invest time and effort in adding to their own capital in order to
enhance careers, or obtain greater rewards for their efforts. It has been
established that smaller firms, on average, offer poorer terms and con-
ditions of employment than large firms (Rainnie, 1989: Storey, 1994) and
that career progression may also be limited because of the absence of
internal labour markets (Wynaczyk et al., 1993). These two factors
increase the possibility that those that have undergone training in smaller
firms would be more likely to seek alternative employment outside the
firm, to take advantage of enhancement in their human capital. In these
circumstances it may be expected that smaller firms would be more scep-
tical about investments in training, and particularly that type of training
that is generic to all firms which may be then used by the individual to
gain employment elsewhere, a situation documented by Westhead and
Storey (1997). However, the Kitching and Blackburn (2002:xiii) report
suggests that a relatively low proportion of employers (2 per cent of
respondents) perceive the threat of poaching trained employees as a
barrier to training.
A failure to associate training with performance
The problems faced in identifying positive causal relations between invest-
ment in training and development initiatives and enhanced performance
have been identified by a number of commentators (Westhead and Storey,
1997; Patton et al., 2000). Smaller firms may be more reluctant to invest in
training because there are no clear indicators that even coherent and
integrated training initiatives reap a tangible return.
Diseconomies of scale
As Vickerstaff (1992) suggests, in practice within smaller firms, there will
be relatively few trainees per firm but such firms will generally require
bespoke training due to the diverse nature of requirements within the
sector. Not being able to spread the cost of training across a number of
employees significantly raises the cost involved. This was identified by
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respondents in the Kitching and Blackburn report as the second most
important reason for not providing more training.
Significant loss of output
The high associated opportunity costs of providing time away from work
has been identified as a key reason for not releasing employees for train-
ing. The cost relates not only to the loss of productivity, which can be very
significant within a smaller firm, but also the associated cost of hiring
someone else who is likely to be less efficient or competent (see Blackburn
and Hankinson, 1989; Atkinson and Meager, 1994; Curran et al., 1997).
Kitching and Blackburn (2002:57) note that, ‘lost working time while
workers were being trained was the third most important reason, among
respondents, for not providing more training’. The extent of this problem
is highlighted by the SBC (2003) when they suggest that the proposal to
pay an employer 150 per cent of the worker’s wage under the Employer
Training pilots will not be sufficient to replace the experience and know-
ledge of the person given leave to train.
Suitability of the training available
There have been a number of studies that have suggested that the supply
of training to small firms in the UK may be inappropriate (see for example
Vickerstaff, 1992; Westhead and Storey, 1997; CBI, 2003). A main concern
being that the training available is based upon what can be supplied, not
what is required/demanded and as a consequence, provision does not
recognise the true needs of the sector. In addition, owner-manager aware-
ness and confidence has not been helped by the fact that previous training
programmes introduced by the government have not had a particularly
long shelf life (Jennings et al., 1992). Small firms have also indicated that
the training provision has not been conveniently provided either in terms
of timing and/or location and that, in general, too little consultation has
been made by those providing training with the recipients of that training
(Kirby, 1990; Cambridge Small Business Research Centre, 1992; CBI,
2003).
Perceived quality of the training provider
Criticism has been made of the quality of those involved in providing the
training to smaller firms. It has been indicated that providers lack both the
essential skills and knowledge to deal with the heterogeneity that exists
within the smaller firm context (Cambridge Small Business Research
Centre, 1992; Johnson and Gubbins, 1992; CBI, 2003).
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Issues linked to ignorance
Problems in understanding the need to train
Micro and small firms, in particular, are less likely than larger firms to
have a training and development plan or training budget established from
some formal assessment of needs. For example, Keogh and Stewart
(2001), report that SMEs often lack the capacity to undertake skills fore-
casting and strategic analysis that would enable them to plan future train-
ing interventions. Consequently, smaller firms often do not have in place
the systems that could highlight skill deficiencies. At this level the owner-
manager is critical in the decision to train and convincing them that busi-
ness performance can be improved through the skill enhancement of
employees is crucial to raising the demand for training. Curran et al. (1997)
also indicate that many owner-managers hired people already fully trained
and this probably contributes to the perception that training is not
required. The study by Kitching and Blackburn (2002:57) offers some sup-
porting evidence for this, indicating that two of the most important
reasons for not providing more training to established workers were ‘suffi-
cient training is provided after workers are recruited’ (31.8 per cent identi-
fied this as the most important reason) or ‘staff are all fully trained before
they are recruited’ (11.2 per cent).
Awareness of opportunities
Ignorance of available opportunities is also a critical issue regarding the
degree of commitment to existing schemes and the IFF (2002) report
indicates that awareness of all training initiatives increases as the size of
the firm increases. Fuller et al. (1991) have previously suggested that train-
ers do not provide sufficient information about training programmes and
as a consequence owner-managers are unaware of courses available and
this may explain some of the difference in awareness between size of busi-
ness. This point was also emphasised in the study of the Small Firms Train-
ing Loan Scheme (Maton, 1999), where the main reason indicated for the
low take-up rate of the scheme was a lack of awareness on behalf of
respondents.
It is probable that all of these criticisms contribute to a negative
perspective on behalf of owner-managers leading to mental barriers
against training because previous experiences have not lived up to expec-
tations (Kirby, 1990; Vickerstaff, 1992). So, any solutions in developing the
propensity of smaller firms to train may need to start with redressing the
negative perceptions that have been instilled within owner-managers as a
consequence of antecedent factors.
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The role and importance of informal and formal training
When reviewing the training process within smaller firms it is important to
identify the differentiations that have been made within the literature and
provide some commentary on the reasons for such distinctions. Training
has been essentially subdivided into three categories: informal and formal
training, induction and continuous training, and management and
employee training. If a generalisation from the literature were to be made
then it could be suggested that smaller firms will tend to utilise informal,
induction training for employees; larger firms will also use these tech-
niques but, in addition, offer formal, continuous training to employees and
managers. Furthermore it would, normally, be assumed that the majority
of continuous training, especially that which related to management,
would be delivered formally by external providers (Kitching and Black-
burn, 2002).
The term, formal training and development refers to initiatives which
can be identified by both recipients and deliverers as an intervention
which has a structured mode of delivery, where the aim is to impart new
awareness or knowledge of a workplace process or activity. After the
training experience, the recipient should be able to demonstrate new skills
and/or competencies. Formal training would normally result in a qualifica-
tion or other form of recognition and is often divided into three distinct
groups.
• Professional and job specific skills training which is required to do the
job or is a necessary part of improving a person’s ability to do the job.
• Training that is a legal requirement for the position, often done as a
rolling programme or on an annual basis as part of continuing profes-
sional development.
• Training undertaken for an individual’s personal development.
In contrast informal training and learning is a far more diffuse process
and occurs throughout the organisation as individuals observe, imitate and
learn from others on a fragmented and flexible basis. The extent to which
this occurs is dependent on the environment of the organisation, the
nature of the tasks in hand, the propensity of individuals to learn, imitate
and innovate etc. As a consequence of its informality training of this
nature has often been described in rather negative language, for example,
undertaken on an ad hoc basis, unstructured and/or unplanned. Such lan-
guage can lead to the mistaken assumption that it is of a lower value than
formal training. This perception has led researchers, for example Curran et
al. (1996), to question the emphasis placed upon formal training in a
smaller firm context. They go on to suggest that in smaller firms the nature
of the labour process combined with owner-manager concerns regarding
time and financial resources ensure that informal training is preferred and
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this preference should be considered as a valuable source of new skills and
knowledge. In particular, diffuse forms of knowledge and skill accumula-
tion should not be dismissed because they are outside the measurable tem-
plate of formality.
The SBC (2003:4) suggest that ‘training is often distinguished by its for-
mality, but all these types of training are equally valid and those that are
less formal are more suited to the needs and demands of small employers
and should be recognised as such by the Government’. In addition, it
should be pointed out that an individual in a firm may undertake some
form of formal training and then utilise this to provide informal training
for those employees within the firm to whom it is relevant. In a smaller
firm this would probably be regarded as an effective and efficient use of
resources where some skill gap had been identified. In a recent article,
Storey (2002) suggested once more that smaller businesses were not
scaled-down versions of large ones and that, ‘While smaller companies
provide less formal training than large ones, they are nevertheless substan-
tial providers of informal training, encapsulated in the phrase “sitting by
Nellie”.’ It is argued that a better understanding of the diversity that exists
within smaller firms and the contexts under which they operate is required
to inform the policy agenda.
The IFF report (2002:99) suggests the proportion of employers provid-
ing off-the-job training increases with increasing size of employer. In the
2001 study, just over a quarter (29 per cent) of the smallest firms did so,
rising to half (49 per cent) amongst those with 5–24 employees and to
three-quarters (77 per cent) amongst those with 25 employees or more.
When looking at those employees who had received off-the-job training in
the previous 12 months, the average number of days provided by different
sizes of firm does not follow a regular pattern and does not vary by size of
employer in a uniform manner. Around half of the smallest firms had pro-
vided on-the-job training. The proportion amongst those with five or more
employees was higher. Whilst the provision of on-the-job training
increases with increasing size of employer, the variation is not as great as it
is with off-the-job training
Curran et al. (1997) also suggested that it was important to distinguish
between induction training and continuing training; previously Johnson
and Gubbins (1992) had highlighted the significance of induction training
within smaller firms. Induction training is normally associated with more
informal practices, generally offered to new or recently promoted staff and
corresponds to the type of training most often offered by smaller firms.
The content of induction training in most sectors, as Curran et al.. (1997)
have suggested, is closely tailored to the employee’s needs in relation to
the work role, instruction on pay and conditions, health and safety and
workplace practices. The findings from their study indicate that ‘almost 80
per cent of owner-managers reported providing induction training for at
least some employees’ (1997:93). Kitching and Blackburn (2002:83)
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support this conclusion and indicate that some 82 per cent of respondents
from the telephone survey provided initial training and that for at least 16
per cent of firms this was the only form of training offered. The findings
from this report (2002:12) also support the notion that such training is
most often delivered using more informal practices and examples include
initial training being delivered through ‘learning on the job’ (84 per cent of
respondents), informal conversations (74 per cent) and tours of the work-
place (66 per cent).
Continuing training is offered to existing employees in an attempt to
improve the existing skill base and improve work performance. This type
of training has, recently, become associated with the notion of workforce
development defined by the Cabinet Office, Performance and Innovation
Unit (2001:3) as consisting of ‘. . . activities which increase the capacity of
individuals to participate effectively in the workplace, thereby improving
their productivity and employability’. Such training has, in the main, been
linked with more formal practices, as identified earlier and consequently
with larger firms, the content of which typically includes issues related to
quality, product knowledge, working methods, computing and IT.
The study by Curran et al. (1997:94) indicated that just over 80 per cent
of owner-managers reported providing continuing training for at least
some employees during the previous 12 months. Kitching and Blackburn
(2002:7) take the analysis a little further and look at the training of estab-
lished staff in terms of the incidence of training and the ‘intensity’ of such
training based upon an index created to give an approximate measure of
the proportion of staff that had received training in the previous year. The
findings indicate that some 59 per cent of respondents had undertaken
training initiatives for established staff and the index would suggest that
approximately half (47 per cent) of the workforce in those firms that
offered training to established staff had been involved in such initiatives in
the year prior to interviews being undertaken.
There has also been a distinction made in the literature between train-
ing which is offered to managers, including owner-managers, and training
offered to non-managers or employees. Abbott (1993) has suggested that
the type of training normally undertaken by professional and managerial
employees was much more likely to have been of a formal nature than for
any other groups of workers. It may be the case that management training
is more likely to be formal and external to the workplace simply because
the new skills that managers are seeking to acquire could not be found
within the workplace. For this reason it is less likely that management
training will be undertaken by smaller firms, and why it is more prevalent
within the large firm sector. The distinction between managerial and non-
managerial training is often made on the implied assumption that the
training offered to managers may have a greater impact upon firm
performance. For example, Atkinson and Storey (1994) identified the low
quality of management as a major problem facing the survival and internal
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efficiency of small firms. In addition, McRae (1991) indicates that a distin-
guishing feature between high growth and low growth firms is the training
and experience of senior management, whilst the Bank of England (1998)
makes specific reference to the need for improved management skills in
small firms.
Evidence on the characteristics of management and non-management
training and its relative take-up within smaller firms is limited. The Kitch-
ing and Blackburn (2002:7) study indicates that owner-managers were less
likely to report undertaking any training themselves (40 per cent) and
suggest that this is probably related to one of two factors. First, owner-
managers were more likely to adopt a narrow view of training that limited
the inclusion of informal practices and, second, training may be perceived
as more problematical as their absence within the workplace would be
more acutely felt.
The different approaches to training within smaller firms partly reflects
distinctive size-related characteristics, which affect the ability of firms to
identify their skill and training needs and also their capacity to respond to
them. However, they may also reflect different requirements, particularly
with respect to the greater need for multi-skilling and functional flexibility
in organisations where it is a necessity that workers are able to turn their
hands to several tasks. Furthermore, while some of the differences in
approach stem from differences in management resources that affect the
ability of managers to define and organise training, management attitudes
can also be a factor. A lack of ‘professional’ management training is often
associated with practices that fail to recognise the full potential value of
training or the more general potential contribution of human resources to
a firm’s competitiveness. In addition, behavioural characteristics that stem
from the coalescence of ownership and management mean that the owner-
manager’s attitudes towards and experience of education and training are,
in themselves, a major influence on the training and wider HRM culture
within the firm. Financial resource constraints may also contribute to
expenditure on training being viewed as a cost to be justified in terms of its
contribution to solving an immediate problem or undertaking a particular
task, rather than as an investment for the future development of the firm
through upgrading its human resource base.
Characteristics that influence the decision to train and
training typologies
Having determined that size is a significant variable in the decision to train
and the type of training activity undertaken, this section reviews some of
the factors that could account for the diversity that exists within size
bands. A number of writers have suggested segmenting the smaller firm
sector by the propensity of individual firms to train and early examples
include the Training Agency (1989) and Blackburn and Hankinson (1989).
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Goss and Jones (1992) built on these examples to identify three distinct
training patterns within smaller firms ‘Sophisticated training’, ‘Instrumen-
tal training’ and ‘Restricted training’. Restricted trainers are defined as
providing only informal on-the-job training, or no training at all. Instru-
mental trainers are defined as those who provide only training of a directly
vocational or technical nature, for example apprenticeships for young
workers and retraining for more established employees, the latter usually
being related to the demands made by the installation of new technology.
Sophisticated trainers are defined as those who provide, in addition to
Instrumental training, programmes of a more developmental and inno-
vative nature, for example leadership and supervisory skills, graduate or
postgraduate sponsorship and management development.
Goss and Jones (1992) indicate that when these training categories are
put against size rank a distinct clustering pattern is apparent whereby
Sophisticated training is predominant in higher size rank (i.e. largest
firms), Instrumental in the mid-range, and Restricted training in the lower
size ranks (i.e. smallest firms). However, to offer a more meaningful expla-
nation they found it necessary to use the managerial role structure of the
organisation to explain differences in attitudes towards training.
It has already been indicated that some of the difference in attitudes
may be as a result of the undoubted influence that the owner-manager can
have on training decisions. Goss and Jones (1992), however, take this a
stage further and investigate the influence that more sophisticated organi-
sational structures can have upon the decision to train. The authors
offered three types of organisational structure that might exist within
smaller firms:
• Monarchic structures, where no managers or supervisors, other than
the owner-manager(s) were employed.
• Diarchic structures, where, beneath the owner-managers, there was a
single line-manager level.
• Polyarchic structures with usually two, but possibly more, managerial
levels beneath senior/owner-managers.
Employing this typology Goss and Jones (1992) find that a significant
relationship existed between structures and training patterns within
smaller firms with the sophistication of training activity increasing as
organisations became more complex. In addition, as might be expected,
the simpler monarchic and diarchic structures show less formality in terms
of the identification of training needs, the designation of training budgets
and functional responsibility than that displayed by polyarchic structures.
The Curran et al. (1997) study investigated 4,000 enterprises from three
sectors, those of manufacturing, services and construction. While not iden-
tifying any specific typology, the study did report differences in training
determined by the sector in which the firm operates. Their findings indi-
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cated that firms in the service sectors were most likely to have a training
plan and budget, followed by manufacturing firms and finally, construction
firms. The low performance of construction was, in part, explained by the
use of sub-contractors on short-term contracts hired only if they could
demonstrate the skills required. The relatively high levels of training that
existed in service businesses was suggested to be linked to the high propor-
tion of businesses in new, knowledge-based and professional services.
Curran et al. (1997) suggests that the owner-managers of such firms are
more likely to exhibit positive attitudes towards training. The vagaries and
diversity that exists within business sectors are also highlighted in the
Kitchen and Blackburn (2002) report, which indicates that the sectors
found to be high trainers included ‘other services’, ‘business and profes-
sional services’ and ‘primary and construction’. The last grouping, in some
part, contradicting the findings made in the Curran et al. (1997) study.
Kitching and Blackburn (2002) also sought to categorise employers
based upon the extent to which they varied in their orientation to train,
but their analysis of the differences identified advances as based upon
responses to questions concerning attitudes towards training and the exist-
ence of a training budget; they segmented the sample into ‘strategic’ (30
per cent of firms), ‘tactical’ (55 per cent) and ‘low’ (15 per cent) trainers.
Such segmentation shows the variation in small employers’ approaches to
training and acts as a possible basis for explaining differences in training
activities. In summary, Kitching and Blackburn (2002) suggest that a rela-
tionship existed between a firm’s orientation towards training and both the
incidence of training provision and training index values. Strategic trainers
were more likely to report training for all three types of recipient identi-
fied in the study (new recruits, established staff, owner-managers) than
tactical trainers who, in turn, reported a higher incidence of training than
low trainers. Furthermore, ‘strategic trainers’ offered additional training to
twice as many established staff as tactical trainers and to seven times as
many staff as low trainers during the previous year. The fact that strategic
trainers reported a higher number of benefits of training, were more likely
to measure the effects of training, were more convinced of the value of
training, and also likely to have a more favourable view of qualifications,
probably underpins the propensity of training activity.
Similar to Goss and Jones (1992), Kitching and Blackburn (2002) indi-
cate firm size is important and that strategic trainers tended to be larger
than other businesses. However, they also indicate that such firms tend to
be located in ‘other services’ rather than other sectors, to operate in
slightly more competitive product market conditions than low trainers,
and to compete on the basis of non-price factors more commonly than low
trainers. Other differences highlighted include the fact that strategic train-
ers were more likely than tactical and low trainers to report employment
growth over the previous two- and five-year periods, to anticipate employ-
ment growth over the next two years, to have experienced real sales
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growth over the previous two years, and to expect real sales growth over
the next two years.
Finally, strategic trainers were also more likely to report genuine bar-
riers to further training such as financial cost, lost working time and a
failure to find suitable training opportunities. Low trainers, in contrast,
were more likely to give reasons reflecting the lack of a perceived need for
further training. Instead, they claimed that staff were fully trained before
they arrived at the firm and that training would not produce any benefits
for their businesses. Tactical trainers were more evenly divided on their
reasons for not providing additional training.
Consequently, there are some similarities between sophisticated and
strategic, instrumental and tactical, and restricted and low trainers, but
Kitching and Blackburn (2002) have highlighted significantly more issues
other than size that differentiate the various categories. It is important for
policy makers to understand when developing new initiatives that firm
characteristics, such as organisational structure, market sector, growth
aspirations and the perceptions of barriers, can affect future training
decisions within smaller firms.
A further point to note from the Kitching and Blackburn (2002) study is
the reported differences in training patterns by occupational group; in
particular, professional and technical workers were more likely to receive
training than other occupational groups. Moreover, it is likely that some
relationship exists between the propensity of certain occupational groups
to receive training (professional, technical and managerial) and the
propensity of certain sectors to exhibit higher levels of training (business
and professional services).
The implications for government policy on training in
smaller firms
Storey (2002) indicates that UK public policy-makers have, over the last
two decades, attempted to deal with the limited take-up of training in
smaller firms in three ways. The first has been a focus upon making smaller
firms aware of the benefits and the added value that training can offer to
the operations process. Second, and often in association with the first, sub-
sidies and grants have been offered on the assumption that once smaller
firms were able to experience the benefits of training, they would continue
to use such initiatives even if subsidies were removed. Finally, and prob-
ably least effective, has been the attempts to coerce smaller firms to train
as a consequence of verbal rebukes and reprimands issued through
government bodies and the media. It is Storey’s opinion (2002) that these
attempts have not been effective in that smaller firms continue to under-
take less formal training than their larger counterparts. The Kitching and
Blackburn (2002:xiv) study offers empirical support for this view indicat-
ing that, unlike smaller firms, ‘larger employers were more likely to be
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involved in at least one government training initiative’. The same study,
which focused specifically on firms with less than 50 employees, suggested
that the great majority of employers were indifferent to government initi-
atives, finding them irrelevant to their training needs or perceiving little
need for any further training per se. However, it should be noted that,
those employers who had received funding and/or were involved in the
Investors in People initiative expressed general satisfaction with the inter-
vention.
Consequently, Storey (2002) argues that a radical rethink of policy is
required to change the current scenario and this should commence with a
broadening of the definition of training to include more informal
approaches. This greater recognition of more informal approaches to
training is required as such practices are more applicable and cost effective
within the smaller firm context. So, it is argued that smaller firms cannot
be amalgamated with larger businesses within a ‘one size fits all’ method as
such policies fail to address the nuances that exist within the smaller firm
community. In fact, policies may actually have to be redesigned to include
the informal approaches to training favoured by smaller firms and the link
between training and qualifications may have to be broken.
Kitching and Blackburn (2002) offer a number of suggestions on how
this radical rethink in policy might be enacted, in particular a key policy
implication from the study refers to the targeting of training initiatives at
particular types of employer and within enterprises at particular members
of the workforce. The advantages of such segmentation are suggested to
be a clearer identification of needs and improved targeting of initiatives
through, most importantly, the use of relevant delivery mechanisms. The
case for segmentation is based upon differences in the type of employer
and differences in the training recipient. In the first instance, it is suggested
that those firms that had previously undertaken training and exhibited
what was described as a strategic orientation to train would be likely to
increase their training activity if perceived barriers were alleviated. The
barriers identified are the monetary costs and time constraints associated
with training. However, they are less optimistic about those firms that
have not trained previously and exhibit a low orientation to training. In
these circumstances it is suggested that business owners do not perceive
the need for training or any potential benefits, in fact, the reverse is the
case with training perceived as a drain on resources that could be better
allocated elsewhere. As a consequence it is suggested that these firms are
unlikely to train unless, somehow, they can be persuaded of the advan-
tages such activity can bring. Even in the former case the report suggested
that take-up would only be improved if initiatives also built upon the exist-
ing provision which was generally delivered at the workplace either in-
house or by external providers. Kitching and Blackburn (2002) link
perceptions in this cohort with the product strategies currently pursued
and therefore, suggest that the take-up of training might be improved if
Training in smaller firms 99
measures are taken to shift product strategies which are combined with
more traditional inducements to train.
Training could also be targeted at different groups of staff within an
enterprise; Kitching and Blackburn (2002) make the distinction between
new recruits, established staff and owner-managers. With reference to the
former, initial training is viewed as often being firm specific but it is sug-
gested firms may be more prepared to engage with NVQs and apprentice-
ships for new recruits. Once staff are ‘established’ the barriers to training
are similar to those identified for employers; government training initi-
atives may have the greatest opportunity to interface with this group when
there is a technical or product change in the enterprise. Of the three
groups, increasing the propensity to train of owner-managers is thought to
be most difficult. The main reasons suggested for this are the limited time
that owner-managers have and the concern that their knowledge and skills
cannot be covered in their absence. The main route forward for this cohort
is thought to entail linking training to broader business strategy relating to
product, technical or process developments. This may enable governments
to embed training of this nature into existing initiatives which are product
or market focused, and this approach could be favourably received as it
more closely follows the owner-managers line of thinking in that training
is not undertaken for its own sake, but reflects wider developments in the
business.
The SBC (2003) has used the information developed in the Kitching
and Blackburn (2002) study, which they commissioned, to inform their
recommendations on future government initiatives. Consequently, the
SBC support the recognition of all forms of learning within smaller firms
and, in particular, the value offered by informal training. It is suggested
furthermore, that governments should concentrate on providing ‘effective
advice and quality provision rather than passing prescriptive legislation’
(2003:6). The SBC are critical of recent government initiatives and suggest
that ‘Employer Training Pilots’ requiring compulsory time off for training
or ‘the Licence to Practice’ that necessitates compulsory qualifications are
not compatible with smaller firms. The main reasons for this are that such
initiatives fail to address the smaller firm requirements of accessibility,
quality and relevance.
The CBI (2003) suggests that both the government and the various
training agencies need more understanding of the training requirements of
smaller firms, training is not something that can be improved by coercion
or force and take-up must be internally driven, originating from the moti-
vation that exists amongst employers and employees. As a consequence,
the CBI identifies four areas that they perceive to be key to improving the
take-up of training initiatives by smaller firms. In the first instance, it is
suggested that such firms have to be convinced that investments in training
will improve business performance and productivity. To achieve this, gov-
ernments should assist SMEs to identify the means of improving business
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performance, including the improvement of skills. The CBI suggests that
one way this could be achieved is through the Business Improvement Tool
for Entrepreneurs (BITE), which encourages owner-managers to think
about the broader problems their businesses face and new ways in which
these could be addressed.
Second, the CBI argues that it is important to recognise the role of
informal learning and the benefits this can bring to the firm, particularly in
the area of management training. Using evidence from NSTF (1999) and
CEML (2002) it is noted that the UK has a limited supply of skilled man-
agers and that improving the take-up rate of training initiatives by owner-
managers who have previously had limited involvement in such activity
has proven problematic. It is suggested that this may be because owner-
managers prefer to learn from experience, their peers and authentic
examples rather than formal courses. Take-up, therefore, might be
improved if learning was offered through mentoring and coaching, which
owner-managers may view as more flexible and relevant to their needs,
and the ‘Beacon Company Scheme’, which involves visits to ‘exemplar’
businesses, is identified as one way forward. Nevertheless, it may also be
necessary to assist owner-managers to make the link between change that
is going on within the enterprise and the need to undertake training activ-
ity that could help manage that process.
A third area regarded as important by the CBI is the provision of
qualitative information which would help smaller firms differentiate
between initiatives and find suitable training interventions. Simply for
employers to know the various types of training initiative that exist is
insufficient to make informed decisions. The CBI have proposed that
more qualitative information is made available to employers and that the
government takes responsibility for providing an evaluation of various
training interventions and make available to SMEs a guide which high-
lights this assessment.
Finally, it suggested that government must ensure that smaller firms can
access training that is flexible and relevant. The CBI (2003) indicate that
the early findings from the Basic Skills Pathfinder Projects and Employer
Training Pilots highlight that the most important factor that encouraged
firms to participate was the availability of appropriate training delivered in
a way that meets the business and individual’s needs in terms of timing,
location and course content. In essence the CBI advocates that training
providers should investigate methods by which training programmes could
be tailored to specific needs.
Discussion
The training agenda in smaller firms has been dominated by two issues,
the sector’s relative dependency upon informal approaches and the sub-
sequent limited take-up of more formal training interventions, especially
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those offered by government. As a consequence, government efforts
regarding training in smaller firms have been led by an assumption that
such firms need ‘special help and support in raising the skill levels of their
workforces’ (Curran et al., 1997:90). Successive governments have sought
to address this issue either by introducing new formal training pro-
grammes, or by encouraging the take-up rates on existing formal courses
with little reference to, or consultation with, the small firm sector. Curran
et al. (1997:99) argue that ‘public policy needs to recognise more clearly
that small business owners rather than government (or even other experts)
may be best placed to plan employee training in the small enterprise’. In
essence, smaller firms may require special assistance but the method and
direction of assistance should originate, more often, from smaller firms
and their representatives. This change of emphasis and direction of input
has obvious problems for any government that is trying to deal with the
level of heterogeneity that exists within the smaller firm sector, but
acknowledging and understanding this level of diversity should facilitate
potential improvements in the training agenda.
Antecedent factors
Before investigating how the recognition of diversity may offer solutions,
it is critical to recognise the difficulties that any new policy on training will
face as a consequence of negative antecedent factors built up from a
plethora of previous initiatives that have not managed to deliver take-up
rates to levels considered acceptable to governments. The range of bodies
and initiatives that have been and gone within the last two decades is well
documented and the accusation of short-termism, levelled by Jennings et
al. (1992) still needs to be addressed. As previously indicated, the initi-
atives themselves have also been criticised (see Vickerstaff, 1992) for
being less than appropriate to the smaller firm context, delivered at incon-
venient times and by providers that may not be those best informed to
offer advice. The introduction of any new initiative, therefore, has the
problem of gaining the confidence of a smaller firm sector that has become
somewhat cynical of the commitment and motives of government policy-
makers and those charged with implementing the initiatives that underpin
such policies. So, an immediate area that needs to be addressed is the
restoration of confidence in the training agenda, one possible way this may
be achieved is with reference to the SBC that has been established to rep-
resent the needs and concerns of small businesses to the government.
The recent report by the SBC (2003), however, has potentially uncom-
fortable conclusions given that it criticises the more prescriptive approach
taken by the government and suggests that recent initiatives, for example
the Employer Training Pilots and Licence to Practice, are not compatible
with small business needs. The SBC (2003:6) go on to state that the
‘government should work with small firms to recognise the training they
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do and encourage them to enhance their training in a way that works for
them, rather than trying to impose prescriptive and at times, irrelevant
training provision’. As such, the SBC concur with previous findings by
Curran et al. (1997) and Kitching and Blackburn (2002), and are also sup-
ported by the recent CBI report (2003). If the government were to accept
the recommendations of the SBC and the findings of the extant literature
then they will need to equate informal training practices that are more
appropriate/acceptable to the smaller firm sector with the requirement to
foster tangible, transferable skills and prevent the more unscrupulous firm
from adopting a ‘free rider’ approach and opting out of the training
agenda. It is suggested that there are two strands to the training agenda
which need to be addressed: one that recognises and fosters informal prac-
tices bespoke to the firm, and one that addresses particular contexts and
antecedent factors that have limited the take-up of more formal training
initiatives. In the former case the emphasis needs to be placed on the
recognition and fostering of training initiatives internal to the firm that
improve employee productivity. In the latter case the accent is upon train-
ing initiatives that are more meaningful and bespoke in that they segment
either by sector, training recipient, or perhaps type of enterprise. These
latter initiatives would not deliberately set out to provide information at
the level of the firm, rather the final application of skills/advice appropri-
ated would be applied to the firms by the recipients themselves.
Raising the profile of informal training
The SBC (2003) have suggested that a ‘skills passport’ could both encourage
the development of informal training and improve its standing relative to its
more formal counterpart. The ‘skills passport’ would effectively be a record
of both formal and informal training that an individual has undertaken and
provide verification of the skills and competencies accumulated via partici-
pation with initiatives that took place within the firm, in addition to more
formally recognised qualifications. A process of this nature could assist in
both the employability and productivity of the workforce providing each
employee with employer-validated transferable skills along with more
formal qualifications that offer an external verification of an individual’s
ability to learn. Providing a record of externally verified courses would not
prove a problem but putting a value upon informally delivered internal
training, often conducted on the job, would prove to be more so. The SBC
(2003) offer a number of solutions to the measurement of such training
using criteria that includes the number of hours involved, the number of
hours involved multiplied by the employee’s hourly rate, or the increase in
an employee’s remuneration. Each criteria has problems that would need to
be addressed, and arriving at a common standard is more likely to result
from an experiential process of trial and error, but this can only take place if
there is a political will, in the first instance, to develop such an initiative.
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Increasing demand for training
One of the issues that segmentation highlights is the need to create greater
demand for training initiatives within the smaller firm sector; there are
enterprises that do not perceive the need to train, established employees
that find it difficult to justify access to continuing training, and owner-
managers/managers who are concentrating more on short-term issues
within the firm rather than devoting time to train to meet future develop-
ment needs or unexpected challenges. In all cases, for training initiatives
to be adopted, governments need to investigate approaches which will
recognise specific needs from particular segments of the sector as well as
smaller firms in general.
A number of approaches have been suggested that might improve par-
ticipation in training initiatives, perhaps the most important is to develop
schemes that offer smaller firms the opportunity to contribute to the
design and implementation of new initiatives. As indicated earlier, previ-
ous initiatives have been criticised for their lack of relevance and flexibil-
ity; governments have also failed to recognise the contribution and
significance of informal activity. Increasing the representation of smaller
firms on bodies that design and develop initiatives would, perhaps, gener-
ate/restore confidence, create more appropriate schemes and be the first
stage in a continuing dialogue that needs to be developed with the sector
as one element in the process of increasing demand for training.
Kitching and Blackburn (2002) also suggest that one route by which
enterprises may be encouraged to train is through the promotion of
changes to product or market strategies that, in effect, lead owner-
managers to seek assistance in what, for them, are uncharted waters.
However, the authors are also quick to point out that it may be as difficult
to encourage firms to move into more innovative products and markets as
it would be to improve the take-up of training in smaller firms. Neverthe-
less, this is an area where the SBC (2003) feel the government should take
a greater interest and become more actively involved.
The demand for training could also be encouraged if more smaller firms
were prepared to undertake skills audits. As the CBI suggest (2003), SME
owner-managers have to be convinced that raising employees’ skills will
benefit business performance and productivity before investing in training.
The CBI recommend the Business Improvement Tool for Entrepreneurs
(BITE); the SBC (2003), while not as prescriptive, would advocate a skills
audit which assisted a firm to benchmark its skills and develop future
training initiatives based upon planned objectives. Once more it may be as
difficult to convince smaller firms of the value of such audits as it is to
encourage them to engage in training per se, and audits may be perceived
as simply highlighting limitations internal to the firm rather than contribut-
ing to a plan of action. Establishing policy that creates activity of this
nature cannot, however, be viewed as a short-term goal but should be
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undertaken as part of an ongoing long-term strategy that builds relevance
and engagement into the training agenda for the smaller firm sector.
Improving the quality of training and its signposting
Encouraging skills audits and motivating employers and individuals to
improve skills could be counterproductive if they cannot access relevant,
high quality, training. So, government policy should also focus on improv-
ing the signposting and quality of available training initiatives. Indeed, a
key issue identified by recent reports is that of signposting; there is a need
to provide a critical assessment of what is available rather than simply
identifying the various types of training provision that exist. Smaller firms
are able to access training from a variety of routes, but it is the intention of
the government that there should be ‘no wrong door’ whatever route is
used to access training. Such an initiative could be facilitated by the intro-
duction of a new guide to training provision that goes beyond stating
simply what is available and instead offers an evaluative assessment of the
quality of training provided (CBI, 2003). Smaller firms and their interme-
diaries could, therefore, use a guide of this nature to inform training
decisions and reduce the trial and error often associated in contracting
with training providers external to the workplace.
Recent reports (SBC, 2003 and CBI, 2003) were also keen to promote
the use of professional intermediaries that already offer services to smaller
firms, for example accountants, management consultants, lawyers and
other peer intermediaries, who are often small business owners in their
own right. The expectation is that such individuals will be accredited to a
high standard and, consequently, able to match firms to appropriate train-
ing initiatives. The term ‘appropriate training’ is important as it refers to
the content, quality, timing and location of training being offered and to
this end any recommendation should encompass both informal and formal
initiatives.
Engaging smaller firms in the training agenda has proven difficult for
successive governments and the limited success of previous initiatives
would suggest the need for a radical rethink of policy intervention. In
other countries training has prospered under a more prescriptive regime
where regulation makes training an integral and compulsory element of
business practice. In the UK such initiatives, in the current business
environment, are unlikely to win very many supporters and it is up to
government to find more representative methods to encourage smaller
firms to invest in training. This chapter has suggested that a more inclusive
approach to the design and implementation of initiatives, recognition and
support of existing informal practices and the segmentation of initiatives
by type of business and training recipient may offer a more logical and
cohesive set of policies.
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6 Breaking out of survival
businesses
Managing labour, growth and
development in the South Asian
restaurant trade
Monder Ram, Trevor Jones, Tahir Abbas and
Sara Carter
Introduction
Despite the statistical problems of cross-national comparison, it is safe to
say that the rise of ethnic minority business ownership is an international
trend, being especially strong in relatively deregulated Anglo-Saxon
economies (see Light and Rosenstein, 1995, on the USA; Ram and Jones,
1998, on Britain; Razin and Langlois, 1996, on Canada), but also dis-
cernible in some mainland European nations such as the Netherlands
(Rath and Kloosterman, 2000) and France (Ma Mung, 1999). Much of the
recent literature endeavours to explain the presence of ethnic minority
enterprise in particular sectors, localities and communities. For example,
Werbner (1984, 1990), has demonstrated how Pakistani clothing manufac-
turers in Manchester (UK) draw on an array of ‘ethnic resources’ to initi-
ate and sustain their businesses. These include: a supply of willing, flexible
and cheap labour from the family and co-ethnic community; interest-free
credit offered on trust by fellow Pakistani suppliers; and preferential
outlets among co-ethnic wholesalers and retailers. From a radically differ-
ent ‘mixed embeddedness’ perspective, Kloosterman et al. (1999) and
Rath and Kloosterman (2000) locate immigrant entrepreneurship in its
social, economic and institutional context rather than reducing it to a pure
‘ethno-cultural’ phenomenon.
Yet despite a burgeoning research interest, the concrete ways in which
ethnic minorities attempt to grow and develop their business remains a
neglected issue, with comparatively few attempts to identify what distin-
guishes the relative handful of fast trackers from the broad mass of sur-
vivalists.
Rarer still is any considered assessment of the ‘people-dimension’ of
ethnic minority firms that have attempted the transition from survivalism
to growth. While realism demands an insistence on the marginal nature of
many ethnic minority enterprises, greater attention now needs to be
directed at entrepreneurial success and the exceptional factors that under-
pin it. In comparison to the prevailing approaches in the field, the present
chapter is distinct in three respects. First, we directly address the experi-
ences of growing and developing firms, as well as survival-orientated
enterprises, using as a framework the concept of ‘break-out’ (Ram and
Hillin, 1991; Ram et al., 1998). This term was introduced to underline the
constricted nature of much ethnic minority enterprise within narrow and
highly competitive market segments and the need to escape into more
high yielding markets. Here, a key argument is that the success of such a
transition is contingent upon the availability of ‘class resources’ (Light and
Bonacich, 1988), together with a commitment on the part of the entre-
preneurs to modernisation, especially with regard to labour relations.
Informal working methods like the use of uncosted family labour and
paternalistic relations with co-ethnic employees work very well as an
insurance for survival but are less appropriate for expanding firms in main-
stream markets (Bates, 1993). As Scase (1995:584) argues, the study of
small business growth tends to focus on issues like the capacity to raise
finance and the nature of market opportunities. Yet, the substantive
growth of small enterprises often rests upon the capacity of entrepreneurs
to manage the altered dynamics to negotiated orders that are often neces-
sary in small organisations undergoing transition. In essence, the ‘human
dimension’ is often neglected in the prevailing discourse on small business
growth.
Second, we focus upon the sectoral as well as the ethnic context,
through an investigation of South Asians operating in Birmingham’s
independent restaurant sector. Such a focus is consistent with the recent
literature’s recognition of the social and economic embeddedness of ethnic
minority business activity, its determination by external forces as well as
by its internal family and community dynamics (Kloosterman et al., 1999;
Rath, 1999; Rath and Kloosterman, 2000). This perspective is also in line
with the firm-in-sector approach to the study of employment relations. In
the context of small firms, this requires an acknowledgement of the
importance of market relations, which at its most extreme has been advoc-
ated by Rainnie (1989; see also Barrett and Rainnie, 2002). Importantly
though, market relations are not accorded a determinate role in shaping
shop floor dynamics; of greater significance is the way in which the market
is actually interpreted in the workplace. A key aim of the present study is
to demonstrate a wide range of responses to market pressures, even in a
comparatively narrow sectoral and spatial milieu.
Finally, our preference is for a qualitative methodology, drawing in this
instance on 23 case histories to illuminate the processes involved in growth
and development. Arguably, this approach is more conducive to an explo-
ration of the meaning and content of business development than the quan-
titative orientation hitherto dominant in this field (Aldrich et al., 1981;
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McGoldrick and Reeve, 1989; Jones et al., 1992; Metcalf et al., 1996; Basu,
1998). Further, as the broader literature on industrial relations suggests,
more subtle forms of control will emerge only through intensive methods
(Edwards, 2001).
Breaking out: the development of ethnic minority
businesses
For all its rapid quantitative proliferation, it remains almost universally
true that ethnic enterprise remains qualitatively limited, its scope largely
restricted to a narrow range of activities in the least rewarding areas of the
economy. Numerous British studies remark on the pronounced over-
representation of South Asian firms in low order retailing and catering,
and their under-representation elsewhere in the economy (Rafiq, 1985;
Jones et al., 1989, 1992; McGoldrick and Reeve, 1989). Essentially, the new
wave of self-employed South Asians, many of them displaced from manual
labour, have gravitated towards sectors with low entry thresholds, usually
those requiring little start-up capital, specialised expertise or formal cre-
dentials. Moreover, the low returns intrinsic to these sectors are often
compounded by over-dependence on a limited South Asian clientele and
by all the classic disadvantages of operating in an inner city location (Jones
et al., 1989; Rafiq, 1985, 1992). Significantly, this sectoral skewedness, far
from an isolated British instance, is widely reported internationally. In
Germany, for example, 20 per cent of ‘foreign’ entrepreneurs are in retail
businesses and a further 26 per cent in catering, ‘an example of an area
that has become unattractive for Germans because of the long hours
involved and the small profit in exchange’ (Wilpert, 1999:10). Here,
Wilpert echoes the long-running theme of racialised minorities as replace-
ment entrepreneurs, moving into the void created by the exodus of main-
stream business owners from markets increasingly seen as undesirable
(Aldrich et al., 1984; Light, 1984). In cases such as Italy, where for cultural
and economic reasons, independent retailing and catering continue to be
highly valued activities, even this low quality market space is largely
absent and immigrant entrepreneurs are driven to the extreme margins of
irregular street trading and hawking (Quassoli, 1999). Strictly speaking,
however, these international variations are a matter of degree rather than
kind, and it would seem that the ubiquitous processes of racialised exclu-
sion, so well documented in other spheres of life, extend also into the
realm of enterprise.
However, in the British case at least, these unpromising market circum-
stances have to be set against two complementary developments, which
presage an interest in the potential of more economically sustainable and
viable ethnic minority firms. First, as a small number of empirical studies
indicate, there are signs that some well established entrepreneurial minori-
ties such as South Asians are gradually diversifying into the kinds of
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economic sectors that can support flourishing businesses above the micro-
scale (Jones et al., 1989; Ward, 1991; Basu, 1998; Ram et al., 2003). Operat-
ing in these fields also represents a move away from the
labour-intensiveness and the arduous toil to which so many owners are
subject. While such businesses continue to represent only a tiny minority
of the total, they might be taken as role models for some of the broad mass
of micro-scale ‘trundlers’ and ‘strugglers’ (to use Storey’s, 1994 terminol-
ogy). Second, at a more conceptual level, there has been some theoretical
interest in the general processes by which some ethnic minority firms
emerge from their often-straitened market circumstances. For example,
Ram and Hillin (1991) have coined the term ‘break-out’ to capture the
need to escape from the stereotypical activities in which most businesses
are confined and the need for an outward reorientation towards new and
more expansive market space. Building upon this, Jones et al. (2000) argue
that such repositioning ought to take the form of a shift away both from
dependence on fellow South Asian customers and from corner shop retail-
ing and other activities aimed at a local neighbourhood clientele. Where
possible, Asian entrepreneurs need to aim at higher-level activities – man-
ufacturing, wholesaling, producer services and high order retailing and
consumer services – whose markets are in principle spatially and ethnically
unbounded.
By the use of such strategies, the South Asian firm can release itself
from overcrowded and hyper-competitive niches, where labour-intensive
toil usually provides only lean pickings. Where this hypothesis has been
applied to real world conditions as in Jones et al.’s (2000) study of two sets
of South Asian firms in Britain and Canada, it has tested positive, with
those firms operating in higher order sectors with expansive market poten-
tial clearly performing better than those operating in low level bounded
markets.
Having the will to break new ground, however, is not the same as
having the wherewithal, and whether or not the ethnic minority firm can
tap into such market potential depends upon three further considerations.
First, it is likely that any significant re-orientation of the firm’s market
position will require radical changes in the management process, particu-
larly with regard to management roles and the use of labour. At a
minimum, it is likely to require a redirection of the proprietors’ efforts, if
not a more substantial change in their role, a significant undertaking since
many ethnic minority businesses operate on a tight budget with little paid
assistance. As Jones et al. (1994:195) point out,
one of the major weaknesses of the ethnic minority enterprise
economy is the great preponderance of micro-firms, taking onerous
toll of the owner’s own labour and further impeding efficiency by
leaving little opportunity for planning, information-gathering or any
other activity which might be designated ‘managerial’.
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The widely noted characteristic of utilising predominantly co-ethnic
labour may further inhibit break-out since such workers are in effect
recruited on the basis of ethnic loyalty and other paternalistic considera-
tions rather than for their skills, qualifications and experience. Although
family/co-ethnic labour is conventionally portrayed as a crucial resource,
whether the presentation has emphasised consensus (Werbner, 1990), or
exploitation (Hoel, 1984), the reluctance to enlist ‘outside’ labour (Jones et
al., 1994; Ram, 1992; 1994) works directly against all rational management
principles. Highly functional in the corner shop context, such ethnic infor-
malism becomes increasingly uneconomic past a certain level of scale and
sophistication.
Second, although the discourse of promoting ‘growth’ firms or ‘picking
winners’ is well established in the small business field (Hakim, 1989;
Storey, 1994; Freel, 1998), it is vital to recognise that most small businesses
do not have such aspirations. ‘Fast-trackers’ driven by goals of profit max-
imisation and expansion are in a very small minority, irrespective of their
ethnic origin. For the most part, small business owners are guided more by
a cluster of values related to a desire for independence (Bechoffer and
Elliott, 1978; Scase and Goffee, 1982; Curran, 1986, 1991; Storey, 1994;
Baines and Wheelock, 1998), an outlook that cannot be dismissed as irra-
tional or backward. Equally, it should be recognised that break-out can be
a risky and daunting option. To penetrate the more fruitful markets of the
mainstream is by definition to venture out into contested territory. This
highly desirable market space is the preserve of firms owned by the major-
ity population, in fields where demands on capital, management, techno-
logy, knowledge, expertise, information, labour skills and customer
relations are likely to be much greater than in the abandoned niches,
where ethnic minority businesses generally reside. Ram’s (1994) investiga-
tion of small South Asian-owned clothing firms underlines this point and
warns that, in certain circumstances, such reorientation can be positively
misplaced. The owners in Ram’s study, who relied heavily on very basic
machinery, family and co-ethnic labour and ‘informal’ working practices,
were exhorted by local business support agencies to ‘go up-market’, a
course requiring investment in new machinery, adopting ‘enlightened’
labour management policies, and utilising more ‘efficient’ production
methods. However, many firms following this advice became victims of
fierce competition; whilst the seemingly ‘irrational’ firms remained suffi-
ciently flexible to cope with the vagaries of a turbulent marketplace.
Finally, the growth and restructuring capabilities of ethnic minority
firms and indeed small businesses per se (Storey, 1994) will be contingent
upon their access to class resources. In their extensive treatment of this
concept, Light and Rosenstein (1995) observe that ‘a defining feature of
class resources is universality’. Unlike ethnic resources, which derive very
specifically from membership of an ethno-cultural fraternity, they emanate
from an individual’s class position, occurring irrespective of national or
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ethnic origin. In practice, of course, the two categories are by no means
mutually exclusive and one fairly common pathway for ‘rags-to-riches’
South Asian entrepreneurs in Britain (still a comparatively rare category)
has been to start by using ethnic resources, such as family labour or a loan
from community religious and cultural organisations. Subsequently, suffi-
cient class resources in the form of wealth, property and credit-worthiness
are accumulated to launch out into higher-level spheres (Jones et al.,
1994). Often class resource accumulation is an intergenerational process,
as when the business generates sufficient income to support the owner’s
offspring through advanced education and training to acquire vocationally
relevant expertise and credentials (Ram, 1994). This fits well with Light
and Rosenstein’s (1995) definition of class resources, which they see as
including both tangible financial wealth and intangible assets such as
human capital in the form of educational credentials.
From this we can appreciate that, even where ethnic minority busi-
nesses are in a position to pursue growth, rather than survival, they still
nonetheless face major obstacles. Apart from the organisational implica-
tions and the need for ‘class’ as well as ‘ethnic’ resources, the growth
option is almost always a high-risk proposition. Moreover, there are other
key entrepreneurial decisions to be taken about such considerations as the
location of the enterprise (Rekers and van Kempen, 2000) and the negoti-
ation of official regulations, an issue normally ignored in the informal
economy. These issues will now be explored in the case of South Asians
operating in Birmingham’s independent restaurant sector.
Methodology, rationale and context
The methodology for the current research was informed by three key
guiding principles: a sectoral emphasis; an exclusive focus on the experi-
ences of South Asians; and a qualitative orientation. Since, as we have
seen, growth opportunities for small firms are decisively influenced by eco-
nomic sector (Storey, 1994; Smallbone et al., 1995; Rath and Kloosterman,
1999), a sectoral focus must be central. Our choice of the independent
restaurant sector is influenced, among other criteria, by its potential for
growth, which stands in sharp contrast to most other historic Asian entre-
preneurial specialisms. There is a long-term trend for consumers to spend
more on eating out which has continued in recent years, with turnover in
the British restaurant market (including takeaways) reaching £11.71
billion in 1996, an increase of 5.1 per cent at current prices on the previous
year. With the increasing popularity of eating out and a widening choice of
outlets and menus, it is estimated that the restaurant market is likely to
achieve £15.11 billion sales by 2001 (MINTEL, 1997).
Within the restaurant industry, South Asian businesses providing South
Asian cuisine are a growing presence, expanding even more rapidly than
the total sector itself. Throughout advanced western society, the independ-
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ent restaurant sector is a highly popular activity for ethnic minority entre-
preneurs (see for example Bailey, 1985, on the case of New York;
Herman, 1979, on Toronto; Kesteloot and Mistiaen, 1997, on Brussels;
Kloosterman et al., 1999, on Amsterdam), and Britain is no exception with
an ethnic restaurant market valued at around £3 billion in 1997, thus
accounting for over a quarter of total sales. Within this highly diverse
ethnic sub-total, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi) outlets
accounted for 55 per cent of sales (MINTEL, 1998).
The qualitative orientation of the study is the third principle underpin-
ning the current research. There were two dimensions to this, which stem
from the multiple case logic outlined by Eisenhardt (1991) and Eisenhardt
and Bourgeois (1988). First, in order to develop a picture of how South
Asian firms were faring in the restaurant sector, it was important to
involve a broad range of businesses and to this end the participation of 23
restaurants was secured from the Bangladeshi (eight), Pakistani (eight)
and Indian (seven) communities. Second, we were anxious to avoid the
occasional misconceptions and the superficiality that sometimes results
from the use of the standard questionnaire method. The questionnaire
approach has tended to reduce complex and often convoluted entrepre-
neurial decision-making to rigid one-dimensionality (see Ram and Jones,
1998 for critique). By contrast, in recent years a small but growing number
of studies have gained deeper insights into the processes of ethnic business
development through an in-depth case history approach (Jones et al., 1989;
Ram, 1994; Dhaliwal and Amin, 1995). Following this method, our respon-
dents were tape-recorded and encouraged to discourse at length on a com-
prehensive range of issues relating to entrepreneurial attitudes and
behaviour, the interviews consisting in effect of lengthy and detailed con-
versations prompted by a check list rather than confined by a question-
naire format. To ensure thoroughness of coverage this procedure was used
with each business owner on at least two separate occasions, while to
achieve a more rounded coverage at least two employees from each firm
were also interviewed. As intended, this form of investigation has gener-
ated a rich accumulation of findings across a broad spectrum, but for the
purposes of the present paper it is the respondents’ relationship to the
market and their strategies to negotiate this which form the core of the
analysis.
Essentially then, this study is predicated upon a methodologically dis-
tinct case history approach, with sufficient participants to be broadly
representative of South Asians in the sector and multiple interactions with
multiple respondents in each firm to permit qualitative assessment of busi-
ness development processes, taking into account their full complexity.
Although we include sufficient firms to capture the breadth of South Asian
involvement in the restaurant sector, the canons of statistical notions of
representation and generalisation are not of primary significance here. Of
more importance is an interest in the illumination of processes in action,
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and analytical modes of generalisation (Stake, 1994; Yin, 1994). The
qualitative case history approach permits scrutiny of the processes by
which restaurants survive and develop and, in so doing, highlights the
integration of social and economic forms of embeddedness (Rath, 1999).
Research setting
In Birmingham, there are 23,599 service sector companies, of which 16,176
are service sector businesses with fewer than 10 employees (Birmingham
Economic Information Centre, 1998:92). Of these, approximately 350 are
both licensed and unlicensed restaurants with less than 10 employees.
Precise figures on ethnic minority firms are not recorded; but in the case of
South Asian restaurants, as many as 70 are to be found in the Sparkhill
and Sparkbrook areas of inner city Birmingham. A concentration which
has led the area to be dubbed the ‘Balti Quarter’, after the special version
of South Asian cuisine prevalent in this area. As Table 6.1 indicates, this
area has a significant South Asian (particularly Pakistani) presence.
A familiar pattern of disadvantage accompanies the minority ethnic
community concentrated in this area. For example, unemployment in the
‘Balti Quarter’ is higher than the city average (Table 6.1). High unemploy-
ment levels are exacerbated by the general dilapidation of the local
environment, a widespread fear of crime, and the often-hazardous traffic
flow in and out of the area. Ten of the outlets (eight Pakistani and two
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Table 6.1 Composition of South Asians and total unemployment in the ‘Balti
Quarter’
Population Small Heath Sparkbrook Sparkhill
Ward population 31,617 25,896 26,251
Indian (No.) 1,832 1,969 3,796
Indian (%) 6 8 15
Pakistani (No.) 11,764 7,926 9,145
Pakistani (%) 37 31 35
Bangladeshi (No.) 1,846 2,136 594
Bangladeshi (%) 6 8 2
Unemployment ratesa
Male (No.) 1,339 1,693 1,242
Male (%) 20 31 20
Female (No.) 359 413 342
Female (%) 10 14 9
Total (No.) 1,698 2,106 1,584
Total (%) 16 25 16
Source: Population Census (Office of National Statistics, 1991) and Birmingham Economic
Information Centre (2000).
Note
a These unemployment rates easily exceed that for Birmingham as a whole, where rates of
male, female and total unemployment are, respectively, 13%, 5% and 9%.
Indian) investigated in the current research were located in the ‘Balti
Quarter’. Promisingly at first sight, the customer base for these restaurants
is predominantly white young professionals with high disposable incomes
(Warde et al., 1999) and students, the professionals of tomorrow. As we
shall see, however, the pervading problem of operating in the ‘Balti
Quarter’ is market saturation, an over-supply of restaurant outlets leading
to intense competition, in itself the archetypal condition of Asian business
in Britain in general and a perfect demonstration of the commercial trap
from which they need to escape. By contrast the remainder of our sample
represent those who have escaped, spatially at least. All eight
Bangladeshi-owned restaurants, and three with Indian proprietors, were
geographically dispersed, presenting themselves as ‘up-market’ establish-
ments with a largely white middle-aged and middle-class clientele.
The following sections examine how the sampled restaurants have
adapted to the distinctive market environment of Birmingham’s independ-
ent restaurant sector.1 Four approaches are discussed: survival, which
essentially refers to those unwilling or unable to break out and hence com-
pelled to come to terms with an unsatisfactory market environment; and
three versions of proactive breakout strategy – multiple business owner-
ship; product differentiation; and geographical relocation. As Table 6.2
reveals, these ostensibly different modes of operating and developing
restaurant businesses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example,
it is possible for a business owner who is intent on survival to have more
than one food outlet; and restaurateurs who are located in ‘up-market’ set-
tings may similarly stress the ‘authenticity’ of their cuisine. Rather, case
comparison logic has been followed, which involves an assessment of the
similarities and differences between the firms. Hence, on the basis of a
detailed reading of respondents’ transcripts, firms have been assigned to
categories that best capture their market approach.
Survivalists
During the 1980s, the pervasive discourse of ‘enterprise’ fuelled an interest
in small business ownership as a means of promoting economic prosperity,
both for the nation and for the individuals involved. Empirical studies,
however, have noted that the outcome is often more akin to ‘survival self-
employment’ than dynamic enterprises capable of significant growth (Mac-
donald, 1996; see also Storey, 1994; Baines and Wheelock, 1998). Even the
ostensibly buoyant market conditions enjoyed by the restaurant trade
offer no cast-iron guarantee of success and, in the current research, eight
of the 23 firms could be described as survival- rather than growth-
orientated. One of the most notable features of these eight restaurateurs
was their almost uniform lament of the spiralling competition from other
South Asian restaurants based in the same locality. As noted earlier, these
restaurants were located in the city’s ‘Balti Quarter’, where supply outlets
Breaking out of survival businesses 117
T
ab
le
 6
.2
T
yp
ol
og
y 
of
 b
re
ak
-o
ut
Su
rv
iv
al
M
ul
tip
le
 b
us
in
es
s 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
P
ro
du
ct
 d
if
fe
re
nt
ia
tio
n
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l r
el
oc
at
io
n
(8
 fi
rm
s)
(6
 fi
rm
s)
(2
 fi
rm
s)
(7
 fi
rm
s)
St
ar
t-
up
L
ow
 s
ta
tu
s 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 
E
ar
ly
 e
nt
ry
 in
to
 e
m
er
gi
ng
 
W
el
l-
ed
uc
at
ed
, s
ta
rt
-u
p 
E
du
ca
te
d 
in
 b
us
in
es
s.
 S
ta
rt
-
al
re
ad
y 
ov
er
-s
up
pl
ie
d 
m
ar
ke
t. 
W
el
l e
du
ca
te
d,
 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
co
-e
th
ni
c 
up
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 o
n 
cl
as
s 
m
ar
ke
t. 
U
se
d 
on
ly
 
st
ar
ts
 e
nt
re
pr
en
eu
ri
al
 
re
so
ur
ce
s.
 E
ar
ly
 
re
so
ur
ce
s.
 H
ig
h 
le
ve
ls
 o
f s
ta
rt
-
fa
m
ily
 a
nd
 c
o-
et
hn
ic
 
ca
re
er
 y
ou
ng
er
. U
se
 o
f 
sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
up
 in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
so
m
e 
fr
om
 
su
pp
or
t. 
L
ac
k 
of
 
et
hn
ic
 a
nd
 c
la
ss
 r
es
ou
rc
es
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
. E
ar
ly
 fo
cu
s 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
fa
m
ily
 
st
ar
t-
up
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 
on
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
cu
st
om
er
 
so
ur
ce
s
ev
ol
ve
s 
in
to
 s
ho
rt
-t
er
m
 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 
re
ta
in
ed
 a
s 
su
rv
iv
al
is
t o
ut
lo
ok
bu
si
ne
ss
 d
ev
el
op
s
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
is
tr
us
tf
ul
 o
f o
ut
si
de
rs
. 
R
es
po
ns
e 
to
 m
ar
ke
t 
R
es
po
ns
e 
to
 m
ar
ke
t 
R
es
po
ns
e 
to
 m
ar
ke
t 
Se
ni
or
 p
os
it
io
ns
 g
iv
en
 
in
te
ns
ifi
ca
ti
on
 is
 to
 s
pr
ea
d 
in
te
ns
ifi
ca
ti
on
 is
 to
 
in
te
ns
ifi
ca
ti
on
 is
 to
 (
re
)l
oc
at
e 
on
ly
 to
 fa
m
ily
 m
em
be
rs
. 
ri
sk
: m
ov
e 
to
 m
ul
ti
-o
ut
le
t 
sp
ec
ia
lis
e 
by
 p
ro
du
ct
/ 
in
to
 a
ffl
ue
nt
 a
re
as
. 
N
o 
fo
rm
al
 tr
ai
ni
ng
, s
om
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
di
ve
rs
if
y 
se
rv
ic
e 
di
ff
er
en
ti
at
io
n.
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t o
f s
pe
ci
al
is
ed
 
in
fo
rm
al
 le
ar
ni
ng
. L
ax
 
in
to
 o
th
er
 b
us
in
es
se
s.
 
F
or
m
al
is
ed
 s
ta
ff
 
pe
rs
on
ne
l, 
an
d 
fo
rm
al
is
ed
 
re
ga
rd
 fo
r 
re
gu
la
ti
on
s
P
re
fe
rs
 c
o-
et
hn
ic
 la
bo
ur
, 
re
cr
ui
tm
en
t o
f t
ra
in
ed
 a
nd
 
re
cr
ui
tm
en
t a
nd
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
bu
t o
pe
n 
to
 c
om
pe
te
nt
 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 p
er
so
nn
el
. 
pr
ac
ti
ce
s
pe
rs
on
ne
l. 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 d
iv
is
io
n 
of
 
di
vi
si
on
 o
f l
ab
ou
r.
 C
on
ti
nu
ed
 
la
bo
ur
. E
m
ph
as
is
 o
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
va
lu
ed
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s
M
ar
ke
t r
el
at
io
ns
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
to
 m
ar
ke
t 
A
tt
en
ti
on
 to
 m
ar
ke
t p
os
it
io
n.
 
A
tt
en
ti
on
 to
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
D
el
ib
er
at
e 
m
ar
ke
t p
os
it
io
ni
ng
 
is
 p
as
si
ve
. R
es
po
nd
 to
 
M
ax
im
is
es
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
of
 
cu
st
om
er
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
, 
to
 g
ai
n 
qu
al
it
y 
pr
em
iu
m
. 
in
te
ns
e 
co
m
pe
ti
ti
on
 b
y 
ni
ch
e 
m
ar
ke
t, 
w
hi
le
 m
ov
in
g 
m
ov
es
 b
ey
on
d 
re
ta
il 
in
to
 
F
oc
us
 o
n 
re
pu
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 
pr
ic
e-
cu
tt
in
g.
 S
tr
on
g 
us
e 
in
to
 d
iv
er
se
 b
us
in
es
s 
se
ct
or
s.
 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
w
or
d-
of
-m
ou
th
 m
ar
ke
ti
ng
. 
of
 in
fo
rm
al
 o
ff
-t
he
-b
oo
ks
 
A
w
ar
en
es
s 
of
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
an
d 
su
pp
ly
 to
 o
th
er
 
A
w
ar
en
es
s 
of
 th
ei
r 
cu
st
om
er
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
B
el
ow
 
cu
st
om
er
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
, f
oc
us
 
re
st
au
ra
nt
s.
 E
th
ni
c 
de
m
an
ds
 fo
r 
hi
gh
 q
ua
lit
y 
m
in
im
um
 w
ag
e 
pa
ym
en
ts
on
 N
P
D
pr
od
uc
t, 
un
de
rp
in
ne
d 
by
 
pr
od
uc
t, 
se
rv
ic
e 
an
d 
‘w
es
te
rn
’ m
an
ag
em
en
t
re
pu
ta
ti
on
A
sp
ir
at
io
ns
L
im
it
ed
: s
ur
vi
va
l o
nl
y,
 
O
n-
go
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 c
ap
it
al
 
Si
gn
s 
of
 d
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n 
in
to
 
Id
en
ti
fy
 th
em
se
lv
es
 a
s 
hi
gh
-
no
 g
ro
w
th
ac
cu
m
ul
at
io
n.
 G
ro
w
th
 s
ee
n 
ne
w
 m
ar
ke
ts
 a
nd
 n
ew
 
fly
er
s.
 S
tr
on
g 
gr
ow
th
 
in
 w
id
er
 b
us
in
es
s 
in
te
re
st
s 
lo
ca
ti
on
s,
 b
ut
 la
ck
s 
as
pi
ra
ti
on
s 
fu
el
le
d 
by
 c
ap
it
al
 
an
d 
m
ov
es
 o
ut
 o
f s
ec
to
r.
 
re
so
ur
ce
s.
 G
ro
w
th
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
t s
ta
rt
-u
p.
 F
oc
us
 
G
ro
w
th
 fu
el
le
d 
by
 c
on
ti
nu
ed
 
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
et
hn
ic
 a
nd
 
on
 m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 q
ua
lit
y 
in
ve
st
m
en
t o
f e
ar
ne
d 
cl
as
s 
re
so
ur
ce
s,
 b
ut
 o
pe
n 
pr
em
iu
m
 a
nd
 m
ar
ke
t p
os
it
io
n
re
so
ur
ce
s.
 M
ov
es
 a
w
ay
 fr
om
 
to
 e
xt
er
na
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t
et
hn
ic
 r
es
ou
rc
e 
ba
se
have multiplied even faster than growing consumer demand; resulting in
the over-population of this market niche (Ram et al., 2003).
Extreme price-cutting was a common means of coping with this
competition, as one owner commented,
Well, there are too many. People … get a business and they try and
make a go of it and if they can’t make a go of it they get cornered …
So what they do is drop their prices down, so they kill the market. You
know, they have got 20 per cent off, or 50 per cent off or have one
free. You buy one and get one free, you know, its just killing the
market.
(Javed, Punjab Delight, Pakistani)
This business owner was clearly aware of the contradictory forces operat-
ing in this market. On the one hand, a concentrated swarm of ‘Balti-
houses’ had beneficial cluster effects, ‘because you are getting more
people into the area’ and picking up passing trade, but past a certain
threshold, diminishing returns set in. Alongside this were complaints
about the alleged laxity of planning regulations, with many owners berat-
ing local authority officials for granting permission for the establishment of
excessive numbers of Balti-houses.
Consistent with previous studies of immigrant restaurants (Herman,
1979; Bailey, 1987), family and co-ethnic support was crucial in initiating
and sustaining the business, especially through intensive use of familial
labour. Family members tended to occupy senior positions within the firm,
primarily because they could be ‘trusted’ and the fear of losing staff in
these pivotal roles was removed. In such family-oriented firms, informality
is the keynote throughout, with face-to-face personalised relationships
prevailing over textbook management practices. Accordingly, recruitment
of workers is almost entirely via word of mouth and formal training is
almost non-existent, the preference being for on-the-job coaching by
experienced employees. Similarly informal is pay determination, with
many interviewed workers disclosing significant ‘off the books’ working
and pay levels well below the National Minimum Wage. In a labour
market offering pitifully few openings for unqualified workers, these
arrangements provided workers with an opportunity for employment,
while employers benefited from the ‘flexibility’ of these work methods,
which was often vital to their own competitiveness. As is so often the case,
meaning depends upon context and in this instance ‘mutual benefits’ must
be judged against the employees’ utter lack of choice.
In the light of labour-intensive working methods and the harshly
competitive market environment, the notion of ‘success’ was viewed in a
modest way by most respondents in this category. As one commented, ‘if
you can … pay the bills and make a living and that’s it. That’s a success’.
This same respondent had to bring in at least ‘£600 a month’ in order to
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‘cover the debt’ incurred in an earlier failed business venture. Employers
enmeshed in such a hostile trading milieu were often cautious about
further expansion. A second-generation respondent stated,
My father said, ‘Did I want to [expand]?’ But I said to him, ‘Listen,
you are going to take out that loan for £40,000, £50,000 for another
shop, you have got to do it up, it is going to cost you at least
£25,000–£30,000 to do the place up, right. It just makes it awkward;
you are going to end up paying seven or eight hundred pounds for
over three years or four years to pay the mortgage off. What’s the
point. And you are going to have to get more staff.’
(Jamil, Desi Cuisine, Pakistani)
In summary then, survivalists are characterised by limited aspirations
and short-termism, a present rather than a future orientation. Their
approach to market relations is largely passive, with few proactive strat-
egies to counter hyper-competition apart from self-destructive price
competition. As is widely characteristic of small Asian firms throughout
Britain, their operating methods are highly traditional, with an intense
reliance on family members and low cost labour-intensive practices to
cushion their survival (cf. Jones et al., 1994). While family/co-ethnic labour
has been repeatedly presented as a highly advantageous competitive asset
for ethnic minority business, it ought more properly to be viewed as a
safety net for low-level survival rather than a developmental resource.
Multiple business ownership
Despite the barriers, however, other restaurants are deploying a variety of
strategies designed to elevate them above the survivalist basement. One of
the striking features of the sample is the comparatively high incidence of
multiple business ownership, with eight employers owning more than one
outlet. One of our Bangladeshi respondents perfectly exemplifies the
benefits of this multi-outlet approach. A highly successful and self-fulfilled
operator, he confidently declared, ‘yes, my business has improved. I am
quite happy with the way things are going’. This respondent was the sole
owner of a restaurant in a relatively affluent part of the city, and a partner
in another three others dispersed over the West Midlands, in prosperous
small town locations. To a certain extent, the key to success in this case
was the owner’s very early entry into the field before its eventual satura-
tion. Arriving in Manchester in 1967 as a student, the respondent supple-
mented his income by working for fellow Bangladeshis in the restaurant
trade, developed an interest in the business, abandoned his studies and
started his own ‘curry house’. At that time, competition was minimal,
‘people were queuing outside, but not any more you know, this does not
happen now’, virtually guaranteeing the success of his initial venture.
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As competition increased, he kept ahead of the field by buying up and
maintaining a string of restaurants, thereby spreading his risks, diversify-
ing and geographically expanding his customer base, and in some cases
selling them off as valuable going concerns. It was an on-going process of
capital accumulation over a thirty-year period and a classic example of the
important role of class resources in ethnic business development. From
another perspective, he might be seen as exemplifying the principle of self-
sustaining growth, with continually increasing scale and diversity permit-
ting ever more plough-back investment. Pertinently for the present
argument, this expansion has obliged him to dispense with time-honoured
working practice and to shift towards a more modern approach, central to
which is a specialised division of labour. Even though his preference is for
co-ethnic workers because, ‘I can trust them’, practical requirements have
required a preparedness to recruit any suitable candidates via job agencies
and advertising. Unlike the more typical hands-on South Asian firm,
relying as it does on the owner’s own heavy work load (Jones et al., 1994),
this respondent was a genuine owner-manager (Scase and Goffee, 1982),
whose headquarters restaurant is managed by his nephew and whose own
role is defined as customer care, ‘I personally welcome most of my cus-
tomers and they love it’.
Another illuminating example of multiple business ownership was pro-
vided by the manager of an Indian-owned restaurant, who commented on
how the proprietor, an economics graduate from Cambridge, expanded
from one outlet in 1966 to the current number of five. He had observed
the shortage of ‘authentic Indian restaurants’, and duly opened up his first
establishment in London, subsequently seizing the opportunity to expand
his operations. The manager from the restaurant described how
he looked at about seven or eight sites all over the country. He wanted
to expand in a big way and he started off with Cheltenham … Chel-
tenham was chosen because of his brother-in-law and his sisters. His
two sisters were married and he had manpower. So, he arranged all
the finance with the bank. He had a huge house in London which he
put down as collateral to raise the finance and he had two brother in
laws who were there to sort of help him and that did very well.
(Mohinder, Raj Palace, Indian)
The managers employed in this chain of restaurants were either relatives
or ‘recruited through the ranks’. It was clear from this account that growth
was largely contingent upon the interplay of a variety of factors: educa-
tional credentials, financial resources, familial and co-ethnic networks.
These respondents demonstrate the importance of a number of factors
which have been documented in broader debates on ‘growth’ in small
firms: attention to market position, appropriate niches, new product devel-
opment, and the management of human resources (Smallbone et al., 1992;
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Storey, 1994). Interestingly, the characteristics of these respondents, such
as their relative youth at start-up, also replicate characteristics found in
other studies of multiple business owners (Kolvereid and Bullvag, 1992).
However, the extent to which this model of growth is feasible for others is
highly questionable. Given the expense of acquiring and equipping
premises, the multi-outlet strategy noted above is virtually impossible
without access to class resources, particularly financial capital. The paucity
of financial resources necessary for expansion has often been highlighted
as a major barrier for many ethnic minority businesses (Jones et al., 1992;
Deakins et al., 1994; Ram and Jones, 1998). Hence, for two of the firms in
the category of multiple business owners, the development of their enter-
prises had been a much more incremental, ad hoc and prosaic process.
For example, one respondent owned a commercial property that was
currently up for sale. In the case of his own restaurant, it was clear that his
wife’s income from a full-time job, and her informal labour in the restau-
rant was vital to the survival of the business,
My wife has got a full time job. She works during the day time and
helps us whenever she can in the evening … To tell you the truth I am
struggling now more than I was struggling seventeen years ago … I am
keeping afloat by working seven days a week with no days off.
(Kalvinder, Seven Spices, Indian)
In a discussion on the changes and developments in the business, the
respondent commented,
We have not been able to do any changes … because you need a lot of
money for that … I am just paying my bills … debts and things like
that, just trying to survive … You can only change the décor when you
are making a lot of money.
(Kalvinder, Seven Spices, Indian)
Product and service differentiation
By its very nature a creative activity, the restaurant trade offers obvious
opportunities for any individual firm to blunt the hard edge of competition
by promoting its own uniqueness through product and service differenti-
ation. This is a theme exemplified in the current research by the Sikh
owner of a sweet centre also offering restaurant and takeaway services.
This respondent had consciously based his appeal on the ‘rediscovery’ of a
genuine regional cuisine, with no concessions to what is assumed to be the
European palate, ‘we only do traditional Punjabi dishes … anybody who
comes through that door and comes out with a fancy name, we tell them
we don’t do it’. Uncompromisingly traditional and ethnic though his
product may be, his working methods are at odds with the labour-intensive
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practices commonly associated with ethnic minority firms. He pointedly
eschewed familial and co-ethnic approaches to business, and attributed his
business approach to his westernised upbringing (he had been in England
since the age of five),
Well we are changing pretty dramatically, I would say, because a lot of
the things we are tending to do are more westernised than anything
else … we don’t employ family members … I couldn’t work with them
all day … [my children] are not involved in the business … they have a
choice, they can do what they want.
(Baljit, Eastern Delight, Indian)
Significantly, this firm also operates a distinct division of labour, with
ownership and management functionally separated from employees. At
the time of interview, the restaurant employed four staff, including two
highly trained chefs cooking to the specifications of the two partners,
husband and wife, both of whom are able to devote their entire energies to
supervisory functions and customer care. His wife’s status and contribu-
tion were formally acknowledged in the form of a legal partnership, which
contrasts sharply with many accounts of the unrecognised role of women
in ethic minority firms (Phizacklea, 1990; Ram, 1992). Equally significant
was the formalised method of staff recruitment through advertising and
the job centre rather than the ethnic network.
Differentiating products based on ‘authenticity’, however, was not the
only way in which respondents attempted to create a niche in a competit-
ive marketplace. For instance, a Pakistani owner operating in the crowded
‘Balti quarter’ saw little scope for development in the existing business.
Rather, he was actively pursuing a franchise arrangement with a fast-food
company specialising in fried chicken,
We are concentrating on the Southern fried side, on the franchise … It
is working out very well for us … for the whole of Birmingham …
With that we are going to do Southern fried chickens and things like
that so we are going to give it a … brand new concept.
(Bilal, Mogul Palace, Pakistani)
In another case, a Pakistani restaurateur was attempting to develop a
supplementary trade by supplying neighbouring restaurants with starter
dishes. According to the owner this sideline was ‘picking up gradually’, but
it also entailed the kind of labour-intensive practice and small margins
which are part of the ethnic minority business trap and as such can hardly
be considered as an example of successful growth at this stage. Signific-
antly, this respondent continued to operate on the back of traditional prac-
tices such as a heavy personal workload with a close hands-on approach,
exclusive use of family and co-ethnic workers, and little external funding.
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Attention to customer care and direct engagement with customers, a
key feature of this group, enabled these restaurant owners to become
quickly aware of on-going and incremental changes in their customer pref-
erences. This, in turn, enabled this group to offer enhanced levels of
service, which provided an element of differentiation, as well as make
amendments in their product offerings.
Locational break-out
Locational break-out refers to conscious (re)location in potentially
rewarding areas, such as middle class suburbs and affluent city centre
spaces not yet colonised by competitors (there were seven firms in this cat-
egory). Often, this form of business development went hand-in-hand with
the kind of discourse of ‘exclusivity’ and ‘authenticity’ noted in product
differentiation. Highlighting this point, a Bangladeshi respondent, the
owner of ‘a very high class restaurant’ had chosen to distinguish himself by
going ‘up-market’, placing a premium on ‘quality’ and the salubrious
nature of the surroundings. He combined this with a highly distinctive
cuisine and asserted, ‘I don’t copy anyone at all. Therefore, I don’t see
anybody as my competitor’. Yet, once again the acquisition and fitting out
of this restaurant had been extremely capital-intensive, ‘a few hundred
thousand pounds’, and was heavily dependent on his class resources; an
entrepreneurial father, who was both a mentor and a financial backer for
his initial entry into the trade; and a business studies degree which attuned
him in a formal way to the world of enterprise.
Two Indian-owned restaurants were also to be found in this niche of
spatial and product exclusivity. Both were located in expensive parts of the
city centre, and both claimed to have developed ‘national’ reputations for
the quality of their cuisine. For example, one of these proprietors com-
mented,
if people come to [my restaurant], it’s because we are very innovative.
We don’t take things for granted, we are very experimental in the
restaurant and it shows in the way the word has grown in the last 20
years … It’s a small restaurant but we have won national recommen-
dations many, many times.
(Kalra, Taj Mahal, Indian)
The nature of work relations was a revealing feature in both restaur-
ants. In each case, the proprietors had recruited highly experienced chefs
from India; they had been with the firms for over fifteen years. These chefs
had developed their own reputations; as one commented, ‘in this career
you can go very high in this job. You can make your own future’. Perhaps
reflecting the discretion that these highly skilled operators enjoyed in their
work, employees in these firms enjoyed considerable autonomy, as stated
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by one chef, ‘I control the kitchen area … I am left alone … [The
manager] is not worried about the kitchen’. Moreover, owners in both
establishments appeared to exhibit the kind of management style revealed
in the more benign depictions of ‘human resource management’; illustrat-
ing this point, one employee commented,
In industry in general, … staff are regarded as … expendable com-
modities, not valued or appreciated. Here I think it is different … The
proprietor of the restaurant he regards us and customers more as
friends and family as opposed to employees and he doesn’t look at the
staff as expendable. He values the staff and I am sure he likes to have
his staff value the establishment, so people do stay on.
(Bovinder, Kohinoor, Indian)
Both owners made a point of stressing their ‘on the books’ employment
practices; and compared this with the more informal modus operandi of
the ‘Balti’ restaurants. However, it is important to look again at the wider
context, particularly the market relationships, to explain this apparent
contrast. For example, one of the respondents was a manager of a restau-
rant that was part of a chain of five establishments. He elaborated,
Because we’re part of a large organisation … [The owner] has put a
system in … Everything has to go through the till; everything is regis-
tered … We only do 15 per cent cash turnover … the rest is through
credit cards … There is no scope [for informal practices] … How can
they [Balti restaurants] survive on those prices … Their biggest over-
head is staff. They compromise on VAT, PAYE, and anything else
that they can get away with.
(Nirinder, Raj Palace, Indian)
Discussion and conclusions
The continuing proliferation of ethnic minority businesses in advanced
industrial economies reflects these ethnic groups’ resilient mining of fringe
economic activities. Extant studies have drawn upon different theoretical
traditions to document the presence of ethnic minorities in business; these
range from cultural approaches (Hardill and Raghuram, 1998; Werbner
1990), to the recent articulation of a ‘mixed embeddedness’ perspective
(Kloosterman et al., 1999). Still neglected though, is an appreciation of the
ways in which ethnic minority businesses may be developing, and the
dynamics that underpin the growth of such enterprises. Working within a
contextualist approach to ethnic minority enterprise, this chapter has
sought to shed light on the actual process of ‘break-out’ and especially the
entrepreneurial strategies employed to this end. A key aim has been to
demonstrate the importance of employment relations to the management
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of growth in South Asian firms operating in a particular sectoral spatial
setting. A variety of responses were evident, even in firms operating in a
comparatively narrow segment of the market. The variation in patterns of
response owed much to the external context as well as the particular
‘informal’ characteristics of employment relations in the restaurants. An
important lesson is that the pressures stemming from the product and
labour market are not easily predictable in advance; they are mediated
internal dynamics within the firm.
Using the empirical context of South Asian in Birmingham, a number
of other propositions may be advanced that might apply more broadly to
small family firms aiming to move beyond traditional business practices.
Excessive reliance on social networks can inhibit the capacity of
firms to break-out
The experiences of the survivalists highlight both the opportunities and
constraints of relying primarily on informal insider social networks. Such
networks (in the form of family and co-ethnic ties) were important to the
processes of business start-up, recruitment and management. Moreover,
the ensuing nature of social relations within the enterprise provided
employers with an important means of coping with fierce competition,
with social networks utilised to operate ‘flexibly’, which often means oper-
ating informally (and on the margins of legality) by avoiding regulations.
Yet, although this provided employers with room for manoeuvre in highly
pressurised circumstances, it also limited the scope for more substantial
development of the enterprise, since over-reliance on social networks is
likely to place serious limitations on access to financial and human capital.
In addition, the circulation of new information and material resources is
also limited in tight groups and so consequently are the chances of busi-
ness success (Rath, 2002). Having said this, we should also reiterate that
lack of capability is often compounded by lack of will. As suggested previ-
ously, entrepreneurs of this type tend to define success less in terms of
growth and more in terms of economically ‘irrational’ criteria such as per-
sonal autonomy and self-satisfaction. In line with the mass of the entrepre-
neurial petty bourgeoisie irrespective of ethnicity they are ‘steady state
survivalists’ (Blackburn et al., 1990), whose agenda is dominated by
staving off threats to their very existence rather than by prospects of
dynamic expansion.
Economic sector has an influential, but not determinate, effect on
the capacity of firms to break-out
On the face of it, there are good reasons for arguing that ethnic minority
firms’ prospects are decisively shaped by their sectoral location (Jones et
al., 1994). In Britain, the great bulk of Asian businesses are concentrated
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in retailing, a conspicuously unpromising area, where the number of
independent operators has been shrinking throughout the entire post-war
period and declining with particular rapidity in the last two decades, their
markets largely wiped out by the invasion of super- and hyper-markets
(Jones et al., 2000). By complete contrast, the restaurant sector could
hardly be more buoyant, with ethnic restaurants taking an increasing share
of rapidly increasing consumer expenditure (Mawson and Fearne, 1997).
Yet, as the present research insists, this has to be severely qualified, since
in many localised cases such as Birmingham, the perceived attractiveness
of the restaurant trade has caused the supply of Asian entrepreneurs to
out-run even a vigorously expanding demand, resulting in market satura-
tion. In consequence, our respondent firms face intense competitive pres-
sures, mostly from fellow Asians. Even so, simply because the city-wide
and regional markets are expansive, entrepreneurs are granted some scope
to shape the trajectory of the business. As we have seen, some developed
new markets, adapted existing niches, and re-oriented working practices.
This clearly illustrates that markets are not given, but are the products of
human actions, and that their emergence involves economic and social
determinants (Rath, 2002:15). Even in the highly competitive ethnic
restaurant market, the findings illustrate that there is scope for business
growth and development. The market relationships documented in the
firms that had grown, through multiple business ownership, product
differentiation, and locational breakout, highlight the variety of strategic
responses open to these operators. Overall then we can conclude that,
although nothing can be simply ‘read off’ from sectoral location, neverthe-
less some sectors certainly do offer ethnic entrepreneurs a more
favourable opportunity/constraint mix than others. What appears to be
decisive is the way in which individual firms adapt to this and the way their
strategic response is conditions by access to business resources (see
below).
Effective break-out requires a combination of financial, human
and cultural resources
Essentially it is the possession and proactive deployment of financial,
human and cultural resources (or class resources) that distinguishes the
break-out businesses in our sample from the survivalists. Such resources
were crucial in helping to acquire additional businesses, locate in more
auspicious market settings and invest in work relations that would produce
the ‘authenticity’ required to differentiate the business from its competi-
tors. Enterprises with locational and multiple outlet strategies were better
endowed with these resources than other firms. Hence they were in a posi-
tion to pay much closer attention to market trends, have more ‘open’ prac-
tices to recruitment and management, observe employment regulations,
and adopt more innovative approaches to new product development.
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Firms in the product differentiation category tended not to have as many
of these resources; but nonetheless, they possessed sufficient human and
social capital to engage in a selective re-working of their ethnic resources.
Hence rather than investing in new premises, these firms concentrated
their efforts on refining their products and developing relationships with
key staff that would nurture ‘authenticity’.
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Note
1 In addition to the market environment, the city of Birmingham also provides an
important setting for the study. With a very significant ethnic minority popu-
lation (21.5 per cent), the city is seen as an important, test case for the future of
race relations in British society (Back and Solomos, 1992:329). Of the city’s
ethnic minority population, South Asians represent a substantial component,
with Bangladeshis comprising 1.3 per cent of the city’s population, Indians 5.3
per cent, and Pakistanis 6.9 per cent (Birmingham Economic Information
Centre, 1992). Settling mainly from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, Birming-
ham’s ethnic minority communities have tended to form distinct spatial clusters;
‘Sparkbrook became a largely Pakistani area, the Handsworth area became the
Caribbean centre of Birmingham, alongside the Soho area which was over-
whelmingly Indian’ (Rex, 1987:104).
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7 Labour regulation and SMEs
A challenge to competitiveness and
employability?
Mark Hart and Robert Blackburn
Introduction
Since the adoption of the Single European Act, European Community
priorities have shifted from the task of harmonisation to the definition and
implementation of minimum requirements in the area of working con-
ditions. The encouragement of high labour standards, through legislation,
as part of a competitive Europe is a central objective of the priorities in
the social field of European Union policy. At the centre of the argument is
the belief that the labour market is just as much a social institution as an
economic one (Solow, 1990) and that ideas of fairness, motivation and
morale imbue the labour market. However, without regulation such prin-
ciples rarely emerge, and the result is a set of labour standards erroneously
designed to serve the economic imperatives of growth. All forms of regula-
tion, therefore, must be resisted in order to pursue greater levels of eco-
nomic prosperity. Companies can more profitably respond to signals from
the market place if they can reduce their core workforce and ‘hire and fire’
contract and/or part-time workers with the minimum of contractual com-
plication. Such is the thinking of the economics of the new right which
came to dominate much of the rationale behind labour market policy in
the US and the UK.
A counter-argument, however, would suggest that attention to the
social aspects of the employment contract would also provide important
contributions to economic growth by delivering higher productivity and
high-quality jobs. The elimination of discriminatory wage practices and a
reassessment of the attitude towards traditionally low-paid groups would
also contribute to the stated objectives of achieving economic and social
cohesion within the EU. Such developments, driven through necessity by a
legislative framework at national level, would also enhance the employa-
bility of the discouraged worker who also tends to be among the more
marginalised groups in society.
In short, the European Commission’s twin objectives of competitive-
ness and employability may not be at odds with an increase in the regula-
tory framework governing employment relations and employment rights
across the EU. This chapter has two themes. First, to assess the extent to
which such claims are valid by looking at recent evidence from the UK
where there has been an increase in the volume and complexity of employ-
ment legislation on the statute book (DTI, 2000). This legislation covers a
variety of individual employment rights including working time, maternity
and parental leave, wage rates and discrimination. These rights are
enshrined in a number of pieces of legislation, including the Employment
Relations Act (1999), the Working Time Directive (1998) and National
Minimum Wage (1998).
Second, the discussion seeks to explore a range of issues in relation to the
development of labour regulation in the EU and the impact of this regula-
tion upon small firms. So, to what extent are owner-managers aware of the
new employment regulations? What, if any, are the different awareness
levels and effects within the small business population? What have been
their adjustments to it? How has it affected their business performance? The
rationale for this focus on the small firm sector is that employment legisla-
tion has excited a great deal of debate and comment from the media and
pressure groups with employers’ representatives expressing concern about
the effects on their enterprise (see The Daily Telegraph, 2000; Financial
Times, 2001). In theory, it has been argued that small firms are dispropor-
tionately affected by legislation and regulation because of the fixed costs of
compliance which are more difficult for them to absorb in terms of time and
resources afforded to these tasks (Better Regulation Task Force, 2000a).
EU social policy, employment relations and individual
employment rights
Flexibility and regulation – some aspects of the debate
The move towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has, according
to the Commission (CEC, 2000), helped create a more co-operative
employment relations climate as a result of shared macro-economic
objectives. The social partners have, albeit slowly, responded to the far-
reaching structural changes affecting industry, which has resulted in an
expansion of flexible forms of employment in European labour markets.
In the early 1990s, European labour markets were increasingly deregu-
lated, albeit from very different starting points. However, recent develop-
ments at European level towards the increased protection for atypical
workers (e.g. part-time workers) indicate the initial signs of the recon-
struction of labour market ‘institutions’. Such trends are treading a fine
line between the increased need for working time flexibility in many
sectors and firms and employee protection. This is clearly the case con-
cerning the labour market experience of women who, unlike men, are
more likely to experience flexible employment conditions throughout their
working lives (Rubery et al., 1999). The EU’s Part-time Workers’ Direc-
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tive in 1997 provides an indication of the attempt to ameliorate some of
the disadvantages confronting women in the labour market.
Arising out of the Social Charter, which was adopted by all the Member
States except the UK in 1989, the EU’s Social Affairs Council adopted the
Working Time Directive (WTD) in 1993 which was designed to limit
maximum hours of working (48 hours), and establish minimum entitle-
ments to rest periods and paid annual leave for most workers in the EU.
The objective and appeal of the policy was simple. The reduction of
working time would reduce unemployment without tinkering with Welfare
State regimes or affecting worker interests (Marimon and Zilibotti, 2000).
But can the WTD be an effective employment policy to translate the
volume of work into an increase in the number of individuals employed to
deliver that volume? Even if positive employment effects are found there
is always the difficulty of separating out the causal relationships from cycli-
cal trends. It should be noted that the debate on the efficacy of working
time reductions as an important tool in employment policy has its origins
in the late 1970s when countries such as Belgium, Germany, Denmark and
the Netherlands introduced a number of statutory or collectively agreed
reductions in working time (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2001).
There was a great deal of debate over the introduction of the WTD
within the EU with resistance coming particularly from the UK Govern-
ment, who were more inclined to present the counter-argument that com-
petitiveness would suffer as a result of higher employers’ unit labour costs
arising out of working time restrictions. According to orthodox economic
theory most individuals will be working at their utility level maximising
number of hours conditional on the wage they receive (Addison and
Seibert, 1979). Working time restriction has the effect of lowering
workers’ utility and hence employers’ unit labour costs rise. Another way
of looking at this is that when the working time of an individual worker is
cut, unit costs can be affected by the negotiated rise in wages to compen-
sate for the reduced hours worked (e.g. raising the hourly wage).
However, part of that negotiation may also involve effects on productivity
and changes in operating hours which, in turn, can have an effect on unit
costs (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2001). Further, there is an implicit assump-
tion in this theoretical position that the total amount of work to be done
remains constant. Finally, the way in which the total package is negotiated
between the employer and the employee will determine whether or not
the outcomes are cost neutral. For example, a reduction in the number of
working hours may be compensated by a wage increase but this in turn
may be offset by a lower annual pay rise.
A closer look at working time directives across the EU
The duration of working time has remained at the centre of discussions on
the employment relationship in the last two years across the EU. With the
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exception of the UK, the move towards the regulation of working time has
been covered by domestic industry specific or national collective agree-
ments. However, the move towards major cuts in the working week
through collective bargaining appears to have stalled in 2000 although they
are still on the agenda of many trade unions in Greece, Portugal and
Spain, or governments such as in Belgium (European Industrial Relations
Observatory (EIRO), 2001). France remains the stark exception within
the EU, where legislation introducing the 35-hour working week was
introduced in January 2000 for firms with more than 20 employees. In
January 2002, firms employing less than 20 employees were required to
reduce their working week to 35 hours.1 Within the EU this represents by
far the strongest policy initiative on WTD and is in no small way related to
a long-standing trade union goal within France.
Table 7.1 illustrates the statutory maximum working week across the
EU. In short, the countries can be divided into two groups. First, those
that have set their maximum weekly hours at 48 hours (as set out in the
EU WTD). France is included in this group but as noted above they have
set their statutory working week at 35 hours. For these countries this
maximum is well above the level of the average collectively agreed weekly
working hours and indeed of actual average weekly hours. What seems to
be happening here is that the 48 hours acts as some sort of a ‘safety net’
for workers. Second, those countries which operate a lower limit of 40
hours, which is much closer to the actual or agreed weekly hours, reflect a
much more effective legislative framework for ‘policing’ working time.
However, despite the impression of the universality of these legislative
changes, employees with ‘autonomous decision-making powers’ (i.e. man-
agers and executives), or those who work in excluded sectors (e.g. trans-
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Table 7.1 Statutory maximum working week (2000)
Country Hours
France 48
Germany 48
Greece 48
Ireland 48
Italy 48
Luxembourg 48
Netherlands 48
UK 48
Austria 40
Finland 40
Portugal 40
Spain 40
Sweden 40
Belgium 39
Source: EIRO (2001).
port or hospital services), or where they have negotiated an agreement at
the level of the firm to restrict the application of the WTD, are exempt
from the directive. In short, large groups of workers are clearly not
covered by the directive and what is perhaps more worrying is that there
exists the ability for workers to ‘self-select’ themselves as possessing
‘autonomous decision-making powers’. The incentive to do this will reflect
the preferences of individual workers who are more likely to be motivated
by more earnings rather than fewer working hours (OECD, 1998). With
these opt-outs, the ability of the WTD to be an effective tool in an overall
employment policy is somewhat weakened. To reiterate, there is a three-
fold tension between the increase in flexible working practices, a need to
create jobs across the EU and the development of regulatory frameworks
designed to reduce the discriminatory processes in the labour market.
What has been the impact of working time reduction on
employment?
Although it is perhaps too soon to assess the employment effects of the
EU WTD, due to its very recent introduction into national legislative
frameworks, the earlier moves to reduce working hours in many European
countries do allow some attempt to reflect on the impact on employment.
Bosch and Lehndorff (2001) show that these early working time reduc-
tions have impacted upon the trends in working time. For example, in
Germany and Denmark the average weekly working time has fallen
markedly for full-time workers over the period 1983 to 1993: 1,808 to 1,739
hours and 1,833 to 1,747 hours, respectively. By contrast, data from the
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO, 2001) indicates that in
the UK, annual hours for full-time employees have increased. But has the
absolute fall in annual working time hours resulted in increased employ-
ment? Bosch and Lehndorff review existing empirical studies which have
used a variety of techniques to isolate estimates of the employment effects
of reductions in working time. The difficulty, as noted above, is the ability
to separate out the effects of reduction in collectively agreed or statutory
working hours from broader effects of growth and productivity gains on
employment.
In summary, and notwithstanding the weaknesses associated with each
technique, Bosch and Lehndorff (2001:227) conclude that ‘most empirical
studies confirm that collective working time reductions can be expected to
have positive employment effects’. For example, in France the Ministry of
Labour, using data on the performance of companies introducing a reduc-
tion in working hours compared to those that had not, estimated that the
overall employment gain over the period 1996–99 preparatory period for
the legislation was around 100,000 jobs.
What emerged from many of these studies was the need to recognise
the importance in understanding the ‘employment gain’ which was not just
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a reduction in working hours per se, but also the actions taken by the
company, the social partners and the state in the period after the reduction
was implemented. In other words, to understand the conditions that are
necessary to ensure that working time reductions do actually lead to posit-
ive employment effects, which can best be summarised as follows:
• Agreement over the compensatory pay increases and productivity
gains (importance of incremental progress on the wage–time tension –
initial two-year agreements as in the case of France).
• Ensuring that the supply side of the labour market can respond to the
new opportunities.
• A sensitivity between working time, the total volume of work in the
company (operating hours) and the organisation of work.
• Ensuring job security in the growth of flexible working time systems.
• The role of the state in supporting a collective working time policy
through subsidised measures such as lower social security contribution
in the case of France.
One of the important debates concerning the WTD has been the differ-
ential effect that the legislation might have on the ability of small busi-
nesses to maintain their competitive position in the market place. For
example, the French Government decided not to go ahead in January 2002
and introduce the 35-hour working week for businesses employing less
than 20 employees in the face of some quite forceful lobbying on the
part of the small business sector. More generally, it is important to
assess the extent to which the raft of legislation within the generic frame-
work of ‘individual employment rights’ may have a greater impact on
small firms compared to larger firms. One might argue, a priori, that the
introduction of Individual Employment Rights (IERs) might have a dis-
proportionate effect upon micro-enterprises (less than 10 employees) and
small firms (between 10 and 49 employees) for a number of reasons. We
take a closer look at these reasons in the next section within the context of
a detailed assessment of the impact of the increased scale of IERs in the
UK since 1997.
Individual employment rights in the UK
When the Labour Government in the UK came to office in May 1997, one
of its first actions was to sign up to the European Social Chapter in an
acceptance of the existence of a social dimension to the process of Euro-
pean integration. However, rather than signalling a full acceptance of
European social policy the reality in the detail of the legislation has been
to accept the proposals and directives in a minimalist fashion, never
exceeding what was required by European legislation (McKay, 2001). The
following section probes in more detail the way in which the regulatory
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framework in the UK has undergone a relatively dramatic change since
1997 and seeks to assess the impact of this change on the small firm
sector.
The context: employment legislation and small firms
Employment legislation is amongst the most commonly applicable aspects
of regulation in the workplace. Over the past 10 years or so, employment
legislation has increased and since coming to power in 1997, the Labour
Government has added to the amount of legislation with the aim of pro-
viding more protection and rights for individuals in the workplace. This
new legislation is broadreaching and complex. Surprisingly, there has been
very little research undertaken on owner-managers’ awareness and know-
ledge levels of employment rights. Instead, the bulk of attention has
tended to look at the impact of employment legislation. The research that
does exist on awareness levels tends to focus on firms employing five or
more people (Callendar et al., 1999; Hogarth et al., 2001). However, the
volume of new employment legislation raises the question of the extent to
which smaller employers are aware of, and have detailed knowledge of,
these new rights. Government has attempted to communicate to employ-
ers through various media, but little is known about its success in reaching
owner-managers. Evidence suggests that owner-managers are generally
aware of the rise in legislation. Research conducted by MORI, commis-
sioned by the Small Business Service (SBS) on 1,500 firms with 0–249
employees, found that over two-fifths of SMEs considered that the amount
of Government regulations had increased since the election of the Labour
Government in 1997 (Small Business Service, 2001).
Whilst research on basic awareness and knowledge levels is scarce, that
on the impact of employment legislation is more readily available. A
number of small business membership bodies and lobby groups have been
vociferous in their criticism of new employment regulations. Studies have
shown the new employment legislation to be expensive for employers and
constrains the flexibility in their employment practices, ultimately affect-
ing their competitiveness (see British Chambers of Commerce, 1999; The
Daily Telegraph, 2000). Some surveys (e.g. Forum of Private Business,
2000; NatWest SBRT Quarterly Survey, 2000) have attempted to measure
the costs of compliance by asking employers to estimate the time taken to
deal with regulations. For example, a survey for the Small Business
Service survey reported that, of the regulations employers’ mentioned,
complying with Health and Safety legislation was considered to take the
most person hours, followed by the Working Time Directive (8 per cent)
and the National Minimum Wage (6 per cent) (Small Business Service,
2001:61–3). A survey of small business advisers has also provided esti-
mates of the financial costs of compliance with regulations amongst micro
and small firms and found that government regulation has become a more
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important factor in employers’ perceptions upon the constraints on busi-
ness performance (ICAEW, 2000).
In principle, the compliance costs of legislation are relatively higher in
small firms because of a poorer level of resources in comparison to larger
enterprises (Stanworth and Gray, 1991; Van de Horst et al., 2000). These
costs include learning the legislation, adjusting administrative procedures
to meet the new legislation, paying the relevant taxes or benefits and
absorbing the effects within the enterprise. In relation to employment leg-
islation it is likely that small firms are at a relative disadvantage because of
the absence of a personnel specialist and the greater proportionate contri-
bution of individual employees to output. Academic research which does
exist on the impact of recent employment legislation tends to present a
more limited effect than the more popular accounts, with this evidence
drawing attention to owner-managers’ ‘fire fighting’ management style
(Marlow and Strange, 2000). One of the main effects of the new legislation
has been a rise in the search for external advice by employers (Better Reg-
ulation Task Force, 2000b; Harris, 2000). However, compared with the
amount of legislation it can be argued that the volume of research is dis-
proportionately low.
A research focus on employment regulations and small firms is,
however, not new. Over 20 years ago, following the introduction of a
series of employment rights, employers’ representative groups voiced con-
cerns and research was commissioned by government. The results of the
research found that only two per cent of small employers cited employ-
ment legislation as the single main difficulty in running business. The
biggest perceived constraint was on being unable to sack unsatisfactory
workers; and that the expense and time involved in compliance were of
secondary importance (Clifton and Tatton-Brown, 1979:Ch.11; Employ-
ment Gazette, 1979; Westrip, 1982). The report concluded that the legisla-
tion may have involved expenses to employers and that, as a result, the
latter were being more careful about whom they employ.
In this section of the chapter we focus on three main areas of this legis-
lation (Table 7.2). The Working Time Directive is one of the major new
developments in employment legislation during the past decade. Intro-
duced in 1998, the legislation seeks to regulate employees amount of time
at work and provide certain break entitlements whilst at work. It has been
argued elsewhere that the WTD is a key element of employment rights’
legislation in terms of both its range and depth (IRS, 2000). Certainly the
WTD has received a number of criticisms because it has improved the
terms and conditions of workers at a cost to employers in addition to the
compliance costs of understanding and administering new regulations
(Forum of Private Business, 2000:22).
A further thrust of Government legislation has been on developing
‘family friendly’ employment regulations through the extension of mater-
nity leave and pay and parental leave. The rights to reinstatement after
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childbirth and protection from unfair dismissal on the grounds of preg-
nancy were introduced in June 1976 and maternity pay in April 1977.
Under the 1976 regulations, all pregnant women who met continuous
service requirements had the right to return to their previous jobs before
the end of 29 weeks after childbirth.2 These rights were reinforced under
the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act (1993) which intro-
duced the ‘Pregnant Workers’ Directive. Women who were expecting a
baby on, or after, October 1994 had the right to take 14 weeks off work,
regardless of their hours of work or length of service and those with 2
years service were entitled to 29 weeks leave. More recently, the rights for
maternity and parental leave have changed as a result of the Employment
Relations Act 1999 and the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations
1999. Initial reactions from employers’ groups to the new rights have been
critical and there have been suggestions that small firms should be exempt
from some of the provisions (British Chamber of Commerce, 1999).
However, there is no reason to assume that this emphasis will lose
momentum in the near future. There has, however, been an absence of
comprehensive and reliable evidence of employers’ knowledge levels of
the existing and new maternity and parental rights.3
A final area of study in this chapter is on the National Minimum Wage
(NMW). This has received a great deal of publicity and has been subject to
scrutiny by the Low Pay Commission of Inquiry which reports on the
impact on the NMW and makes recommendations on the rate to Govern-
ment (e.g. Low Pay Commission, 2000). Arguably, because of the relative
simplicity of the NMW and its high profile this may be one of the most
clearly understood areas of legislation. It is also the area where most
recently the bulk of research has been conducted (see for example, chapter
8). The overall aim of this section, therefore, is to provide: an analysis of
employers’ awareness of employment rights; to establish any differences in
small employers’ awareness of employment rights; and to analyse the
effects, real or perceived, of employment rights on their business.
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Table 7.2 Areas of recent legislation on employment rights in the UK
Working time (Working Time Directive, 1998)
Covers rights on maximum average hours (48) compelled to work; right to four
weeks paid leave (after 13 weeks); right to one day off per week; right to Statutory
Sick Pay; right to rest periods
Family friendly (Employment Relations Act, 1999)
Covers rights on: Maternity Leave; Additional Maternity Leave; Parental Leave;
Emergency Family Leave
National Minimum Wage (National Minimum Wage Act, 1998)
Sets minimum wage rates for workers in the UK.
Currently £4.10 per hour (from 1 October 2001); £3.50 per hour for workers aged
18–21 and workers aged 22 and above during their first six months in a new job
with a new employer and who are recently accredited training
It is likely that some areas of legislation may be better known to
employers than others because of the length of time on the statute books,
the amount of effort put into publicity campaigns and the perceived rele-
vance by employers to their enterprise. We also expect that knowledge
levels of specific rights would be very much influenced by ‘a need to know’
basis. Size of enterprise was expected to be a strong influence on aware-
ness and knowledge levels because of the increased likelihood of having to
understand the range of employment rights with a larger workforce and
the ability of employers to devote more time to a personnel specialism. It
was also expected that industry sector and the composition of the labour
force would be important determinants in awareness and knowledge
levels.
Methodology
The analysis in this chapter draws on a telephone survey of 1,071 small
business owners conducted in Autumn 2000 throughout Great Britain by
the Small Business Research Centre at Kingston University for the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This was a survey stratified by
enterprise size, sector and location and then weighted back to reflect their
true proportions in the overall GB economy using the Inter Departmental
Business Register (IDBR). This ensured that a sufficient number of firms
having certain characteristics were interviewed. This was especially
important since one of the main weaknesses in other surveys is that they
often omit, or simply fail to attract, responses from owners of very small
firms. The mean size of firms in the sample was 7.2 employees (median six
employees), the minimum two employees and the maximum 49
employees. The response rate of the survey was 53.8 per cent, calculated
as the number of successful interviews (1,071) expressed as a percentage of
total valid firms contacted (i.e. including refusals and aborted interviews).
The results in the following analysis are based on the weighted sample and
therefore can be said to reflect the GB business population.
Interviewing business owners about employment legislation posed a
range of special problems. For example, who should we address our ques-
tions to when there was a division of labour between owners in the enter-
prise? How could we approach the key informant to discuss our research
questions and how detailed could our questioning of their awareness and
knowledge of rights go? Prior to the telephone interview, 18 face-to-face
interviews were conducted in order to help the researchers understand the
attitude of business owners and see how they responded to answering
questions and discussing employment rights. This helped shape the main
fieldwork instruments and design of the telephone questionnaire. In the
final questionnaire, on the core questions covering employment rights, we
started by asking employers’ awareness of a particular right such as mater-
nity leave, and only if they said that they were aware of such a right did we
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then ask detailed questions. This helped us focus on those rights which
employers were able to discuss as well as avoid alienating the employer.
This also helps raise the validity of the research when asking the perceived
impact of particular employment rights on their enterprise, something
which, we would argue, has been weak in other studies.
For businesses, individual employment rights constitute government
regulation. For small businesses, in particular, it is often argued that there
is a compliance burden which is regressive because of the economies of
scale required in meeting or administering the regulations. The Better
Regulation Task Force (2000a) for example, found that the absence of an
in-house expert on legislation did mean that legislation did have a dispro-
portionate effect on small firms. There are also suggestions that this legis-
lation is having the effect of deterring employers from recruiting and
expanding their workforce because of a regulatory burden. The last major
government research undertaken on this issue was carried out over 20
years ago following protests from employers’ groups over the adverse
impact of the employment legislation introduced in the 1970s (Clifton and
Tatton-Brown, 1979).
The next two sections present evidence on the owner-managers’ actual
awareness and knowledge of regulations, together with the perceived
impact of employment legislation on small firms’ business performance. A
number of questions are relevant here. For example, to what extent is
contemporary legislation promoting IERs inhibiting the performance of
small firms? What are the perceptions of business owners of the effect of
IERs on their businesses? To what extent are these based on actual
experiences or based on perceptions? How important a factor are IERs on
business performance in the context of other influences such as product
market conditions, availability of finance and so on? Which specific IERs
do employers perceive as having the greatest and least impact on their
business? What are the effects of these IERs?
Awareness and knowledge of IERs
Although there is a great deal of publicity surrounding the impact of regu-
lation on firms, there is relatively less understanding of owner-managers’
actual awareness and knowledge of regulations. Employment legislation
establishing the legal rights of workers is no exception. However, this is
important to investigate, particularly in a period of growing IERs. If
employers are relatively unaware of the IERs then this has implications
for how government communicates to SMEs. The awareness and know-
ledge levels of employers are also important to understand since they will
also help determine whether the reports of the effects of IERs are percep-
tion or experientially based.
Employers were presented with a sequence of questions to explore dif-
ferent levels of awareness and knowledge. The first question collected
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information on respondents’ self-assessed knowledge of employment
rights. This was followed by questions designed to test awareness of
particular rights. Those respondents who knew a particular right was
covered by legislation were then routed to a series of further questions, to
test their detailed knowledge of the provisions. In the sequence of ques-
tions on awareness and knowledge, three fictitious employment rights
were included. The rationale for this was to see if owner-managers were
merely claiming awareness to every right mentioned, which may be a
socially desirable response, or whether they were prepared to state no
awareness.
A number of major themes have emerged from this analysis of the
awareness and knowledge of IERs amongst respondents. First, generally,
owner-managers claimed to be aware of the major pieces of legislation in
relation to IERs (Table 7.3). Whilst this awareness was ‘claimed aware-
ness’ and in a telephone survey, every effort was made to ensure that
employers were able to reveal their understanding or ignorance on IERs.
Second, awareness varied according to particular IERs. Highest levels of
awareness were amongst both new (the NMW) and older pieces of legisla-
tion (maternity rights). However, lowest levels of awareness were amongst
new pieces of legislation, with the right for parental leave being the least
well known. Third, employers’ detailed knowledge was much lower than
their claimed awareness on all issues covered. This suggests that owner-
managers had some basic notion that legislation existed but they were not
able to provide many accurate responses on the details of legislation. It is
suggested that employers’ awareness and knowledge was raised when they
had to deal with a matter rather than any prior strategic knowledge acqui-
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Table 7.3 Summary of owner-managers awareness of IERs
Per cent aware that 
this is covered by 
legislation
Highest National Minimum Wage 98.7
Maternity Leave 95.6
Right to rest break 94.1
Right to paid holidays 91.1
Written statement of employment terms 89.7
Maximum number of hours worked 85.2
Application of employee rights to part-timers 83.7
Right to Maternity Pay 82.7
Right to a whole day off per week 68.4
Right for time-off to deal with emergencies 57.7
Minimum size of enterprise for disability rights 
to be applicable 50.1
Lowest Right to parental leave 48.8
Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
sition. These were small business owners and they dealt with information
on employment rights on a need-to-know basis.
Fourth, the size of enterprise proved to be the most consistent discrimi-
nator in picking out sub-sample variations when the sample was disaggre-
gated. It is argued that the major reason behind this relationship is that
employers in the larger small firms (rather than the micros) will encounter
a wider range of employment rights issues merely because they employ a
wider diversity of staff. It is also likely that the smaller enterprises were
less able to dedicate resources to keeping up-to-date with employment leg-
islation. Fifth, business sector and labour force composition (such as pro-
portion of females and part-time workers) proved influential on awareness
levels on specific issues. Being taken to an employment tribunal also
proved highly influential on knowledge levels: this not only raised detailed
knowledge about unfair dismissal and compensation levels but it also sen-
sitised employers to the wider range of IERs.
At the outset, it is expected that awareness and knowledge will vary
according to employers’ need to know. It is assumed that the particular
explanatory factors will include the size of enterprise, business sector,
employment composition and experiences during the running of the enter-
prise. However, the extent to which these factors are important remain
hitherto unexplained. In order to provide an overview of the awareness
and knowledge of IERs, a composite variable was created using the
employer’s responses to 21 questions asking them to indicate whether the
current legislation covered a list of possible employee rights. Table 7.4
indicates the number of questions asked under each area of the legislation.
A maximum score of 21 could have been obtained for correct answers
to all of the questions. Overall, a mean score of 16 was recorded for all the
small firms in the sample indicating a less than perfect awareness of all the
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Table 7.4 Owner-managers’ awareness of IERs covered by legislation: nature of
the composite variable 
Area of the legislation Number of questions included
Maternity provisions (Q14a–Q14c) 3
Time off for dependents (Q14d) 1
Terms and conditions of employment (Q14e–Q14f) 2
WTD (hours per week) (Q14g) 1
WTD (rest and holidays) (Q14h–Q14k) 4
NMW (Q14l) 1
Part-timers (Q14m) 1
Discrimination (Q14n–Q14o) 5
Unfair dismissal (Q14p–Q14r) 3
Total 21
Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
areas of the legislation. How does this score vary across sub-groups within
the sample? In order to understand the complexities of awareness and
knowledge across the diversity of the small businesses in the sample, a
multi-variate approach was adopted for the analysis of the composite vari-
able. An OLS regression was undertaken with the dependent variable
specified as the composite awareness variable with a possible score in the
range 0–21. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.5.
In this model, what could be classified as three types of variable are
included: contextual (Size of firm, Age of firm, Sector, Location); internal
firm characteristics and experience (Sex of employer/respondent, Work-
force composition I and II, Ethnic minorities in the workforce, Major
occupational grouping, Businesses taken to an employment tribunal); and
perception of the Impact of employment legislation (impact of IERs). The
last may in fact have two-way causality, but this is included because it is
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Table 7.5 Equation for composite awareness of individual employment rights
Variable Coefficients t statistic
Constant 14.785 38.985
Size of firm 0.544 3.861
(log of employment)
Age of firm 0.207 3.007
(logged)
Sector 0.495  2.584
(1 Primary, manufacturing and construction; 
0Services)
Location 0.364 2.169
(1 South East; 0 Rest of GB)
Sex of employer/respondent 0.598  3.429
(1 Male; 0 Female)
Workforce composition I 1.362.102 4.230
(% Part-time workers)
Workforce composition II 1.006.102  2.943
(% Female workers)
Ethnic minorities in the workforce 0.407 1.707
(1 Yes; 0No)
Major occupational grouping 0.431  2.033
(1 Operatives; 0 All others groups)
Business taken to an employment tribunal  0.425  1.478
(1 Yes; 0No)
Impact of employment legislation  0.673  4.082
(1 A burden; 0Other responses)
R2 0.073 F8.575
n1,058
Critical values
F(11, 1,047)0.05 1.79
t (1,058)0.05 1.645
Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
significant. The R2 is low but the equation is statistically significant and all
but one variable (employment tribunal) is significant.
The interpretation of the results of the model suggests that there is a
clear relationship between firm characteristics and awareness of IERs with
size, age and sector being significant. In detail, the larger the enterprise the
more knowledgeable employers are of the legislation, while greater know-
ledge is associated with younger businesses. If enterprises are in the
primary, manufacturing or construction sectors (i.e. not in services), then
the employers are more knowledgeable of the legislation. Connected to
this, if operatives are the main occupational group in the business, the
employers are more knowledgeable of the legislation. Knowledge levels
increase outside the South East suggesting that in ‘tight’ labour markets
employer knowledge is weak, perhaps due to the confidence that recruit-
ment of workers is a relatively easy process.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the ‘family friendly’ nature of much of the
IER legislation, male employers are more knowledgeable of the legislation
than female employers. The explanation for this does not appear to lie
with the composition of the workforce in the respondent’s firm as these
variables are also held constant in the equation. For example, the fewer
the percentage of part-timers in the workforce and the higher the propor-
tion of females, the more knowledgeable employers are of the legislation,
irrespective of their gender. Employing ethnic minorities does not raise
knowledge levels. As noted in other studies (Marlow, 2002), the
experience of an Employment Tribunal does raise employers’ knowledge
levels and induces greater compliance, but although this contributes to
the model, the individual relationship is not statistically significant.
Finally, those respondents who stated that the legislation is a significant
burden on the performance of their business are more knowledgeable of
the legislation.
The overall conclusion to be drawn from this multivariate analysis is
that knowledge levels of IERs are complex and vary greatly within the
small business sector. The range of variables which may ‘explain’ aware-
ness of the legislation, as measured by 21 factual questions on all aspects
of the legislation, provides an important indication of those segments of
the small business sector which require further intervention by govern-
ment in terms of increasing their knowledge levels about IERs. Although
the model provides some explanation of the variation in knowledge levels
of IERs in the sample, the low R2 suggests that other factors (i.e. missing
variables) not included in the model are also influential.
Impact of employment legislation on business performance
Some of the most high profile studies of employment legislation have been
on its constraining effects on businesses. Business owners in the survey
revealed that despite a rise in legislation, ‘competition’ and labour markets
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were considered to be the greatest constraint on business performance
over the past two years (Table 7.6). However, government legislation or
regulation was mentioned by a third of all respondents as a constraint and
these were cited as the second most important constraint of all the factors
mentioned. Of course, this can include anything ranging, for example,
from taxation to environmental laws. An examination of the responses
found ‘Employment laws’ to be the most commonly cited followed by
‘Health and Safety requirements’.
In the Department of Employment survey conducted 20 years ago
(Clifton and Tatton-Brown, 1979) employment legislation was mentioned
by only 2 per cent of respondents as the single most important difficulty in
running the business over the past year. Even allowing for any methodo-
logical variations between the two surveys, it would be fair to deduce that
employers are now more conscious of employment regulations than 20
years ago as ‘regulatory capture’ becomes more widespread. This ‘effect’
clearly needs further investigation but we would argue that this is a result
of the legislation introduced over this 20-year period and particularly since
1997. However, it should be reported in this context that a formal econo-
metric test (logistic regression) of the impact of awareness of IERs on
business performance, while holding the other variables reported in Table
7.7 constant, showed no influence on whether a firm reported growth in
turnover in the three years prior to the survey (i.e. 1998 to 2001).
Those business owners who stated that employment rights had signific-
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Table 7.6 Constraints on business performance over last two years
Per cent/Weighted
Any Main N (Unweighted N)
mentiona factor
Competition 50.2 33.0 538 (524)
Labour markets 33.9 11.1 363 (465)
Government legislation or 
regulations 33.3 17.0 357 (418)
Cash flow/bad debt 31.3 10.7 336 (319)
Premises/rent/rates 31.0 12.3 332 (318)
Interest rates/cost of finance 21.2 3.3 227 (187)
High value sterling 15.5 3.2 166 (194)
Access to finance 9.6 1.8 103 (95)
Others 5.4 4.2 58 (60)
Don’t know/no main constraint – 3.4 32 (3.2)
Total – 100.0 961 (977)
N 961 (977)
Source: SBRC IER Survey (2000).
Note
a ‘Any mention’ is based on a multiple response question.
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antly affected their business (i.e. a third of the sample) were asked about
their impact. The biggest single effect was on ‘administrative workload’
followed by the ‘amount of legal advice’ (Table 7.7). There were also
important employment and management effects. Adjustments in the
numbers employed, or recruited in the past two years, the ways in which
employees are managed and changes in employment contracts were all
viewed as important changes in business operations by employers as a
result of employment rights. It is also apparent that the effects of employ-
ment rights on the amount of administration workload and legal advice
seeking are higher in the larger firms (Table 7.7) This size effect may be a
result of the fact that these firms employ significant numbers of staff and
thus their owners are more likely to have to come to terms with effects of
employment rights. However, the smaller firms appear more likely to
report an impact on the numbers employed and the balance between full
and part-time employees. It may be that the perception of employment
rights as a constraint on enterprise is deterring some of these micro firms
from taking on staff.
This emphasis on a rise in the administrative workload as a result of
employment rights should not be surprising. Other surveys have shown
this to be the most immediate effect. Similarly, a rise in the amount of
legal advice confirms the results of other studies (e.g. Better Regulation
Task Force, 2000b: 7–8; Harris, 2000). Few employers report a shift in the
balance between male and female employees or a rise in the use of agency
or self-employed workers. In other words, they are not making strategic
shifts in their labour force composition as consciously, or immediately, as
some commentators have suggested. One possible explanation for the
emphasis on the rise in administration is that in many cases it is the
employer who actually deals with these matters and the immediate impact
of IERs may be to actually increase their workload. Given that most
employers are antithetical to bureaucracy (see Scase and Goffee, 1987) it
is not surprising that this effect is recorded as the highest.4
It was anticipated that there would be some variation in the effects of
different employment rights in the sample (Table 7.8) with the greatest
impact coming from the National Minimum Wage (NMW) (8.2 per cent of
the whole sample), followed by basic terms and conditions of employment
(7.4 per cent) and then maternity rights (6.4 per cent). However, the
numbers of employers experiencing negative effects are low overall, and
with a strong positive relationship between firm size and perceived impact.
On a firm size analysis, it appears that the highest negative scores were in
the 20–49 size band and especially in relation to maternity rights, NMW
and unfair dismissal.5
In this research, strong sector difference and labour force composition
effects were expected although, hitherto, there has been little research
exploring such aspects. The data confirmed our expectations of an uneven
impact as shown in Table 7.8, where the number of negative responses by
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employers are classified by business sector. Employers in Distribution
were especially negative about the effects of employment rights (Table
7.8). With those in Hotels and catering most negative about the extension
of rights to part-timers reflecting their high dependence upon part-time
labour, and minimum work breaks. Employers in Business and profes-
sional services recorded the highest number of employers expressing nega-
tivity about maternity rights. Although the precise reasons for these
patterns in the data can only be covered through further qualitative
research, these findings do take us away from making blanket statements
regarding the effects of employment rights in small firms.
In order to explore the uneven effects of employment rights further, an
analysis of employment rights according to the proportion of females in
the labour force is shown in (Table 7.9). Employers with at least 75 per
cent of their labour force being female were most likely to record mater-
nity rights and the extension of rights to part-timers as having a perceived
negative effect on business performance (Table 7.9). However, employers
with no female workers were more likely to record perceived negative
effects resulting from basic terms and conditions, limits on the working
week and rights to regular time off work: that is IERs with no specific
gender target. Again this analysis illuminates the varying effects of
employment rights according to enterprise characteristics.
Conclusions
As the volume and complexity of legislation relating to business expands,
employers’ representative bodies in the UK have complained increasingly
that this creates operational problems, particularly for small firms. In our
investigation of the awareness and impact of Individual Employment
Rights in the UK a major theme to emerge was the relative buoyancy of
the enterprises in terms of turnover and employment. A self-assessment of
the constraints on business performance over the past two years revealed
competition in markets to be the overwhelming factor. This confirms find-
ings of earlier studies (Clifton and Tatton-Brown, 1979; Scott et al., 1989).
In other words, employment legislation was not the overriding factor in
business performance. However, there was evidence to suggest that
employment legislation was rising in importance as a constraint amongst
small firms in the UK. Compared with earlier surveys (e.g. Clifton and
Tatton-Brown, 1979; Scott et al., 1989) mention of employment legislation
has risen in rank order. Employers were particularly affected by the rise in
administration which IERs legislation had created for them.
Few employers provided evidence of a strategic response to the effects
of individual employment rights on their enterprise. For example, employ-
ers were unlikely to report switches in the composition of their labour
force as a result of the introduction of rights for part-timers. Thus, the
argument that such rights may create prejudices against certain types of
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employees, by for example strategic changes in recruitment patterns, were
not founded in the sample. Whether or not these fears are totally
unfounded, or will take time to emerge, remains to be seen.
Our evidence found that whilst the impact of IERs on the sample was
not broad, in the sense of affecting many businesses, they may be affecting
specific types of enterprise at risk in terms of their size, sector and employ-
ment composition. Smaller firms in the sample were less likely to report
negative effects, which fits in with the earlier findings that they were also
less aware of the details of employment legislation. Moreover, the survey
revealed that different types of IER were affecting different types of
enterprise. For example, maternity rights were more likely to affect
employers with a high proportion of females and it was these employers
who were most likely to record negative effects regarding maternity rights.
The results also reveal a curious, though not illogical, pattern on assess-
ing the effects of IERs. Although the bulk of employers tended to be
vague in their knowledge of employment rights, they were prepared to be
critical of the effects of this legislation on their enterprise. This suggests
that the results of surveys of this kind are influenced by a negative predis-
position on the effects of government intervention. Clearly, this predispo-
sition and subsequent perception needs addressing. For example, it could
be that these perceptions are rooted in the self-definitions of owner-
managers. Many owner-managers are resistant to external guidance or
advice, let alone legislation, and even without knowing the detailed effects
many start with a negative disposition. It may also be that perceptions of
the effects of IERs on enterprise are also bound up with other government
interventions such as taxation. A small number of employers were,
however, supportive of the new employment rights recognising that legis-
lation provided guidelines and clarification for them whilst increasing staff
morale and security. However, the finding that almost two-thirds of
employers did not record a benefit of the effect of IERs on their business
does suggest that, overall, there is a very negative outlook such that when
employers are ‘captured’ by legislation, they are more likely to be critical
of it.
Methodologically the study poses some questions for other surveys of
regulation and the small firm. From the results it appears that the greater
the knowledge and experience employers have of employment rights, the
more likely they are able to make informed assessments of the effects on
their enterprise and that these assessments are more likely to be negative.
Whilst we would not go so far as to argue that for the less informed
employer, ‘ignorance is bliss’, it appears to be this group who record
fewest negative effects. Undoubtedly, this is closely linked to their man-
agement style (Marlow and Strange, 2000). However, given the low levels
of awareness recorded by employers on some aspects of recent employ-
ment legislation, the sweeping statements regarding the negative effects of
employment legislation on small firms, as reported in some surveys, are
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open to question. Instead, it is argued that these responses are often
rooted in the negative predisposition employers have on regulation and
the constituency of the surveys rather than on direct experiences.
In short, the above analysis from the UK would tend to suggest that the
increase in the intensity of the individual employment rights legislation in
recent years may not be having the detrimental effect upon business
performance as suggested. Further, there is no evidence to indicate that
the employability of the more atypical worker, namely the female part-
time ‘flexible’ worker, has been adversely affected. Consequently, one
implication to be drawn from these results is that the development of a set
of minimum standards in the EU labour market, which seek to safeguard
many of the social aspects of the employment contract, does not appear to
be an obstacle to the growth of individual SMEs.
However, neither was there any evidence to suggest that such a
commitment to minimum standards has delivered greater productivity
with very few owner-managers reporting any positive effects of IERs on
their business. From this evidence it can be argued that at best the impact
of the IER legislation has been neutral for SMEs in general. As a result
EU-driven policies designed to eliminate discriminatory wage practices
and safeguard traditionally low-paid groups can be introduced into the
regulatory framework for the labour market in order to address the twin
objectives of economic and social cohesion within the EU without damag-
ing competitiveness and growth. In short, the European Commission’s
twin objectives of competitiveness and employability may not be at odds
with an increase in the regulatory framework governing employment rela-
tions and employment rights across the EU.
However, more recent comparative evidence from the Lloyds
TSB/SBRC (2001) European Survey of SMEs carried out in 2002 would
suggest that this conclusion is perhaps too optimistic. The first point to
note is that owner-managers of SMEs in the UK, France and Germany
regard the balance of IER legislation to be in favour of the employee
(Lloyds TSB/SBRC, 2003). Probing further on the impact of this legisla-
tion on the recruitment process, this sample of owner-managers viewed
the impact of IER legislation as a burden with the French and Germans
more inclined to report this view. Almost three-quarters of French and
one-half of German owner-managers view the impact of the IER legisla-
tion as a constraint to employing new staff compared with two-fifths of UK
owner-managers. Indeed, SMEs in France were significantly less likely to
employ part-time workers than SMEs in Germany and the UK, which may
reflect a very pragmatic solution on the part of French owner-managers to
ensure that they do not fall within the ‘footprint’ of certain parts of the
legislation.
While in France and Germany there was no significant difference in the
results by size of firm, in the UK it was the owner-managers of larger
SMEs (employing 50 or more workers) who were more likely to report
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that the IER legislation was a constraint on their ability to recruit workers.
This reinforced the point made earlier from the DTI study and suggests
that very small firms do not report effects (either negative or positive)
because they are not aware of many aspects of the legislation. Overall,
therefore, there are clear differences between the three EU Member
States in this study which reflect the pace, and more importantly the
intensity, of the adoption of EU directives concerning the regulation of the
labour market. What emerges is that the regulatory framework for the
labour market in the UK is perceived as being relatively more benign for
SMEs than in France and Germany.
This then leads on to a final question which concerns the type of regula-
tory model for the labour market that is appropriate to achieve the object-
ives of competitiveness and employability within the EU, whilst adhering
to the principles of economic and social cohesion. From the evidence pre-
sented above it is possible to conclude that the model currently in place in
the UK may be working relatively more efficiently than those observed in
France and Germany. The implementation of the 35-hour working week
in France and the long-established family-friendly work environment in
Germany, appear to be creating difficulties for the small business sector.
The temptation, therefore, in both France and Germany is to seek to relax
many aspects of the current labour market legislation and to move
towards adopting the ‘UK model’. However, there is, of course, a macro-
economic context to these cross-country comparisons with Germany and
France at different stages of the economic cycle than the UK. The guiding
principle at the core of EU social policy, which operates on the assump-
tion that the labour market is as much a social construction as an eco-
nomic one, must not, therefore, be sacrificed under the pressure of
political expediency in the two major economies of the EU 15 as they seek
to resolve their respective economic crises.
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Notes
1 In July 2001 it was reported that only one small firm in 30 in the Provence Alpes
Cotes d’Azur (PACA) region in France had introduced a 35-hour working
week.
2 Only women with 2 years service and working for at least 16 hours a week (or 
5 years if working less than 16 hours) qualified.
3 Hogarth et al. (2001) reported that only a modest proportion of employers
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where aware of the changes in maternity leave and parental leave regulations
introduced in 1999. However, this survey was in workplaces employing five or
more employees. Callender et al. (1999) provide a more detailed, though now
dated, analysis. The DTI Employers’ Survey on Support for Working Parents,
recently conducted for the Work and Parents Review, provides more up-to-date
material although is unfortunately restricted to firms with five or more
employees.
4 Although the overwhelming bulk of research has reported negative views by
employers on the effects of employment rights on their business performance, a
minority in our survey perceived some positive effects. One in five employers
stated that legislation provided them with guidelines and clarification in setting
the conditions for their workers. Almost 10 per cent of employers stated that
IERs raised staff morale and engendered a feeling of security.
5 The positive relationship between the size of firm and negative effects is con-
firmed elsewhere (Small Business Service, 2001:63–5). These results will be pre-
sented elsewhere but in this paper we wish to focus on differences between firms
in different sectors.
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8 Small firms and the National
Minimum Wage
Jim Arrowsmith and Mark Gilman
Introduction
The Low Pay Commission (LPC) was established in July 1997 to recom-
mend the level of a new statutory national minimum wage. This was
arguably the most symbolic act of a Labour government elected, for the
first time for a generation, just months before. It signalled the end of
almost two decades in which labour market ‘deregulation’ and ‘flexibility’
were the primary watch-words of employment policy. In particular, the
Conservative administrations of the 1980s and 1990s had been keen to dis-
tance the state from private-sector pay-setting. The Fair Wages Resolution
was rescinded in 1983. For almost a century it required companies working
on government contracts to observe terms and conditions of employment
not less favourable than those in relevant collective agreements. A decade
later the Wages Councils, first established in 1909 to set minimum pay
rates and conditions for workers in certain low-paying sectors, were even-
tually abolished after successive restrictions in the 1980s. In this context
the introduction of the NMW, alongside a raft of other significant meas-
ures (see McKay, 2001), made a clear statement that ‘fairness’ was a
legitimate consideration underpinning the future direction of employment
regulation.
The importance of this to small firms was considerable, since in many
sectors rates of pay tend to be lower than those offered by large organisa-
tions (McNabb and Whitfield, 2000). Given this, and perhaps mindful of
the Thatcherite legacy of ‘entrepreneurialism’, the case for the NMW was
made on the dual grounds of fairness and efficiency. The efficiency case
was well summarised in the first report of the LPC which quoted the
British Chambers of Commerce view that ‘a low wage policy leads to a
vicious circle of low morale, low performance and low productivity’, and
argued that an NMW ‘has the potential to encourage competitiveness
based on a better skilled workforce and better quality products and ser-
vices’ (LPC, 1998:17). For this to occur, however, the NMW must amount
to a fairly substantial ‘regulatory shock’. In this chapter we assess the
nature of this ‘shock’ on small firms in particular, based on a longitudinal
research project conducted under the ESRC’s Future of Work pro-
gramme.
The NMW as a ‘regulatory shock’ to small firms: theoretical
and methodological issues
Small firms share one obvious characteristic – their size. This underwrites
two universal views of employment conditions in small firms. The first may
be characterised as ‘small is beautiful’, and was popularised by the report
of the Bolton Committee in 1971. This rests on the observation of a close
physical proximity between manager and workers, so promoting a mutual
‘give and take’ that undermines collective organisation and conflict. Wages
might be lower than in large firms, but workers willingly concede this in
return for a more congenial work environment. More recently, small busi-
nesses have been seen as representing ‘the ideal site for the development
of a HRM approach’ because of the possibility of direct communications,
the directly observable contribution of each employee to organisational
performance, and the more immediate ability of the owner-manager (OM)
to envisage and bring about change (Bacon et al., 1996:98). One implica-
tion is that there is little pressure from employees in small firms for higher
pay, especially if this would result in an elimination of either the ‘slack’ or
‘responsiveness’ in terms of patterns of supervision, work organisation or
working time that they might currently enjoy.
An opposing view is that employment in small firms is likely to be harsh
as a result of exposure to more competitive markets and dependence on
large firms as customers (Rainnie, 1989). In some ways this resembles the
atomised ‘price-taking’ model of firms in the tradition of neoclassical eco-
nomics. Small firms not only operate in highly competitive markets, but
they are incapable of influencing their environments. As such, wages might
be expected to be relatively low, and the firm much more vulnerable to
regulatory shocks. Orthodox economic theory predicts that regulatory
interference that raises the cost of labour above market equilibrium will
lead to unemployment (Bazen, 1990; Edwards and Gilman, 1999). Prof-
itability would be adversely affected, jobs would go, and some rational
actors would seek to escape regulation by resorting to illegal practices. As
Milton Friedman once put it, ‘minimum wage laws are about as clear a
case as one can find of a measure the effects of which are precisely the
opposite of those intended by the men of good will who support it’
(quoted in Hirschmann, 1991:27–8).
In contrast, the institutionalist analysis of employment rejects the
assumptions of neoclassical analysis as flawed. From Commons (1909) to
Williamson (1975, 1985) institutionalists have analysed the firm not as an
anonymous ‘black box’ but as hierarchical organisations with labour con-
tracts that are inherently ambiguous. Notions of power and authority, effi-
ciency wages and transaction costs have been used in institutional analysis
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to justify outside intervention to raise the ‘plane of competition’
(Kaufman, 1998). In other words, regulation such as a minimum wage can
have positive ‘efficiency’ as well as ‘fairness’ effects in terms of eliciting,
motivating and retaining labour. Though institutional analysis has been
applied mainly to large firms, empirical research in small organisations
shows that the relevant forces are also at work here, subject to the contin-
gencies of product and labour market context (see e.g. Curran and Stan-
worth, 1981; Scott et al., 1989; Goss, 1991; Kitching, 1997). Small firms are
rooted in an ‘industrial subculture’ shaped by factors such as the nature of
the product or service itself (capital requirements; quality or quantity; high
or low value-added etc.); the patterns of demand and structure of competi-
tion; the skills requirements for labour; and the structure of labour supply
and patterns of engagement, including segmentation by ethnicity, sex or
age (Curran and Stanworth, 1981). Employment in small firms remains a
contested terrain, if one conducted less overtly than in larger organisa-
tions, which varies according to product and labour-market circumstances
(Ram, 1994; Holliday, 1995; Moule, 1998). The effects of the introduction
of the NMW were, therefore, likely to be indeterminate, shaped by both
the universalistic features of size and the contingencies of sector and firm
factors.
The NMW was introduced from April 1999 with a minimum adult
hourly rate of pay of £3.60 (subsequently revised to £3.70 from October
2000, £4.10 from October 2001 and £4.20 from October 2002) and a lower
youth rate for workers aged 18 to 21 inclusive of £3.00 (£3.20 from
October 2000, £3.50 from October 2001 and £3.60 from October 2002).
Though the initial rate was commonly perceived to be set at the lower end
of expectations, the LPC found that around 1.3 million workers received
higher earnings as a result (LPC, 2001:18). The LPC also concluded that,
on the whole and against the background of a strong economy, the impact
on prices, jobs and competitiveness was relatively benign (LPC, 2001:101).
However, as the LPC concedes, such whole economy analysis ‘tell(s) us
little about the processes of employer and employee reactions, which will
require additional research’ (LPC, 1999:29). These processes of adjust-
ment, and their outcomes, include knock-on effects due to the restoration
of pay differentials; substitution between groups in the labour market;
adjustment to increased costs through changes to prices, employment
levels, hours, pay structures, training, work organisation or profits; and
avoidance or evasion strategies (ibid.). These were the issues that formed
the basis of the research in two of the sectors most affected by the intro-
duction of the NMW, clothing manufacturing and hotels and catering ser-
vices.
Much previous research into small firms is based on individual case
studies and does not examine change over time, which is important when
considering the impact of new regulations. To capture this, research needs
a longitudinal and comparative dimension, firmly rooted in appreciation of
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sector as well as size (Wilkinson, 1999:214). It is also important to capture
an employee as well as employer view of the firm. As Scase (1995:569)
remarks in reviewing the growing field of research in small firms, there
remains ‘a need for further detailed comparative research that will enable
us to understand more adequately the diversity of employers’ strategies
and how these, within different contexts, are negotiated with employees to
determine varying patterns of accommodation’. In examining patterns of
adjustment to the NMW, two sectors were chosen, clothing manufacture
and hotels and catering. The sectors, one manufacturing and one service,
were selected because they are dominated by small firms and have a con-
centration of low pay (Bazen, 1990), but they also have different
characteristics. Clothing, together with textiles, remains the ninth largest
manufacturing sector in the UK, but unfavourable exchange rates and the
phasing out of the protectionist Multi Fibre Agreement mean that it is offi-
cially acknowledged to be ‘currently facing the greatest challenges in its
history’ (TCSG, 2000:5). It also faces recruitment problems owing to a
dependence on ethnic minority labour and ‘the widely held perception
that (it) is in decline, that it does not offer good career prospects and that
it is poorly paid’ (ibid.:26). Though fairly diverse, hotel and catering
depends heavily on young and female part-time employees. The work is
generally low skilled, often with relatively high levels of labour turnover.
Product market problems are less acute than in clothing, though many
small catering and hotel businesses face increasing competition from the
‘big chains’ (Lucas, 1995).
It is well known that research access to small firms is difficult (Scase,
1995:580). Managers are time-pressured because of multiple responsibil-
ities, and are often unfamiliar with academic research. However, at the
outset, publicity and concern about the NMW was at its peak. The NMW
was an issue of immediate relevance and interest to small firms (Blackburn
and Hart, 2002). We also used a wide range of contacts to find a range of
firms to approach, including 15 business and trade associations, local coun-
cils, trade unions, banks and low pay organisations. The cases were
selected to provide a range of possible circumstances rather than any sta-
tistical notion of representativeness, a form of ‘theoretical sampling’
(Eisenhardt, 1989:537) which is often used to minimise bias in exploratory
research. The objective was to capture the rich insights into the dynamics
of employment relations provided by a case study approach, but also
address broader issues about paths of adjustment across a range of small
firm types. It is for this reason that mixed research designs are gaining
popularity in small firms research (Curran and Blackburn, 2001). The
research approach involved semi-structured interviews of owner-managers
and an employee in each firm prior to the introduction of the NMW, with
repeat management interviews a year later. Median employment was 27 in
clothing and 16 in hotel and catering. In all, 55 firms were visited, 27 in
clothing and 28 in hotel and catering.
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A framework for identifying different types of regulatory effect has
been provided by Hirschmann (1991),1 who points out that critics of regu-
lation commonly allege three main negative effects. The first is perversity,
that intervention exacerbates the problem under consideration. The
second is futility, that the intervention makes no difference. The third
refers to jeopardy, that regulation imperils other desirable states. In the
case of the NMW, this might occur through increased costs, including the
likely restoration of pay differentials, which would lead to unemployment
and encourage working ‘off the books’. Each of the three criticisms marks
a strong contrast to the fairness and efficiency case advocated by the sup-
porters of the NMW. In the following section we review some of the
empirical findings of the study into the impact of the NMW on small firms.
We then discuss the implications in terms of a revised form of
Hirschmann’s model.
The impact of the NMW
Our first round of visits found that pay in the small firms was largely
opaque, individualised and unstructured. Pay setting was imprecise, with
many owner-managers finding it difficult to juggle competitive pressures
and employee performance. Only one company in each of the hotel and
catering (H&C) and clothing sectors was able to say that they had a formal
pay scheme. Levels of pay often varied for different individuals, especially
with the use of ad hoc bonuses which were usually exercised solely at the
discretion of the employer. Two-thirds of companies said that there was a
variation in the pay of employees carrying out the same work. Further-
more, half of the H&C firms and 56 per cent of clothing firms reported
having no annual mechanism of pay review, and 57 per cent and 35 per
cent, respectively, said that the level of any pay award would probably
vary amongst employees. Employers also had very limited market
information to inform any decision about increasing rates. Eleven per cent
of employers in H&C and 7 per cent in clothing reportedly used no exter-
nal sources of information about what other employers were paying, and
for the rest methods were largely informal and unsystematic, relying
heavily on ‘word of mouth’.
Not surprisingly perhaps, 37 per cent of the employees interviewed in
H&C and 52 per cent in clothing thought that pay increases were awarded
unfairly in their firm. Over three-quarters of employees said that it was the
employer unilaterally who decides how much they are paid. Furthermore,
two-thirds of employees said that pay is not discussed among employees in
the company. This was not only because it was frowned upon by the
employer, but also because employees did not wish to divulge their earnings
to other employees. Yet, as we shall see, this apparent arbitrariness and
secrecy over pay, which risked sending messages of unfairness to employees,
also lent employers the informal scope to adjust to the introduction of the
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NMW without impacting on employees not directly affected. In the first
round of visits, immediately prior to the introduction of the NMW in the
first quarter of 1999, all but eight of the 28 H&C firms reported having
employees paid under the forthcoming NMW adult hourly rate of £3.60.
The average number of directly affected employees per organisation was
three. In clothing, around half the firms had such low-paid workers,
though some of these interviews took place just after the introduction of
the NMW, and may thus reflect adjustments that had already been made.
Just over a quarter (27 per cent) of H&C companies and 42 per cent of the
clothing firms had made changes to their pay system in anticipation of the
NMW. Of the employees interviewed, 85 per cent of those in clothing and
74 per cent of H&C workers were aware of the NMW, and over half (58
per cent) of the former and a quarter (26 per cent) of the latter said they
would personally be affected. Nearly three-quarters (73 per cent) of cloth-
ing workers and two in five (41 per cent) in H&C said that they expected
the pay of themselves or someone else within the company to rise as a
result of the NMW. In all, 18 firms reported that their lowest permanent
pay was below £3.60 an hour, with a further 21 paying exactly £3.60, sug-
gesting the rapid effect of a ‘pay spike’ at the minimum rate (Card and
Krueger, 1995).
A significant proportion of employers expected the NMW to have at
least some impact on costs – 13 per cent ‘a lot’ and 55 per cent ‘a little’ –
and they anticipated making a number of changes in response. For
example a third (32 per cent) of the H&C companies and half in clothing
said that they had introduced, or expected to introduce, new technology or
practices designed to cut down on the cost of labour. In H&C new kitchen
equipment or the buying in of pre-prepared foods were the most common
responses, whereas in clothing it was investment in new machines, subject
to available capital. Around a quarter of clothing firms expected to
increase the use of sub-contracting at least partly as a result of the NMW.
However, 21 per cent of H&C firms and 31 per cent in clothing said they
felt able to pass on any cost increases through prices.
Employees were also asked whether they expected any changes as a
response to their employers having to pay the NMW. In H&C employees
generally foresaw few likely changes although 28 per cent did say that they
thought their employer would want more effort from them and 16 per cent
said their employer would consider changes to work practices. In clothing
60 per cent of employees thought that the employer would seek to
increase effort, 40 per cent changes to work practices and 28 per cent revi-
sions to hours of work. A significant number of employees, therefore,
especially in clothing, anticipated compensating changes in terms of the
wage-effort bargain. However, employees also tended to report that they
were already working hard and subject to tight discipline, suggesting
limited space for adjustment.
In the return visits a year later, a range of adaptation was observed
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reflecting different business conditions and management practice. In cloth-
ing, a deteriorating business context meant that virtually all the firms were
worse off than a year before. A few had closed and employment levels
were reduced in many of the rest. This was blamed primarily on deterio-
rating market conditions, though the NMW was sometimes reported to
have significantly increased costs. In hotel and catering, developments
were more varied, reflecting greater diversity of activities and circum-
stances and the general picture was also less dramatic. Overall, there were
three broad sets of response to the combined effects of deteriorating busi-
ness conditions and the implementation of the minimum wage, which we
label as ‘implement’, ‘ignore’ and ‘critical event’. In the first group, com-
prising the majority of firms in the two sectors, implementation was gener-
ally unproblematic. The second group refers to the small number that
moved into producing illegitimate goods and/or employing (some)
workers ‘off the books’. The third group, also small, looked to reposition
themselves in the market or otherwise used the occasion of the NMW to
revise existing arrangements.
Implement
Most hotel and catering firms implemented the NMW without any major
difficulties, for three main reasons. First, pay was usually already around
or above the level of the NMW for the majority of employees, making it
easier to absorb. The number of employees paid under the NMW was
usually a minority, and the fact that employees were often unaware of the
dispersion in pay within the firm meant that the resultant increase did not
have knock-on effects. Second, many owner-managers pointed out that
there were far fewer options in small firms to offset the implementation of
the NMW by introducing new technology or changes to working practices,
especially in the labour-intensive service sector where most jobs involved
routine tasks. Often, there was also limited scope to intensify the work to
compensate for increased costs. Third, many owner-managers did not
necessarily see pay as the key factor in the retention or motivation of staff.
Some owner-managers admitted that low pay did make it difficult to find
good staff but that qualitative factors such as a ‘relaxed atmosphere’, job
security (including retaining workers at slack times), benefits such as meals
and breaks and flexibility over working time were more important to staff
retention. Their response was therefore to increase pay only to the legal
minimum for those individuals affected.
In clothing, business conditions tended to be harsher, and implementa-
tion was often associated with some rationalisation. The NMW was a
particular complication for firms that used piecework, prompting most to
abandon it (see below). The impact of the NMW was generally less harsh in
the firms that used day-rate pay systems, especially as it was set at a relat-
ively low initial rate. Family and ethnic ties often provided a ‘captured’
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labour force reluctant to move elsewhere (especially in the case of older
women workers), but skilled machinists often expected to obtain pay
above what they could get for alternative labour such as shop work. Rates
had, therefore, been moving towards £3.60 for some time. As one owner-
manager put it, ‘it has not really affected us because we paid nearly the
same, just 10 or 15p [less]’. In this firm employment fell over the course of
the year but this was attributed less to the NMW than to lower demand
and more competition from ‘garages’ (operators from domestic premises).
Another firm, which had cut back by closing one of the two businesses at
its site, blamed its hardships primarily on imports but also said that the
NMW had a final effect by increasing costs and reducing pay flexibility: ‘in
the past when competition increased and prices reduced we could have
asked workers to have less pay but we can’t now, it’s illegal’.
Ignore
The temptation to indulge in illegal practices was a real one, but apparently
not seriously considered by most firms. Deliberate flouting of the NMW was
found in only a few cases, although it may be quite common in relatively
down-market operations where employees are often routinely paid on a
‘cash in hand’ basis (Ram et al., 2001a). The following cases can be taken as
illustrative. In the first, a restaurant, the owner-manager said he was aware
of the NMW but that most workers did not get it. Instead, they received £15
per shift which, if it did not surpass its scheduled five hours, worked out at
£3 per hour ‘cash in hand’. The owner-manager claimed that he would then
‘gross it up’ by paying any tax and national insurance. The workers con-
firmed that they picked up less than the NMW and their view of this was
highly dependent on personal circumstances, what they perceived the owner
was like to work for and relations with other workers and customers.
In another ethnic minority restaurant, in response to the question ‘how
many people do you employ?’ The owner-manager replied ‘do you want
the official figure or the unofficial one?’ Shift rates varied for employees
(e.g. £18, £20 or £25 a night). The mechanism for reviewing pay was also
very informal, helped by staff keeping information on their earnings to
themselves. Pay increases were not considered by the employer unless
demanded, and even then usually resisted with personal appeals and refer-
ence to the ‘relaxed’ work environment enjoyed by staff. In practice this
meant treating staff courteously, extending them some self-regulation of
activities, providing fringe benefits such as free food and transport, and
flexibility over working time including keeping jobs open for staff when
they made a return to the Indian sub-continent. In a third case, a clothing
firm that ceased trading during the course of the research, the employment
of home-workers on a cash-in-hand basis was a regular practice well
before the NMW. For on-site workers, pay was based on a piece-rate that
fell some way short of the NMW. The opportunity to exploit dependent
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ethnic networks reinforced the firm’s position at the bottom end of the
market. When this began to collapse the owner-manager experimented for
a time with manufacturing ‘dodgy stuff’ (fake designer-label products) but
still could not find enough work. The business could not compete with the
fully ‘underground factories’, i.e. ‘factories that don’t exist on paper’. With
the rewards dwindling, the complexity and risk of evading the new legal
minimum wage was too high, and closure was the end result.
Critical event
In contrast, some clothing firms were able to respond to the pressures of
deteriorating business and the NMW by making a shift to specific niche
markets. In most firms the prospect of such a shift was impeded by inade-
quate access to capital on the one hand and a shortage of skilled staff on
the other. The ability of the owner-manager is also a critical consideration
in the performance of small firms, particularly if they are to shift to a
higher wage–skill equilibrium through improved productivity (Mole,
2002). In one firm the owners response was to reposition the firm away
from volume work to the high quality end of the market where import
penetration was much lower because orders were small and customised.
The transition involved significant job losses (16 staff) and substantial
training investment in the remaining workforce. In order to retain staff
against competition outside the sector as well as from within, minimum
pay rates were pegged above the NMW at £4 per hour. In another clothing
firm the owner-manager told us how they:
changed from wholesale to the corporate wear market because this is
better quality and selling prices are better…. Before, say a year ago or
more, this was just five per cent [of our business], then we were forced
to go up-market … The £3.60 was the major factor in the change –
though we were looking at it already, it was the spark to make greater
efforts as soon as it came in place.
However, the shift to more profitable lines was not wholly smooth.
Labour costs increased because of the NMW and variation in employee
performance remained a thorny issue. This was dealt with mainly by the
better performers ‘balancing out’ or effectively subsidising the slower
workers, with some absorption of the cost increase through higher prices.
At first, some efforts were made to claw back the cost increase of the
NMW. However, this led to an employment tribunal case for unfair dis-
missal when a worker was sacked for protesting over the withdrawal of
breaks. This made the owners wary of upsetting the workforce and ulti-
mately led to important procedural change.
Many clothing firms found that implementation of the NMW was
complicated by their use of piecework payment systems. As noted above,
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most firms used a mix of hourly pay and payment by results prior to the
NMW, but almost all decided to switch to wholly day-rate payment in its
aftermath. This was because of practical problems in reconciling average
piece wages to the NMW rate but, again, the change was not solely due to
the NMW. Piecework had been under general pressure for some time
because of increasing variability in the volume, style and delivery require-
ments of customers. It was also reported that the large retail chains disap-
proved of piecework because of the implications for quality. However,
owner-managers commonly complained that abandoning piecework,
which was often blamed at least rhetorically on the NMW, led to falling
productivity. Closer monitoring was, therefore, a common theme. Two
businesses actually moved to new premises partly to ease supervision. In
one of the firms, where the NMW increased the wage bill by around 7 per
cent, the owner-manager stated that
recording and monitoring is much better in the new factory … it [also]
gives a good impression to get the work for Arcadia … it is a good
environment and facilities to keep the workers too … we are trying
hard to keep hold what staff we’ve got – the young generation is just
not interested.
Some hotel and catering firms also asserted that the NMW provoked a
rethink on pay, and not just because of the impact on costs. The manager
of one of the larger firms, with several shopping-centre restaurants,
explained:
I think the minimum wage and working time regulations have focused
our attention on this [pay and working time arrangements] a bit more
– which is an indictment of ourselves that we needed this to prompt
us! When you are small you do a lot of things by the seat of your
pants, there is no vast structure with people specialising [in HR].
The level of the NMW, just below established rates, brought home that
pay might not be as competitive as previously thought. As a result, two
new higher pay bands of £4.00 and £4.20 were introduced, linked to skills
development. Crucially, the business was starting to perform particularly
well, which justified the increase in costs. A similar situation prompted
another independent shopping-centre restaurant to re-evaluate their pay
system in the light of the NMW. Rates were increased to the NMW shortly
before its introduction and subsequently by another 15p per hour in recog-
nition of increased sales due to a new metro station opening nearby. The
owner-manager said that the NMW also prompted the idea, and provided
the opportunity, to introduce standardised pay rates to promote team-
work. Instead of individual variation, all staff were paid the same apart
from the head chef and a cook on a higher rate.
168 J. Arrowsmith and M. Gilman
Occasionally, a review of pay systems reflected a more substantial
NMW impact on costs. In one hotel, where some workers’ pay had not
increased for five years, the NMW was estimated to have taken £40,000 off
annual profits. This stimulated a wider review of the pay system, including
the introduction of merit pay and a grade review to encourage ‘multi-
skilling’. Formal training under department heads was extended in pursuit
of Investors in People accreditation, linked to the hotel’s plan to expand
into the conference market. A mix of market re-evaluation, training and
work intensification therefore followed in the wake of the NMW: ‘now we
expect everyone to work twice as hard – multi-skilling. That is just the way
of life now. The NMW really made the industry look at itself in a big way’.
The NMW, therefore, prompted other changes apart from pay. One
cafe owner/caterer said that the introduction of the NMW encouraged him
to readjust the demographic mix of staff and their contracted hours by
switching from part-time school-leavers to full-time mature workers. The
idea had been under consideration for some time, partly because he had
run into difficulties with the authorities over the employment of minors in
the kitchen, and partly because of problems of turnover and time discip-
line. However, the increase in wages required by the NMW allowed him to
recruit better from older age groups whom he considered more reliable.
Pay increased by 35p an hour to £3.70, reflecting a perceived need to dif-
ferentiate basic pay from the bare legal minimum. In the end, therefore,
the NMW was not viewed in hostile terms.
Discussion and conclusions
The above findings highlight that firms enjoy a range of indeterminacy in
the setting of pay. Pay levels reflects not only economic, product and
labour market factors but also the informality of internal pay structures. It
is this range of indeterminacy, as well as the initially low rate of the NMW
itself, which explains both the generally benign overall impact and varia-
tions in the patterns of response.
The NMW was widely expected, by opponents and proponents alike, to
have significant impacts on employment outcomes in small firms, in terms
of the processes of employee relations and substantively in terms of pay,
hours and numbers of workers employed. This could occur because of
effects on ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ expectations and behaviours. Top-
down pressures refer to the increase in costs experienced by many small
firms, and employers’ possible range of response, from simply absorbing
the cost increase to changes in the capital–labour ratio and other forms of
work reorganisation. They also refer to the administration requirements of
the regulations, which might have stimulated employers to modernise their
systems of record keeping and possibly encourage them to introduce more
systematic means of employee performance monitoring and appraisal.
Bottom-up pressures refer to workers using new employment rights as a
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lever in their formal or informal negotiations with management. In the
event, both sets of pressures were weak, leading to a varied pattern of
response much dependent on the existing business context and manage-
ment plans.
It could be argued that this was because the regulations themselves did
not provide a sufficient shock to jolt employers or workers out of their cus-
tomary practices and habits of employment relations. On the whole, this
argument has some validity, but it is insufficient in two ways. First, the cost
implications of the regulations, especially the NMW, were significant for
many of the small firms in our research, particularly in the clothing sector,
but also for many hotel and catering firms as well. And it was not always
those firms most affected by cost hikes that chose to respond by introduc-
ing wider change. A range of responses was observed and these have to be
explained in different ways. Second, the ‘weak regulations’ argument does
not tell us much about the process of how and why firms did respond, even
if in many cases this response was simply to try to observe as much con-
tinuity as possible. Stability reflected a recognition of mutual dependence
and a reciprocity built on accommodation and notions of ‘fairness’ often
underpinned by a segmentation of the labour force by ethnicity and sex.
Top-down pressure for wider change was limited by access to capital, a
difficult trading environment, and the narrow scope to actually do the
work differently in practice. Also significant in absorbing the impact of the
regulations was the extent of individualised and personalised employment
relations (which prevented, for example, the NMW having an impact on
differentials); labour market pressures (which helped prevent claw-back
through work intensification); and the personal idiosyncrasies and compe-
tence of owner-managers. Indeed, it was a mixture of skilful management
and favourable conditions that enabled some firms to use the NMW as a
‘critical incident’ to introduce further change. Bottom-up pressures were
defused in part by employee ignorance and de-collectivisation, but also by
a common view of small-firm employment in somewhat favourable terms,
especially in terms of personal relations with management. Employees
also tended to appreciate the difficulties of the firm and that, though it
might perhaps be easier to rock a small boat, the consequences are more
likely to be dire.
In most of the small firms, labour turnover was low and average length
of service high. Personal relations were, therefore, long established and
characterised by some degree of mutual obligation. As one owner-
manager put it, good industrial relations is ‘marked by give and take’, and
‘a quiet ship’ was preferable to confrontation: ‘we have enough trouble
with our customers [to want it] with our staff as well!’ This is an important
point in terms of understanding the dynamics of informality. In one sense
informality opens possibilities for management strategy (i.e. purposeful
action) and organisational change, because relationships are individualised
and employees less organised than in many large firms. However, the
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small firms in the research were not only at the mercy of the product
market, but were subject to more or less intense labour market pressures.
Low margins helped keep pay relatively low, leaving working-time vital to
recruitment and retention. This meant that there was a large variation in
practices, including in wages and working time patterns, even in the same
product markets and geographical areas. Certainly, a strong sector effect
was not as evident as observed in larger companies where collective bar-
gaining arrangements are well established (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 1999).
Patterns of informality and accommodation also helped to defuse
‘bottom up’ pressures for change, a fact helped by the clear lines of seg-
mentation in the labour force of most of the small firms. Hotel and cater-
ing was mainly staffed by young workers and women working part-time;
clothing by (older) women from ethnic minority backgrounds. These
gender, age and ethnic characteristics of the workforce helped sustain the
individualised and informal relations observed between workers and man-
agement. It was not simply that alternative employment opportunities
were limited. The segmentation of the work force helped reinforce the
‘family firm’ culture of the organisation. The owner-manager represented
the personification of capital and hence, had a lot of individual authority
and power. Yet, he or she also worked long hours in close proximity with
the workers, reinforcing the sense of mutual obligation which was exem-
plified by the flexibility often afforded workers over working time and the
payment of ad hoc performance bonuses. Conflicts of interest tended to be
resolved personally with mutual appeals to individual reasonableness
rather than articulated in collective forms of dissent.
This dual context of difficult business conditions and the almost defin-
ing feature of informal employment relations mediated the procedural and
substantive regulatory ‘shock’ of the NMW. At the outset, managers
expected the introduction of the NMW to stimulate or support changes to
pay, working time or work organisation, while workers suspected likely
work intensification. However, informal pay arrangements meant that cost
implications of the NMW could be mitigated by absorbing increases indi-
vidually, without implications for differentials. Similarly, there was little
sign, found elsewhere (Adam-Smith et al., 2003), of a revision to the wage–
effort bargain through, for example, budgeting staff shortages into the
equation. As the owner-manager of a small catering outfit explained: ‘it’s
not like in big companies where you can cut one member of staff and get
the rest to work harder. In a small firm there is no room for manoeuvre –
if you cut a job it wouldn’t get done’. Rather, flexibility over pay and hours
meant that in most cases the impact of the regulations was limited.
We can analyse the overall impact of the NMW in terms of a develop-
ment of Hirschmann’s framework (Table 8.1). The ‘type’ of response
includes the three categories identified by Hirschmann, with the important
addition of what we term ‘achievement’ that is a situation in which reform
meets its goals. ‘Outcome’ refers to the concrete results linked to each
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type. Achievement will have fairness and efficiency implications; futility by
definition entails little change; perversity means that a problem is made
worse, in this case that firms are pressed to intensify work; and jeopardy
means that other desirable states are endangered, here the encouragement
of illegal ways of working. On ‘relationship with legislation’, achievement
necessarily entails at least compliance, and may also involve a stimulus
towards improved efficiency which can extend to market re-positioning
(‘niche shift’). Futility can mean compliance but no major effect, but it can
also be associated with one form of evasion of the law, labelled ‘business
as usual’: here, the law simply has little effect and such practices as
working off the books continue. Under ‘perversity’, firms comply with leg-
islation but may find that productivity declines (such as with some moves
from incentive pay in clothing), compromising the ‘efficiency’ objective; or
they may respond to increased costs through work intensification, which
has perverse implications for the ‘fairness’ of the wage–effort bargain.
Some people might even become unemployed as a result. Finally, the con-
trast between perversity and jeopardy is that firms evade the legislation
and pursue a ‘grey market’ approach.
The first response covers cases of ‘achievement’, by which the NMW
met the expectations of the advocates of the reform, especially in terms of
‘fairness’. The pay of a number of employees rose in many clothing and
hotel and catering firms as a result of the NMW. The NMW also had some
implications for ‘efficiency’, where it prompted a rethink of existing pay
systems, or encouraged a repositioning in the market as a result of
increases in costs. Significantly, these firms were already considering such
change, or were at least well placed to do so. Most, however, had little
scope to change, were financially not equipped, or lacked the expertise
and knowledge networks that could have helped them (Edwards, et al.,
2003).
Second, and related, the anticipated regulatory ‘shock’ had few real
effects for many firms. Where there is little change and compliance with
the legislation, we find firms following the letter of law but doing little else.
This may be termed a minimal response and placed under Hirschmann’s
‘futility’ category, though the label is overly dismissive. This is partly
because minimal does not mean zero, but more importantly because regu-
lations can have effects in some respects and not others: even though effi-
ciency effects were absent, the fairness effects could mean that regulations
were not futile. The costs of compliance could in fact be absorbed, even by
small firms, because of the ‘indeterminacy’ afforded by individualised pay
arrangements (Gilman et al., 2002). Little change can also of course mean
little impact because firms already pay above NMW levels. It can also
entail simply ignoring the legislation and practising ‘business as usual’, as
many restaurants did in terms of cash-in-hand payments, working long
hours or without breaks, or providing no paid leave.
Third, the increased costs associated with the NMW helped push a few
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firms onto a perverse ‘low road’ of employment reduction and work intensi-
fication to recoup the increase in costs. This would be consistent with ideas
of unbridled individualism and the expectation that the costs of the NMW
will be offset through reductions in paid breaks and other fringe benefits
(Simpson, 1999). However, these cases were in a minority and were often in
faltering businesses that might have been moving in that direction in any
case. Similarly, evasion may be associated with a move towards the illegal or
quasi-legal parts of the economy and possibly closure of the firm, which we
categorise as ‘grey market’ or ‘closure’ responses, and which ‘jeopardise’
other policy goals of legitimate employment creation.
In short, the NMW was most successful in terms of ‘fairness’ rather than
‘efficiency’. Efficiency effects were limited because the NMW did not
provide sufficient regulatory ‘shock’, but also because of the indetermi-
nacy and informality of employment in the small firms which enabled the
effects to be absorbed or sidestepped. The NMW did trigger some moves
up- and down-market, but this might have happened in any case because
of business conditions. The variation in patterns of response that we
observed owes much to the external context as well as the particular
characteristics of employment relations in small firms.
The findings have a number of theoretical implications, which we have
explored with our colleagues more fully elsewhere (Ram et al., 2001b;
Gilman et al., 2002; Arrowsmith et al., 2003). In terms of wages, Rubery
(1997:338) has criticised theories of pay determination because they have
‘overstressed coherence’ and given insufficient weight to ‘discretionary,
random or opportunistic decisions’. If this is true in relation to large firms
– still the focus of most academic work – it is even more likely to be true of
small ones. The particular point that we would stress is that conceptions of
‘fairness’ (defined not just in external comparisons of pay and hours but
also within the firm in terms of good personal relations and flexibility) are
as important as external factors in the negotiation of this informal work-
place order. Notions of ‘fairness’ contributed to the ‘stickiness’ of existing
pay and working time arrangements, providing a buffer between regula-
tory change and outcomes so that there were relatively few direct and
determinate effects. This issue is explored further in chapter 9.
On the whole, the NMW had the intended ‘equity’ effects of increasing
(some) wages without the perversity of increased unemployment or work
intensification, largely because of the individualisation and indeterminacy
of pay. It was this, together with some ‘Boltonesque’ features reflecting
the importance of mutual dependence and informal ‘give and take’ in
shaping notions of ‘fairness’ in the workplace, that defused wider pres-
sures for change. Also significant, of course, was the level at which the
NMW was initially set. However, there is a more fundamental reason why
the regulations largely failed to promote the secondary objective of com-
petitiveness. This was because the impact of the employment regulations
was also restricted by the inequality of bargaining power in the small firms
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(Kaufman, 1998; Freeman and Rogers, 1999). Without a link to wider reg-
ulation, such as in other EU member states where information provision
and consultation requirements often extend to small firms (Biagi, 1995;
Collins, 2001), the effects of the NMW were highly specific and contingent.
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9 Managing variable pay systems in
smaller workplaces
The significance of employee
perceptions of organisational justice
Annette Cox
Introduction
Over the past two decades, the debate surrounding variable pay systems
has moved on from managing traditional conceptions of occupational
equity and fairness in collective bargaining processes, to influencing indi-
vidual employees’ perceptions of their organisation. The notion of fairness
has been colonised by organisational justice research operating within the
psychology paradigm (Konovsky, 2000). Much work has focused on defin-
ing and classifying types of justice and explaining the antecedents and out-
comes of different kinds of justice in respect of different employment
practices. Remarkably few studies (Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Dulebohn
and Martocchio, 1998; Lee et al., 1999) have focused on pay, thus making it
particularly worthy of analysis.
Organisational context, especially in terms of organisational size, has
also been ignored, since the traditions of psychology emphasise the search
for universal justice perceptions rather than focusing on differences in
justice perceptions between organisational and occupational groups.
Employees in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have quite dif-
ferent experiences of work from those in larger companies; interpersonal
relationships may be more significant and intense and emphasis on pro-
cedural regulation of work through formal HR policies and practitioners is
likely to be reduced (Ram et al., 2001). This chapter begins with a review
of organisational justice theory and highlights the areas where the empiri-
cal work reported can make a contribution. It then analyses a mixture of
qualitative and quantitative data from a semi-structured face-to-face ques-
tionnaire conducted with a sample of employees from four medium-sized
engineering organisations undergoing pay system change. It applies and
assesses the relative importance of three kinds of justice – distributive,
procedural and interactional – arguing that all were important in different
ways and concludes with comments on the nature of justice perceptions in
SMEs and potential implications for future research.
Organisational justice theory and employment relations in
SMEs
A burgeoning literature on employment relations in SMEs upholds the
case for focusing on developing theory to explain the diversity of employ-
ment practice and employee perceptions of work rather than searching for
universal truths. First, we must acknowledge the heterogeneity of work-
places which make up the sector from expanding high-value-added profes-
sional service firms (e.g. Grugulis et al., 2000) to small manufacturing
sweatshops with a precarious existence (Ram, 1993; Holliday, 1994).
Further diversity is found within smaller businesses in the same sector as
both this chapter and previous studies (e.g. Ram et al., 2001; Gilman et al.,
2002) demonstrate. Second, the varying sizes of small business, their
product markets, type of ownership and nature of management–employee
relations have significant implications for the range of management prac-
tices to be found within them. Employment practices are also affected by
the degree of professionalisation of management and access to HR exper-
tise, information and advice as concerns about level of education of
owner-managers and absence of HR personnel may limit the development
of good personnel practice. Much research is concerned with the wider
socio-economic impact of the way SMEs are managed, and while recognis-
ing the policy implications of SME responses to employment legislation,
for example, it is more unusual to find studies which deal directly with
employee perceptions of the outcomes (see Marlow, 2002 as an excep-
tion). In terms of managing pay, we know that SMEs are more likely to
pay low wages (Low Pay Commission, 2003) which may affect how fair
employees perceive their pay to be. They are also less likely to use vari-
able pay systems (Gilman et al., 2002), so it is particularly interesting to
examine smaller firms which have made such innovations and consequent
employee responses to them. We know remarkably little about the
processes of pay system choice, design and implementation in smaller
firms which, given the centrality of pay to the employment relationship,
are likely to act as critical markers of the state of management–employee
relations. Hence, this chapter makes a contribution to this debate by
linking pay systems, small firms and notions of organisational justice.
Distributive justice
Distributive justice is concerned with the fairness of outcomes from
decisions. The principles on which allocation decisions should be made
are, however, subject to debate and our knowledge of how these are
applied in smaller organisations is scant. Measuring distributive justice is
complicated because there are multiple criteria according to which those
outcomes may be judged fair or unfair. Three categories predominate in
evaluating distributive justice, equality, equity and need (Cropanzano and
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Ambrose, 2001), although there is much disagreement about which prin-
ciple should be used in determining pay levels. McFarlin and Sweeney
(1992), operationalise distributive justice criteria as experience, effort,
responsibility, performance and job stress thus, combining job character-
istics, input measures and output measures.
This leads us to consider what we know about pay levels, systems and
distributive justice in SMEs and from the literature, find a similar extent of
variation in wage levels in small firms to that which prevails in large ones
(Gilman et al., 2002). This variation underscores the need to find out how
fair wage setting is perceived to be, especially when the same study found
a formal pay structure was present in only a minority of organisations and
the authors’ calculations, based on WERS 1998 data, indicates that other
methods of ensuring pay equity such as formal job evaluation or individual
appraisal are similarly not widely used. Gilman et al. also refer to fairness
perceptions of both employers and employees regarding what is affordable
and acceptable as a key determinant of wages, but comment that for both
parties these were loosely defined and so this does indeed chime with what
we know of conceptions of fairness from the extant literature.
The centrality of notions of fairness and equity as principles on which
decisions about pay are made and evaluated are not in doubt, but attach-
ing precise definitions to these terms is extremely difficult (Hyman and
Brough, 1975), given the problem of whether to define justice in relative or
absolute terms (Rawls, 1971). The lack of research to illustrate employee
views of pay (system) fairness in SMEs is clear from the discussion so far
and, furthermore, with a few exceptions (e.g. Brown, 2001) we often know
little about the basis for pay comparisons either within or outside the
organisation being studied and to what degree firm size might impact upon
this. Given the sensitivities of the subject, it is perhaps not surprising that
we do not have data on employee views of pay in SMEs but nor do we
know much about the allocation principles which managers apply in
setting wages either, and to what extent these values are shared by
employees.
Procedural justice
Procedural justice constitutes the fairness of the decision-making process
by which outcomes are determined. Several theories of procedural justice
exist, neatly summarised by Konovsky (2000) who suggests these include
the instrumental view – that procedural justice is important in its impact
on distributive justice perceptions, justice judgement theory which com-
prises various ways of assessing the presence or absence of procedural fair-
ness and fairness heuristic theory which examines how distributive and
procedural justice operate in relation to each other. The first of these – the
instrumental view – was one of the earliest versions and in legal settings, it
identified the importance of giving ‘voice’ to judgement recipients during
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decision-making as it enhances their perceptions of the fairness of out-
comes (Thibaut and Walker, 1975).
Evidence also demonstrates the existence of a ‘fair process’ effect
whereby people are more tolerant of outcomes, even when personally
adverse, if they perceive that the processes which determined them were
procedurally fair (Lind, 2001). Interestingly however, voice only appears
to have an effect where employees both expect and desire it (Heller,
1998). There are several potential implications for the significance of voice
in SMEs. Traditional views of the employment relations climate in small
firms, have, in the past, been relatively simplistic, based upon a notion of
harmony marked by an absence of manager–employee conflict as depicted
in the report of the much criticised Bolton Report (1971) (see Rainnie,
1989 and Ram, 1993 for example). We know now, however, that grievance,
absence and turnover rates and the incidence of claims for unfair dismissal
are higher among small businesses (Cully et al., 1999). This indicates
employee use of ‘exit’ strategies in the absence of ‘voice’ mechanisms
(Hirschmann, 1970) and raises concerns about the prevalence of pro-
cedural justice mechanisms. Both of these perspectives oversimplify
employment relations in SMEs, whose culture is usually dominated by a
legacy of the founder or long established owner-manager operating
through a mixture of paternalism and autocracy with decisions unfolding
on the shop floor through a process of ‘negotiated order’ (e.g. Ram, 1993;
Holliday, 1994; Storey, 1994; Moule, 1998; Ram et al., 2001). In this
context then, employees may be habituated to a lack of formal or collect-
ive voice instead of finding personal solutions to this problem whilst being
assured that the boss will act in every ones ‘best’ interest anyway.
In empirical work, procedural justice tends to be operationalised as the
set of structural elements of any decision-making process. Leventhal et al.
(1980) list criteria for ensuring procedural justice is seen to be done, incor-
porating selection of representative decision-makers, accuracy of informa-
tion, consistency between persons and across time and availability of
appeals processes. This is probably one of the most well known and often
quoted examples, but applications of it are hard to find (one exception is
Meyer, 2001). Fulfilling all of these criteria is likely to necessitate the cre-
ation of formal systems or checking procedures which are at odds with a
prevalent culture of informality in SMEs and a managerial dislike of per-
ceived bureaucracy. This raises the question of whether SMEs seek to
apply procedural justice in this way and, if not, what, if any, alternatives
are used. In the absence of clear procedures, the final category of justice –
interactional justice – may assume greater significance in such firms.
Interactional justice
As a relatively novel dimension of organisational justice, debate exists
whether interactional justice is an independent construct, or simply a
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category of procedural justice (see Bies, 2001 for a review of the argu-
ments). Bies and Moag (1986) emphasise that procedures cannot exist
without being actioned and that the manner in which such procedures are
followed are perceived as equally, or indeed, more important as the exist-
ence of the procedures themselves. Bies (2001) has broken down interac-
tional justice further into two subcomponents. First, there is the sincerity
with which procedures are followed; second, interpersonal sensitivity
which comprises the politeness and courtesy with which an individual is
treated when decisions are made or implemented, which affects the main-
tenance of their sense of dignity and self-worth, often referred to now as
‘interpersonal justice’.
Organisational justice and pay systems – interactions
between justice types
At the outset, we can note that dimensions of procedural fairness have
surfaced as significant in HR/employment relations research on pay,
notably the provision of employee ‘voice’ prior to pay system design and
implementation. Evidence indicates that consultation over pay system
design and implementation appear to generate better outcomes (e.g.
Bowey et al., 1986; Cooper and Dyck, 1992; Kessler and Purcell, 1996;
Kim, 1996; Lee et al., 1999) in terms of operational outcomes, understand-
ing and palatability of the systems and employment relations. Participation
in pay system design may offer a number of benefits, these include
improved quality of decision-making, ensuring rewards offered match
rewards desired, enhanced probability that employees will both accept and
commit themselves to the success of the scheme and so, improved manage-
ment–employee relationships (Thorpe, 2000).
Comparative analyses of distributive and procedural justice mostly
concur in emphasising the particular importance of procedural justice.
Much of the evidence suggests that in relation to pay, perceptions of dis-
tributive justice only predict immediate satisfaction with reward outcomes,
whereas perceptions of procedural justice are associated with a broader
range of attitudes. Based upon studies of pay systems in manufacturing
and retail, Folger and Konovsky (1989) and McFarlin and Sweeney (1992)
found that distributive justice perceptions are limited in their links only to
pay and job satisfaction. Procedural justice perceptions, however, were
found to be associated with levels of organisational commitment and the
quality of employee relationships with immediate managers. Distributive
justice had less impact on employee views when procedural justice was
rated as high. This suggests that if procedures for dealing with employ-
ment issues are inadequate or absent, employee perceptions of basic dis-
tributive outcomes become much more salient. It can be dangerous
however, to assume the universality of justice perceptions without consid-
ering individual circumstances.
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Research evidence
The research reported here was part of a wider study undertaken over
three years into the design, implementation and outcomes of variable pay
systems in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the engineering
sector.1 Three different kinds of pay system were identified and classified
(after Purcell in Kessler, 1995) based on the criteria according to which
employees were paid – individual output, individual input and group
output. One organisation used piecework systems, one used a skills-based
pay system, one used an Inland Revenue unapproved cash-based profit-
sharing scheme and one used a profit-related-pay (PRP) scheme. The
characteristics of the case sites, the pay systems chosen and methods of
implementation are shown in Table 9.1, which outlines the features of the
case study firms
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted in each of the
case sites with pay system designers, line managers, wages personnel, per-
sonnel/HR managers and employee representatives (where available) to
obtain data on the reasons and objectives for pay system change, design
and implementation processes and scheme outcomes, supplemented by
documentary evidence where this existed. Given the scarcity of studies
which incorporate employee views of pay issues, this research approach
offers the possibility of a more holistic view of reward systems in operation
than one usually gained from managers.
These firms had a considerable degree of autonomy over personnel
issues since research sites were deliberately selected for independent HR
decision-making in order to examine pay systems chosen by the SMEs,
rather than by large organisations. The exception to this was Heavyengco
since while this organisation retained its autonomy over the majority of
HR decisions, the new PRP system was implemented by the parent
company, it was important to include this firm as no other small organisa-
tions could be found which had implemented a PRP system of their own
volition. The firms’ approaches to labour management were found to
reflect the stereotypes found in the small business literature since evidence
of ‘good’ let alone ‘best’ HR practice was scant and there were no existing
systems of systematic communication or appraisal for example, and no
formal policies on recruitment, training or pay progression. As such, the
case sites represented interesting locations to investigate perceptions of
organisational justice.
Distributive justice in the workplace
Employee perceptions of distributive justice took a number of forms in the
data gathered. First, employees made a global assessment of the fairness
of their pay; second, they assessed distributive justice in terms of perceived
fairness of organisational differentials; third, they were asked to choose
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their preferred reward allocation criteria which was then compared with
managerial priorities. Lastly they evaluated distributive outcomes accord-
ing to perceptions of relative inputs as under equity theory. In order to
check whether employee satisfaction with pay levels was related to their
level of earnings relative to other workplaces, earnings for specific jobs at
each case site were compared with data derived from the New Earnings
Survey (ONS, 1998) and employee awareness of being under/overpaid in
the labour market was assessed.
Employee perception of pay level fairness
Employees were asked whether they regarded their pay level as fair, or
unfair, and to explain their response. Criteria for assessing ‘fairness’ were
deliberately not provided, partly in order to allow employees to use their
own reasoning and also because of restrictions in questionnaire length.
Employee views on fairness of pay levels are shown in Table 9.2.
The tenor of response is unsurprising. As Lawler (1990) has com-
mented, finding employee dissatisfaction with pay levels could be viewed
as a non-finding. Indeed, one employee at Heavyengco echoed this senti-
ment, commenting wryly: ‘We all always want more than we’re getting,
don’t we?’ (Driller, Heavyengco). The exceptions were employees at
Valveco, who had just received a significant pay increase of around 20 per
cent. Amongst the employees, the prime reason discernible for perceived
unfairness with pay was dissatisfaction with basic pay rates due to a pro-
longed time since any pay rise. At Heavyengco too, there was some evid-
ence of discontent with pay increases since employees strongly contested
the notion that PRP constituted a pay rise and perceived it as ‘simply a tax
dodge’ (Driller, Heavyengco). At Heavyengco two concerns predomi-
nated, first, dissatisfaction with pay rates compared both to other firms in
the local area or in the nearest city and second, perceptions that the engin-
eering industry was itself a low payer: ‘it’s reasonable for [town] but they
get paid higher in [nearest city]’ (Assembler, Heavyengco); ‘engineering in
general is not recognised as a skilled job for what you get paid, not com-
pared to my friends in insurance’ (Jig Borer, Heavyengco).
Pay dissatisfaction due to the lack of a recent pay rise is not a common
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Table 9.2 Employee perceptions of fairness of pay level
Company Employee responses (% by company)
Fair Unfair Don’t know
Autonco 12 88 (n9) 0
Lampco 29 57 (n6) 14
Valveco 63 37 (n8) 0
finding of research in this area (cf. Gilman et al., 2002:58) and this may
reflect the nature of the research sites; wage restraint is likely to be more
common in smaller firms in a contracting industry facing tough competit-
ive pressures. Employees were questioned about satisfaction with their
earnings compared to the earnings of others doing similar and different
jobs in their organisation, but responses consistently revealed satisfaction
with comparative earnings. Few employees admitted insufficient know-
ledge of others’ earnings to respond. Given little evidence of discontent
with internal pay differentials, it is worth probing two sources of perceived
injustice outlined earlier: lack of weight given to personal merit as an allo-
cation criterion and the absence of regular pay increases.
Employee satisfaction with allocation criteria
As discussed above, the allocation criteria used to determine rewards are
subject to debate and may be a source of distributive (in)justice.
Employees were first asked whether they agreed with the idea of variable
pay in principle and the results are shown in Table 9.3.
Half of the entire sample of employees believed that pay should be
varied, with considerable variation between firms. Greatest support for
variable pay came from employees at Heavyengco; in contrast to
employees at the other firms, they were the only group who received no
element of pay at all which reflected their individual performance and
their comments about the performance criteria that should be used were
mostly in support of setting salaries according to skill levels. Most hostility
towards variable pay came from employees at Autoco where employees
received the lowest level of basic pay in the sample and to whom the vari-
able element of pay was critical to their overall earnings, while employees
at Lampco and Valveco were more evenly split between supporters and
detractors. The managers at Valveco stated that support for variable pay
was most evident amongst younger employees whilst older workers with
mortgages found the basic rate more important. A further area of investi-
gation, therefore, is whether employees who agreed with the principle of
variable pay felt that appropriate distribution criteria were being used. Of
those employees who supported variable pay, Table 9.4 shows the varying
levels of support for potential reward criteria.
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Table 9.3 Percentage of employees believing that pay should be variable
Company Employee response (%)
Autoco 11 (n9)
Lampco 57 (n7)
Valveco 63 (n8)
Heavyengco 70 (n10)
Employees gave most support to the principle of rewarding for inputs
rather than outputs and defined payment according to people’s skills in a
variety of ways – ‘whether they can use different machines’ (Machinist,
Valveco), ‘speed and co-operation’ (Machinist, Valveco), or ‘how efficient
they are’ (Electrician, Heavyengco). Employees at Heavyengco also felt
that other factors should be taken into consideration including ‘quality’ of
work produced (Assembler, Heavyengco), ‘effort’ (Machinist,
Heavyengco) and ‘location’ by an employee who alluded to London
weightings (Assembler, Heavyengco). Heavyengco employees were the
strongest supporters of payment for skills; this may reflect the views of a
relatively highly skilled workforce which felt individual efforts were
unrecognised by the PRP system. At an abstract level, although payment
according to skill levels received most support from employees, it is
noticeable that where this system was in place in its purest form at
Lampco, employees were least supportive. At this firm morale was low
and the business was struggling, reflected in labour turnover rates of
around 37 per cent so it is unsurprising in this organisational context that
employees felt long service should be rewarded.
Managerial perceptions of fair reward allocation criteria varied.
Lampco managers favoured a skills-based pay system that emphasised
behavioural inputs which went unrewarded under the previous piecework
system including ability to pay attention to quality and to learn new skills.
Valveco’s General Manager recognised perceived inequity in the previous
profit-sharing system, which only included white collar staff, and by
extending it to the whole workforce supported Deutsch’s (1985) principle
of equality of opportunity while retaining the payout criterion of ‘ability to
pay’. Heavyengco managers, however, simply regarded the PRP system as
a way of taking advantage of the tax system ‘to give employees a pay rise
without the company funding it’ (Financial Controller, Heavyengco).
Autoco’s General Manager wanted to retain a piecework system for its
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Table 9.4 Percentage of employees supporting each potential criterion for variable
pay
Company Employee response (%)
Amount of work Skills Length of Something else
produced service
Autoco (n1) 0 100 0 0
Lampco (n4) 0 50 50 0
Valveco (n5) 0 80 0 20
Heavyengco (n7) 0 86 0 43
Notes
a n sample size of employees agreeing with principle of variable pay at each company.
b Rows may sum to 100% where employees chose multiple criteria.
motivationary benefits as he believed that very few staff ‘had a genuine
allegiance to the company’ and piecework was required to ensure that the
employees were productive. Managerial perceptions of appropriate cri-
teria for distributive justice in reward allocation were centred on afford-
ability to the organisation and stimulating appropriate employee
behaviours. Given that some measure of individual merit was the pre-
ferred allocation criterion of those employees who supported variable pay
in principle, it is worth asking to what extent the pay systems achieved dis-
crimination between good and poor employees. Employees of firms using
pay systems which discriminated on the basis of individual rather than
group performance could be expected to agree with the statement,
whereas those rewarded by company performance could be expected to
disagree; Table 9.5 shows the results.
Despite the high levels of hostility to payment for output at Autoco, the
company’s piecework system was felt to be most effective by employees in
discriminating between good and poor performers. Interestingly, half of
Valveco employees felt their pay methods were effective in achieving the
same objective, but from the comments made, it was clear that employees
were evaluating the method which determined their basic pay and were
ignoring the profit-sharing element. Under half of Lampco employees felt
that their system lived up to its intention; this company experienced many
problems in attaining procedural fairness of appraisals due to poorly speci-
fied performance criteria and line manager inconsistency in conducting
skills gradings. Heavyengco employees felt that their pay system was least
effective in distinguishing between good and poor performers as expected,
since these employees’ variable pay was calculated solely according to firm
performance. We might expect pay rates in firms with no recent pay rises
to be relatively low, this is assessed in the next section which compares
employee earnings from the case sites with national pay data.
Employee earnings in context
The question of whether employees receive fair levels of pay deserves
further scrutiny, since perceptions of distributive justice may be subjective
rather than objective (Konovsky, 2000) and in the case of distributive
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Table 9.5 Employees believing that poor performers receive less money than good
performers
Company Employee response (%)
Autoco 55 (n9)
Lampco 43 (n7)
Valveco 50 (n8)
Heavyengco 10 (n10)
justice of pay, outcomes are easily comparable with objective data. Com-
paring the pay levels of employees at the case sites with those of people
doing similar jobs as recorded in the New Earnings Survey (ONS, 1998)
provides a rough guide as to whether employees’ earnings from the case
study firms conform to national averages. Disaggregated pay data for spe-
cific occupational categories was only available at national level, con-
strained by small sample sizes for some occupations, but data was matched
for the year in which the employee survey took place. Small sample sizes
for the occupations under analysis also meant that it was not possible to
restrict the analysis to workers’ earnings in SMEs; instead comparisons are
made between workers’ earnings in organisations of all sizes.
Table 9.6 compares the earnings of employees from case sites with
national averages for the same occupational categories. It has been neces-
sary to manipulate data from both the case sites and the New Earnings
Survey to ensure that the figures are averaged for comparison purposes,
e.g. bonus earnings, working time, overtime and shift pay. In order
to show the effects of the variable pay systems on earnings, Table 9.6
makes an important distinction between base pay rates, shown in bold and
earnings including all sources of variable pay which are shown in ordinary
type.
The table usefully helps to provide some justification for employee con-
cerns with the distributive justice of basic pay rates. Autoco and Lampco
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Table 9.6 Earnings of case study company employees compared with national
averages
Company Job type Earnings National average earnings
(pence per (pence per hour)
hour)
Autoco Pressworker 581 585 Bonus earnings/other premia included
Spot welder 381 527 Bonus earnings/other premia excluded
Lampco Assembler 740 609 Overtime pay/bonus earnings included
480 534 Overtime pay/bonus earnings excluded
Auditor 740 680 Overtime pay/bonus earnings included
480 605 Overtime pay/bonus earnings excluded
Valveco Maintenance 1,014 906a Bonus earnings included
fitter 1,002 665 Bonus earnings excluded
NES NES
Heavyengco Jig borer 796 745 (713) (652)b Figures in brackets are net of
tax
644 659 (585) (583)
Notes
a New Earnings Survey figures for this category include shift pay, as a portion of average
earnings from shift pay was consolidated into basic wages at Valveco.
b Figures in brackets based on net pay after tax so that the effects of PRP become visible.
employees are underpaid when their basic wages are compared with
national averages whilst Valveco and Heavyengco employees are compar-
atively well paid. At Heavyengco the effects of profit-related pay on take
home pay are extremely interesting as while earnings including bonuses
are higher than national averages, when net earnings excluding bonuses
are considered, national base rates are higher than those of Heavyengco.
However, earnings in brackets are those calculated considering the effect
of profit-related pay and Heavyengco’s employees take home pay rates are
actually higher, albeit by a few pence, than the national average.
Heavyengco employees’ widespread perceptions of distributive injustice
with respect to pay levels may indicate that they focus entirely on the
nominal basic hourly rate, as asserted by several interviewees at manager-
ial and employee level. Furthermore, because the PRP bonus was paid out
annually, employees’ wage levels appeared unchanged during the course
of the year so the mechanics of the system increase its opacity.
While employees at two of the case sites were objectively underpaid
according to national comparisons, this would presumably not affect their
perception of distributive (in)justice unless they were aware of other firms
which paid more for their work. Employee perceptions of whether
they were over/underpaid in their local labour market were assessed, see
Table 9.7.
Autoco employees appear to suffer from lowest comparative pay
according to Table 9.7 but also to have least knowledge about this.
Lampco employees’ perceptions of low comparative pay are supported by
New Earnings Survey data. Although only one job is shown for compara-
tive purposes from Valveco, if this is representative of the differential
between wages for other jobs within the company and what employees
could expect to earn elsewhere, it seems unlikely that their expectations
could be fulfilled. Heavyengco employees seem confirmed in their attach-
ment to using the basic wage as a comparison given that such a large
majority of them believed that they were underpaid, since Table 9.6 shows
this is only true when all other bonuses are excluded from the wage
packet.
Therefore, Table 9.7 shows mixed results with respect to the accuracy
and objectivity of employees’ distributive justice perceptions beyond their
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Table 9.7 Employee knowledge of better paying employers in the local area (% by
company)
Company Yes No Don’t know
Autoco 33 33 33
Lampco 57 43 0
Valveco 50 50 0
Heavyengco 70 20 10
organisation and reveal a persistent preoccupation among employees with
basic wage levels as their criteria for evaluating distributive justice. With
the exception of Autoco employees, at least half the employees surveyed
in each of the other case sites knew of better paying local firms. The ques-
tion of why discontented employees did not actively seek other work
remains unanswered; perceived likelihood of getting another job and
inconvenience or other costs associated with quitting current work may be
important factors, but further analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Summary of employee perceptions of distributive justice
Most employees felt that their pay level was unfair and the main source of
distributive injustice was lack of a recent pay rise. The results also show
that choice of appropriate allocation criteria holds importance for
employees in determining their pay and that there was little overlap
between managers’ and employees’ priorities. The employee sample
broadly supported variable pay, but often not in its current form, as no
employees supported the principle of pay related to firm performance.
Employees with the lowest basic pay rate at Autoco were understandably
most hostile to the principle of variable pay. Employees showed a marked
preference for rewards for individual inputs, according to the principle of
equity theory. Once in practice, however, employee support for variable
pay systems, even where systems supposedly rewarded employees on an
individual basis, diminished, suggesting some perceived injustice in the
application of the reward criteria.
Some caveats are necessary in drawing these inferences, however. For
all firms but Autoco, the amounts of variable pay were small so we cannot
speculate too much on the significance of distributive injustice in relation
to variable pay systems, nevertheless, the importance of ensuring positive
justice perceptions of basic pay levels remains a lesson to be learned for
managers. In the light of the discrepancies found between support for vari-
able pay in theory and dissatisfaction with its application in practice, we
now turn to perceptions of procedural justice to compare their relative
impact.
Procedural justice in the workplace
Procedural justice in pay system change manifests itself in two stages.
First, the extent to which employees receive voice in the process of pay
system change was earlier identified as a key success factor for ensuring
pay system palatability. Second, the procedures by which pay decisions are
made may be more or less fair following Leventhal et al. (1980). The
significance of procedural justice to employees in this study also appeared
in two ways, first, the level of consultation experienced prior to the choice
and design of the new pay systems incited strong feelings from many
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workers. Second, employees were invited to comment on and justify their
perceptions of pay system fairness. This was instructive in illustrating their
interpretation of procedural justice and their understanding of pay deter-
mination methods.
As critical commentators have suggested (Ram, 1993; Moule, 1998;
Marlow, 2002), SMEs are associated with a lack of employee voice and an
autocratic management style. This was certainly true of organisations in
this study. Even in the two organisations which had fully recognised
unions before the pay system changes, there were no shop stewards as
employees were unwilling to take on the role and felt it was pointless since
managers firmly rejected the idea of collective bargaining. At the case sites
visited, there was a notable lack of consultation over pay system change
which in turn had significant negative consequences, as employees subse-
quently resisted the unilateral imposition of new pay systems with a negat-
ive impact on production and the employment relations climate.
From the whole sample, only managers at Valveco declared that
employees were not consulted, yet, from the entire sample of employees,
only four (12 per cent) said they had been consulted about plans to change
the pay system. Given the small numbers who could positively identify
whether any consultation had taken place or not, the findings are not
particularly conclusive. However, employee comments below show a
strong display of dissatisfaction, the most common complaint being that
consultation took a ‘pseudo’ form without any sincere desire from man-
agement to hear employees’ views. In some cases it amounted to little
more than informing the employees that the pay system was to change:
‘They told us that they were going to change it … they didn’t ask what we
thought of it’ (Press Worker, Autoco). ‘We were told we would accept it’
(Spot Welder, Autoco).
Employees at Autoco felt that there was no possibility of rejecting,
modifying or changing the system once it was in place: ‘We said we’d give
it a try but once we got it, we were stuck with it weren’t we?’ (Press
Worker, Autoco). Lampco went through a long period of consultation
lasting over a year but it seemed to make little impression on employees,
this can be explained by a number of reasons; it was one of the older pay
systems studied, and in the three years since its creation, employees may
simply have forgotten that there was a consultation process. Furthermore,
as one of the larger case study firms, employee representatives were
involved with the consultation rather than all individual employees con-
sequently, none recalled the consultancy process. One comment made by a
Lampco employee again reflects a perception that decisions had already
been taken before employees made their views known: ‘They asked our
opinion but they were going to do it anyway’ (Assembler, Lampco).
Heavyengco’s employees similarly show an interesting response. Despite
months of negotiation over the implementation of PRP, employees
emphatically denied that they had experienced any true consultation over
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the system: ‘It was a choice of either accept it or no pay rise – it was forced
on us basically, we didn’t really want it’ (Grinder, Heavyengco).
Unsurprisingly, in the firms with little consultation but fundamental pay
system change, employees objected vociferously with a variety of con-
sequences. The results at Lampco were slower to emerge as the impact of
the pay system was less immediate and is discussed in the next section. But
both Autoco and Heavyengco experienced a significant increase in union
activity and mobilisation. Heavyengco employees discovered that man-
agers had violated the Inland Revenue’s regulations for PRP schemes by
not allowing sufficient consultation time when seeking employee consent
to a variation in terms and conditions. Employees sought advice from a
union and subsequently obtained union recognition for the first time in the
firm’s history. This culminated in lengthy annual pay negotiations involv-
ing full-time external representatives for the organisation and the
employees and an acrimonious state of employment relations. As one
employee commented: ‘it’s put divisions in here which weren’t here
before’ (Supervisor and Non-Union Employee Representative).
Autoco employees initially rejected the new pay scheme and downed
tools on a daily basis when sporadic supply of parts and problems with
equipment threatened their opportunities to make satisfactory bonuses.
Under the new scheme bonuses were calculated on a weekly instead of
daily basis which made consistent production across a working week more
critical to maintaining stable earnings. Problems with tools, equipment and
materials supply continued, and after three months, employees requested
a meeting with the General Manager and the full-time union official. After
some temporary improvement, employees then conducted a six-week
work to rule as they believed the job times were unfair and wanted the
work study exercise repeated. Ultimately, employees became more vocal
in asserting their rights and three new shop stewards were elected after a
period of several years when no employees thought it worthwhile to stand
for election.
At Valveco, lack of consultation about the new pay system had little
impact on the recipient group of employees for two reasons. First, the
amount of pay involved amounted to only three or four days’ extra per
year. Second, the only way the change was communicated was through a
ticket in employees’ pay slips, so a proportion of employees was unaware
of the new scheme. However, the lack of consultation and explanation of
the scheme had repercussions elsewhere. The profit-sharing scheme was
created by simply making ‘works’ (shop floor) employees eligible for a
share of the scheme already in operation for office staff. These employees
were extremely angry about what they perceived as the dilution of their
bonus pool and managers noticed a marked deterioration in relations
between white collar and manual workers, especially reluctance to co-
operate in sharing information required for production.
Lack of voice during the pay system change, therefore, had a significant
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negative impact on both production and employment relations at three of
the case sites. The type of concerns employees voiced suggests a twofold
aspect to perceptions of procedural justice. First, they were aggrieved at
the lack of genuine voice per se which supports the view of procedural
justice as an end in itself, but second, the consequences of failing to
involve employees in designing the pay schemes meant that they often
perceived the mechanics of the schemes as unfair or unworkable.
Perceptions of pay system fairness
Employees were asked whether they regarded the new pay systems as fair
or unfair and to explain their response with criteria for assessing ‘fairness’
deliberately not provided, employees to use their own reasoning, these
views are illustrated in Table 9.8.
The results show a mixed picture both in tenor of response and reason-
ing. Employee perceptions of pay system fairness tended to be founded on
two criteria: first, the ground rules on which the pay system was predicated
and second, on the distributive equity of the payout criteria, suggesting an
overlap, at least empirically, between the concepts of distributive and pro-
cedural justice.
Autoco employees’ complaints revolved around typical problems with
piecework systems which have long been recognised as such. Their main
criticism was of the weekly time span used for the calculation of the bonus
which made their earnings more vulnerable to fluctuation. This, however,
was a deliberate strategy on the part of management rather than an error
in pay system design which could have been avoided through more consul-
tation over pay system design. One employee voiced concerns about
equity of outcomes from the system in expressing sympathy for a hard-
working colleague who earned a smaller bonus: ‘It’s not done right, some
pressworkers do a lot more and aren’t earning as much’ (Press Worker,
Autoco).
Obstacles to employees reaching required performance standards were
also the subject of complaint at Lampco. While the vast majority of
Lampco employees felt that their pay system was fair, one had waited
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Table 9.8 Employee perceptions of pay system fairness
Company Employee responses (% by company)
Fair Unfair Don’t Know
Autoco 22 78 (n9) 0
Lampco 71 29 (n7) 0
Valveco 50 25 (n8) 25
Heavyengco 30 60 (n10) 10
several years before being allowed to acquire new skills to upgrade, rein-
forcing the finding that training availability is likely to inform participants’
perceptions of the fairness of skills-based pay plans (Lee et al., 1999): ‘I’ve
been on the same job for nine years, and only recently swapped round,
I’ve got more skills the last three weeks, I’ve been on a sprayer for the first
time’ (Assembler, Lampco).
Even Valveco employees who felt the pay system was fair were unable
to explain their reasons. One cause could be the recent large increase in
base salaries which may have made employees likely to hold positive atti-
tudes to the distributive and procedural elements of both the pay system
which determined their base salary and the variable bonus system. This
would suggest that perceived pay system fairness is associated with percep-
tions of both distributive and procedural justice, in contrast with the find-
ings of Folger and Konovsky (1989) which showed that employee attitudes
were unaffected by the favourability of distributive outcomes from the pay
system.
The most frequent complaint amongst Valveco employees was on the
basis of distributive injustice. Employees felt strongly that principles of
equality should constitute reward allocation criteria given that the profit-
sharing is intended to promote co-operation in the interests of improving
organisational performance from which all employees should benefit. In
practice, because the bonus was calculated as a percentage of earnings,
higher paid employees benefited more than the lower paid, as one
employee put it bluntly: ‘four days at my rate is a lot higher than a
cleaner’s’ (Assembly Shop Inspector, Valveco).
Summary of employee perceptions of procedural justice
Procedural justice in designing and implementing the reward systems
chosen was at best patchy and management attention to it was, in most
cases, negligible. This resulted in the provision of limited information
about the new pay systems masquerading as consultation. Employee dis-
content at the lack of opportunities to put forward their views ran high.
There were consequently negative effects on employment relations and
organisational performance chiefly in terms of managerial and employee
time spent resolving grievances. Not only did employees often disagree
with the reward allocation principles, but also once the pay systems were
implemented, the lack of consultation over their design meant that the
payout triggers and criteria became a frequent source of complaint.
Interactional (in)justice – SMEs and the significance of
interpersonal relationships
The discussion until now has focused on the presence or absence of pro-
cedural dimensions of organisational justice. However, the quality of the
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practices and of the interpersonal relationships generated are likely to be
critical to achieving the outcomes sought from them and may constitute
influences on employee perceptions of interactional justice. We have
noted that SMEs may be less likely to use formal procedures, in the
absence of which relationships between managers and employees are
likely to be more personal and more significant in influencing employees’
views of their bosses and organisation (Ram et al., 2001; Marlow, 2002).
Content analysis of employee comments regarding management style and
conditions of employment revealed findings which map clearly onto
dimensions of interactional justice. Moreover, statistical analysis of associ-
ations between employee attitudes and commitment to their employer
threw up repeated connections between employee satisfaction outcomes
and their relationship with their individual line manager.
At Autoco, lack of responsiveness to employee suggestions and lack of
appreciation were the most frequent complaints: ‘It’s a pity they didn’t let
you know more what’s going on – it gives a bit of interest, a better level of
communication really. You don’t see them often on the shop floor talking to
workers and listening to what they say’ (Press Worker, Autoco); ‘It’s all
down to our cell manager, you ask ’im to do anything and you might as well
talk to yourself, it’s little things like that what niggle you’ (Press Worker,
Autoco); ‘I don’t think you’re appreciated, you’re just another number and
there’s someone always there to step in your place’ (Spot Welder, Autoco).
Problems of lack of management responsiveness to employee sugges-
tions were also widely acknowledged. One Unit Manager commented: ‘I
don’t think we tend to communicate very well with the operators, I think
we let them down a lot, we tend to make promises we can’t keep, they
highlight a problem and never get a permanent fix, that’s what gets their
goat really’ (Unit Manager, Lampco). Operators similarly complained
about the lack of explanation behind decision-making – informational
injustice – and the way in which employees were treated as human beings
– interpersonal injustice: ‘I think management should make their views
understood, show us proof they’ve looked into it and found good or bad
reasons for doing something or not doing something’ (Assembler,
Lampco): ‘Some of the team leaders treat you like shit, and the managers
do too, no one listens to you’ (Assembler, Lampco).
A particular problem for SMEs emerged in the form of dissatisfaction
with perceived deterioration in communication levels, caused by growth
and changes in the management structure at Valveco and Heavyengco:
‘When I came here, it was more of a family firm, when it gets bigger and
management takes over, the bosses move away from you’ (Assembler/
Tester, Valveco).
Heavyengco employees were still aggrieved by the change in manage-
ment style from a paternalistic one to being a small subsidiary of a larger
corporate group, marked by changes in communication and depersonalisa-
tion of relationships between employees and managers: ‘when it used to be
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a family firm you could talk to them, now they don’t want to know, you’re
just here, part of the furniture’ (Assembler, Heavyengco); ‘Heavyengco
years ago was family-owned, it was a far nicer environment, it had that
personal touch from the owner, now you’re just a figure in someone else’s
eyes’ (Jig Borer, Heavyengco); ‘The owner used to come down and say
‘Good morning’ to everyone on the shop floor’ (Assembler, Heavyengco).
Hence, organisational growth is likely to bring challenges in maintaining
perceptions of pay fairness since managers may find it difficult to sustain
employees’ trust when relationships are depersonalised as new layers of
management develop.
Summary of employee perceptions of interactional justice
These findings illustrate three important points about the nature of inter-
actional justice. First, its power appears to be universal. Despite the differ-
ent sizes and circumstances of all the firms, it seems remarkable that
communication practices and social interaction in one form or another
were a major concern and reinforces their perceived significance to
employees. Second, the employee comments illustrate that, as others have
argued (Bies, 2001), interactional justice appears embodied in everyday
social encounters without any specific outcome attached, unlike distribu-
tive and procedural justice which are usually assessed in the context of a
decision-making process. Third, contrary to Bies’s most recent (2001)
depiction of interactional injustice as active malice – personal insults, inva-
sion of privacy and deception – the evidence reported here suggests that
interactional justice was defined as an absence of fair treatment rather
than the presence of unfair treatment. The implications for managing
employee perceptions of justice go far beyond ensuring that employees
suffer no slights or humiliation from colleagues or managers. Rather,
actively fostering good working relationships with managers is of key
significance to employees.
Conclusions: comparing distributive, procedural and
interactional justice perceptions in SMEs
The chief contribution of this chapter is in moving the focus away from
distributive justice of pay systems in SMEs and incorporating and high-
lighting the significance of procedural and interactional justice percep-
tions. These are especially significant in their management implications for
implementing new pay systems and the resultant outcomes in the work-
place. Procedural justice at the case sites was noticeable for its absence
and deficiencies which, in turn, threw perceived shortcomings in interac-
tional justice into sharp relief. The evidence supports views of procedural
justice as both an end in itself, and a means to an end, as the consequences
of inadequate or absent consultation discussed earlier, illustrate.
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The competence of both HR and general managers in small firms in
managing pay processes is brought into question in various ways in the
case studies. Employees were not involved in designing the ground rules of
the pay systems which caused resistance to the systems once implemented,
partly as a result of the difficulty of understanding opaque procedures.
Measurable objectives were not devised and payout criteria were often
subjective. In practice this often made the systems impractical or unwork-
able and sometimes led to avoidable modifications. However, we must
recognise that these emerging problems with the pay systems are well doc-
umented in studies of large organisations with greater resources of HR
expertise and, in this respect, small firms are not necessarily a special case.
The outcomes of poorly managed pay system change, however, are likely
to be felt much more acutely in SMEs such as the ones investigated here,
given more personalised relationships between employees and line man-
agers who may be placed in the position of having to defend ad hoc and
(un)just decisions. Managerial failure to consult employees led, in some
cases, to heightened demands for employee voice and a formalisation of
representation mechanisms to improve procedural justice. While it is
debatable how far these benefited both employees and the organisations,
it illustrates the difficulty of achieving positive justice perceptions in SMEs
with informal or unstructured decision-making processes.
Further research in this area, especially in the light of pending Euro-
pean legislation to enforce consultation mechanisms in smaller organisa-
tions, is much needed. The evidence presented offers formalising
procedures as one response to perceptions of procedural injustice, but the
experience of employees at Heavyengco and Valveco suggests that formal-
ising relationships via organisational growth and ownership change ended
the valued intimacy of interpersonal relationships between managers and
employees. The development of formal consultation procedures then
needs careful introduction to ensure that distancing between managers
and employees does not occur to the detriment of interactional justice per-
ceptions. SMEs which are growing appear to face particular challenges in
managing justice perceptions as, like many elements of HRM, the effects
become critical during periods of organisational change. Further research
investigating managers’ activities as agents of justice in SMEs and
employee views of justice in expanding firms would help develop our
understanding of the role of justice perceptions in these circumstances,
especially given employee concerns with interactional justice which was
focused on line managers as linchpins in the management structure.
Distributive justice, nevertheless, retains a role in influencing justice
perceptions given the centrality of basic pay to employee concerns, espe-
cially where it is low and the amounts of variable pay on offer are relat-
ively small. This is an especially pertinent issue for smaller firms, who may
do well to concentrate on ensuring that basic pay is competitive before
investing time and effort in implementing sophisticated variable pay
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systems which may offer only small extra rewards. However, it is clear from
comparing employees’ perceptions of distributive justice with earnings
levels from the wider labour market that employee perceptions are subject-
ive and that being underpaid does not always lead to employees quitting
their jobs. This work, therefore, supports that of Ram et al. (2001) and
Gilman et al. (2002) who also found a complex set of trade-offs between
wage perceptions, workplace attributes and perceptions of whether altern-
ative work was realistically available shaped employee attitudes. Further
research which integrates employee perceptions of distributive justice within
and beyond their workplace, their commitment to work and their organisa-
tion in the context of the local labour market would help us to understand
the formation and impact of distributive justice. It would also enable us to
address some of the weaknesses of treating distributive justice as if it is 
a-contextual. Given that the amounts of variable pay on offer were gener-
ally small, this lends support to the findings of Brockner and Wiesenfeld
(1996) and McFarlin and Sweeney (1992) that when outcomes are unsatis-
factory, procedures receive greater scrutiny from employees.
Given the limitation of analysing one industrial sector and changes in
one facet of the employment relationship, this chapter merely scratches
the surface of organisational justice perceptions in SMEs. These engin-
eering firms represent only a tiny proportion of a heterogeneous economic
sector. Highly skilled employees in the professional services industry are
likely to have different expectations of and priorities for organisational
justice for example. It has also only been possible to explore justice per-
ceptions around one employment issue. However, the evidence presented
by this chapter, supplemented by our knowledge that employment rela-
tions in many SMEs is often characterised by complaints of injustice,
surely upholds the case for further analysis of the topic for the benefit of
employment relations theory and practice.
Note
1 Funding from the Engineering Employers’ Federation and the University of
Bath is gratefully acknowledged.
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10 Representation, consultation and
the smaller firm
Alan Ryan
Recent reports (TUC, 2003), suggest that there is a growing trend for
people to spend more of their time in the workplace, whether this is called
presentism or a long hours culture seems irrelevant in terms of the overall
outcome; work is taking over ever-increasing segments of daily life (Noon
and Blyton, 2002). Yet, it continues to be a key area within which people
have little say in relation to what they do, how they do it, when they do it
and where they do it. Employment remains, within an allegedly demo-
cratic society, an area of social interaction within which people have few
opportunities for an adequate voice in decisions pertaining to a central life
activity. There is, in effect, a representation gap (Towers, 1997) where few
have influence over the choice of management or upon the strategic direc-
tion of the organisation for which they expend their labour and upon
which they rely for their future livelihood. Freeman and Rogers (1999:39),
exploring views upon this issue, found that employees wanted greater
input in workplace decisions and sought greater influence in key areas
such as finance, strategy, departmental goals, training, work schedules and
the distribution of rewards. It was also found that, in general, the better
educated the employee, the more hours (annually) they worked plus, the
greater length of their permanent status with an organisation, the greater
the desire for more input on such workplace decisions.
Indeed this, and other research (see for example, Cully et al., 1998;
WERS, 1998), appears to indicate that there is a strong correlation
between worker satisfaction and influence over those matters judged as
important in the workplace setting. Moreover, dissatisfaction in this
respect leads to increases in grievances lodged, turnover, absence and ulti-
mately lower productivity (Bingham and Chachere, 1999; Freeman and
Rogers, 1999; Lewin, 1999). Given that employees have indicated a desire
for greater involvement but it would appear that such involvement is the
exception, rather than the norm, it appears that most firms are still organ-
ised on the assumption that control can be most visibly reinforced by the
centralisation of decision-making and hierarchical structures. However,
that is not to say that employees are completely without voice in the
contemporary organisation as trade unions, although diminished in power
and influence during recent years (Edwards, 2003) still act to provide voice
for over six million employees in the UK. Moreover, research would indi-
cate (Cully et al., 1999) that in most large, non-unionised organisations
there are varying degrees of representation and consultation processes
which, even though they might be very weak mechanisms for power re-
distribution, do at least offer some conduit for voice. It is also apparent
that with the adoption of the European Directive on consultation and
information, larger organisations will be obliged to adopt mechanisms
which provide for the communication of information to all employees. The
extent to which such information will be provided directly to employees
will, to some degree, be determined by existing procedures, however,
employees will have the general right to receive classes of information (for
example, relating to the economic situation, probable developments in the
undertaking and proposals for the deployment of labour) for the first time.
This argument moves the debate forward by challenging the simplistic
nature of the theme music which indicates that, as trade unionism has
been the main channel for representation, the absence of trade unions
automatically results in a dearth of voice for the employees.
Since the 1980s, employee voice in larger firms in the UK has definitely
weakened as union influences have been constrained and there is little
evidence to indicate that any credible alternatives have emerged (Towers,
1997). Such conclusions can be drawn from the complex and sophisticated
body of literature which has emerged which focuses particularly upon
issues of representation, trade union activities, non-union alternatives and
the growing trend towards HRM type polices of consultation and direct
communication (Flood et al., 1996; Terry, 1999; Kaufman and Taras, 2000;
Millward and Forth, 2000; Dundon, 2002). It is presumed, moreover, that
such findings apply across the labour force with the key focus upon the
representation strategies themselves. As has been argued in chapter 1, it is
accepted that the effort–wage bargain is the foundation of the employ-
ment relationship in market economies, but the manner in which that is
articulated will be shaped by firm context. In the case of representation,
voice and influence it is again argued that these issues will be influenced by
firm size. The fact that unions are not traditionally active within the small
firm sector combined with the misguided (if now discredited) notion that
employment relations in such firms are defined by harmony and agree-
ment has led to the issue of voice, representation and consultation being
somewhat ignored within the literature.
Recently, a growing body of literature has begun to emerge which
recognises and explores the aspect of informality in the labour manage-
ment processes of smaller firms and the implications of this for both
employees and employers (Ram et al., 2001; Marlow, 2002). As of yet,
however, there has been little attention focused specifically upon how
small firms manage the process of voice and representation although it is
clearly critical to policy issues regarding retention and, as Cox (chapter 9)
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indicates, perceptions of fair rewards. Of considerable importance to this
debate, furthermore, is the possible impact of the forthcoming European
Directive which necessitates indication of compliance with formal chan-
nels of communication and representation. To assess how smaller firms
might deal with such issues, it is essential to consider current-approaches
to representation, consultation and employee voice. To undertake this
task, this chapter will focus on the manner in which management, as the
proactive party in the employment relationship, determines strategies of
participation, noting the extent to which managers in smaller firms make
use of participation strategies and, therefore, the changes likely to be
implemented following the enactment of the Information and Consulta-
tion Regulations. We use case study examples to highlight the mixed mes-
sages emanating from current practice within the small firm sector.
What appears, notably within small firms, to be the principal impedi-
ments to the development of mechanisms that address these issues is the
lack of management willingness to relinquish power and the inability of
workers to escape management hegemony over the workplace; too often,
the trade-off between these is viewed as a zero-sum class struggle. The
foundation stones of these problems are associated with ownership, man-
agement style, product and labour markets and, possibly more controver-
sially, the historic absence of trade union representation within such firms.
This chapter addresses these issues and examines recent proposals to
tackle the effects of the influence gap in terms of legislation designed to
control indirectly the practices, policies and outcomes of the employment
relationship.
Despite a long history of trade union involvement in larger organisa-
tions, both pre- and post-the Bullock Report (1978), attempts to encour-
age employers to develop representation and consultation mechanisms in
the UK are primarily seen as encouraging forms of consultation which are
informational, rather than representational. More generally in smaller
firms, however, the absence of trade unions has arguably led to markedly
different, more informal, management styles in the area of representation
and influence. In the 1980s, legislation was introduced which required
larger organisations to include, within their annual company reports, a
section which indicated the measures they were taking or had taken within
the last twelve months, in relation to the promotion of representative
arrangements within the workplace (Company Act 1985 s235). In detail,
the report had to provide information that identified what measures had
been undertaken to offer employees, in a systematic manner, information
relevant to them as employees and provide an awareness of the economic
factors affecting the performance of the company itself. Analysis by the
Department of Employment (1988) on the effectiveness of this legislation
indicated that many affected firms ignored the requirement (25 per cent),
or gave an ambiguous (12 per cent), incomplete (11 per cent), or brief
response (8 per cent). Such responses prove of limited use in understand-
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ing the current developments within larger organisations and, moreover,
the rule does not apply to smaller organisations employing less than 250
people, so excluding from its ambit a large number of employees (Willey,
2003:516).
Legislative pressure to change this situation has arisen from within the
European Union in terms of the Information and Consultation Directive
(2002/14/EC) introduced in line with Article 136 of the Treaty of Amster-
dam, an article which is designed to encourage the dialogue between man-
agement and labour. These requirements, to be implemented in the UK by
means of the enactment of the Information and Consultation of
Employees Regulations (currently only in Draft form), will apply to all
organisations with 150 or more employees by March 2005, 100–149 by
2007 and 50–99 by 2008. Whilst the Directive (Article 19) indicates appli-
cation to establishments with over 20 employees the UK has chosen to
implement the figures as indicated above. This minimalist approach
excludes many employees in smaller business units. Further, the directive
turns the focus on more than just the mechanisms of delivery, but also the
types of information which must be communicated and the timing of such
communications. As with much new employment legislation there is a
‘wait and see’ element regarding the effect it may have upon employment
relationships, a situation – in relation to research pertaining to the effects
of legislation – which has emerged in the decades following the winding up
of the Panel on the Monitoring of Labour Legislation in 1983. Current leg-
islation on collective redundancies has been the topic of numerous com-
ments from tribunals centring on a working, workable definition of the
legal phrase ‘in good time’ (Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consoli-
dation) Act, 1992 s188). Unless the new regulations make clear the timing
and the issues concerned, smaller firms will be left open to litigation and
may find compliance costly. Such confusing implementation may well
provide evidence of what Marlow refers as ‘exceptionally deleterious
effects on smaller firms arising from increased regulatory burdens’
(2003:535) although it is acknowledged that this effect may be perceptual
rather than experiential (Blackburn and Hart, 2002).
Further, the inclusion of organisations employing as few as 50 people
will extend the ambit of legislation in this area to a greater number of
firms than previously envisaged and represents a further challenge to the
traditional labour relationship in many small firms based upon informality
and focused upon the social relations of production. The draft regulations
proposed by the UK government do not specify the form that any such
consultation should take (union versus non-union for example) nor does it
determine what forum must be used (elected representative versus whole
organisation). To a greater degree, within smaller organisations these
decisions are likely to be decided by ownership and/or management style
(Rainnie, 1989; Marlow, 2000) rather than the influence of pressure groups
such as trade unions, given their weak influence in the sector overall.
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In response to these proposals, business leaders have suggested that the
approach contained is based on the false assumption that ‘one-size’ fits all
and as such, is misguided. They also argued that employee involvement is
only one of a number of practices that can contribute to information dis-
semination and, therefore, the emphasis should be on direct consultation
rather than consultation through representatives. Indeed, despite a
growing wealth of evidence to the contrary, the CBI point to the achieve-
ment of harmonious employment relationships within small business as an
example of the effectiveness of direct consultation. In arguing from this
perspective they take for granted the discredited harmony thesis, which,
whilst superficially attractive in this context as it supports their ‘laissez
faire’ preferences, has more recently undergone detailed questioning
leading to the realisation that it has little basis in fact (Duberley and
Walley, 1995; Marlow, 2000; Burgess et al., 2001). They view this regula-
tion as overly prescriptive and restrictive as it would limit the flexibility
needed to introduce structures appropriate to their different organisation.
This being the case they argue for a light touch which puts in place trigger
mechanisms requiring workers to ask for consultation before there is a
requirement to set up councils or committees. This would preserve the
existing diversity, enable organisations to keep current mechanisms that
have broad employee support and protect the legitimate business confi-
dentiality.
The TUC argue that effective implementation of the directive is critical
to the achievement of high performance and competitive advantage. It is
imperative, they suggest, that the regulations need to be specific in relation
to the subjects open for consultation and that any mechanisms should be
permanent rather than triggered by particular incidents, requests or eco-
nomic circumstances. In simple terms, it would seem that a statutory fall
back arrangement, similar to the procedures relating to conflict resolution
(discussed below) should be put in place and should be enforceable in
relation to all organisations unwilling to implement the required proce-
dures by agreement.
Such a statutory procedure would have major implications for smaller
businesses, many of which currently operate on the basis of informality,
arguably involving a regulatory shock in areas of vital importance to
smaller businesses, especially when placed alongside other recent legisla-
tion (Ram et al., 2001). This regulatory shock will be further compounded
by the pressures exerted by the recent enactment of legislation enforcing
minimum standards and procedures in terms of organisational discipline
and grievance procedures. This legislation further constrains the exercise
of (un)questionable authority and imposes mechanisms on all firms
(Employment Act 2002 schedule 2).
In the past decade, the number of tribunal applications has risen from
some 73,346 to over 100,000; whilst recent figures show a decline from the
high of 130,000 in 2001–02 there appears a line of resistance inhibiting a
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drop below 90,000 (Burgess et al., 2001). Tremlett and Banerji (1994)
noted that whilst the median size of organisations involved in such cases
was 35 employees, many were part of larger UK groups and over two-
thirds employed personnel staff. However, the smaller the firm, the more
likely the jurisdiction was to be unfair dismissal, and within that area the
main issues relate to disobedience/refusal to obey orders. From these
results, we see a reflection of the informal nature of control within smaller
organisations and the manner in which owner-managers lead their busi-
nesses. Whilst the research indicated that many of the organisations had
formal discipline and grievance procedures, the application of these
mechanisms was erratic. In 1998, survey evidence (DTI, 2002) indicated
that small employees were less likely, on average, to be involved in dis-
crimination cases, but significantly more likely to be involved in cases
relating to redundancy payments. This is indicative of two pressures
placed on smaller firms during the intervening years. The changes in legis-
lation in this area relating to increased consultation requirements have
presented owner-managers with more pitfalls to avoid, whilst the decline
of manufacturing in the UK, alongside the developing use of offshore sup-
pliers has led to increased job losses in specific sectors of the economy. If,
as Blackburn and Hart (2002) noted, the knowledge of employment rights
is to some extent determined by the experience of their application to the
business, the regular appearance of smaller businesses is easy to explain
following legislative changes. In terms of redundancy many smaller busi-
nesses experience such situations only once (closed down) or make use of
managerial prerogative to remove people before redundancy becomes an
issue second time around.
The government has responded to the increasing number of applica-
tions arriving at Employment Tribunal offices by putting in place statutory
minima in terms of workplace dispute resolution procedures, specifically
statutory dismissal, disciplinary and grievance procedures. These proce-
dures, intended to apply to all businesses, are designed to internalise
dispute resolution and restrict the number of applications to tribunals. For
many smaller firms, this may prove problematic in relation to the restric-
tion of managerial prerogative. Employees will enjoy the contractual right
not to be dismissed or disciplined without the implementation of the stan-
dard three-step procedure. Where such a basic procedure is not followed
the tribunal can find the dismissal automatically unfair, award a small basic
award of compensation for this failure, and award an increased amount of
compensation of up to an additional 50 per cent of the award, where the
employee is successful. Equally, employers can require employees to
adhere to a three-step grievance procedure before making any claim of
constructive dismissal. For both procedures strict timetables are set out
which will further limit the exercise of the traditionally accepted preroga-
tive associated with ownership. The government figures (DTI, 2003)
suggest that some 20 per cent of firms with under 200 employees currently
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have either no procedures or sub-standard procedures and that implemen-
tation for these organisations will cost, on average, £171 to  £190 per case.
Whilst this is well below the average cost of attendance at an Employment
Tribunal, such costs on a workplace scale need to be added to the percep-
tion of lost control/authority within the organisational hierarchy. The
introduction of such procedures should, therefore, generate debates within
a number of smaller organisations linked to the pressures to democratise
the workplace.
A central element in the outcome of this internal debate will be the
management style adopted by smaller organisations. In these organisa-
tions, two other factors influence the choices made in relation to employ-
ment relations. First, we look at ownership (Scase and Goffee, 1980)
divided into situations where the owner works alongside other employees
undertaking routine managerial roles as employers as well as employees.
In these organisations, the face-to-face nature of the employment relation-
ship would suggest a style of representation and consultation, which is
more direct and informal. In such situations, the notion of formalised
meetings seems alien to the general tenor of the relationship. Whilst in
other situations the employment relationship is more distant with owners
acting as managing directors within less personalised organisations. It
would seem that these firms are more likely to employ larger numbers of
workers, have a distinctive management cadre, and operate within the less
technologically advanced sectors (Lewin and Mitchell, 1992). A final
strand to this debate is where the plant under consideration is part of a
larger organisation and as such finds employment relationships deter-
mined by an external authority. In these organisations, it is more likely to
find information and consultation mechanisms, whether unionised or
otherwise, imposed on the plant, more formalised, and with an agenda set
by the interests of the parent organisation.
From these arguments, it can be suggested that the style of manage-
ment varies across organisations within the parameters indicated by Goss
(1991) of paternalistic, fraternalistic or autocratic. Associated with each of
these styles are particular forms of consultation in connection with the dif-
ferent objectives, organisational and individual, inherent in each. Etzioni
(1961) has identified these in terms of the philosophy underlying coercive,
remunerative or normative management policies. For the smaller busi-
nesses, this typology of managerial philosophy is clear and useful. Owner-
managers may choose to use the threat of dismissal as a mechanism to
legitimise their decision-making power despite the negative effects this
may have on personal relationships. In this respect, we see the mainte-
nance of personal control, a lack of consultative policies, and the 
(re)assertion of relationships of subordination. Alternatively, some owner-
managers attempt to secure control by the application of additional
rewards where service (work levels) are exceptional. It matters little
whether these reward schemes are paid in cash or fringe benefits, indeed,
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in smaller firms such rewards, it is argued, may well take the form of pater-
nalistic indulgences; smaller business managers and propagandists argue
that the harmonious relationships are evidence of such a managerial style.
However, claims for the school of modern management techniques,
whether called Human Resource Management, High Commitment
Manager or some other ‘buzz’ word variant, claim allegiance to a style
which relies on normative assumptions. Here we are making reference to
the development of organisational cultures which determine the behaviour
patterns of both managerial and other staff. Such cultures in smaller busi-
nesses are generally set, developed and maintained by the owner-manager
without consultation with the employees. In high skill settings, it is more
likely that the culture will make some acknowledgement of the profes-
sional profile of these workers.
Here the argument is that the primacy of each philosophy will infect the
way in which individual managers view the role, importance and useful-
ness of the various representational systems. In this respect, smaller firms
are again, not merely miniature versions of larger firms, as in the latter
there is less scope for personal/managerial innovation, flexibility and flair
as they tend towards procedural bureaucracy. As Parker (2002) notes,
‘bureaucracy is dehumanising because its dull rationality causes human
beings to become morally encrusted and incapable of passion’ (2002:37); a
condition which stifles the individualisation of managerial systems and
leads to an employment relationship which lacks the trust required from
each party where both power and authority are shared.
We can concentrate on sectoral issues more directly to note that in
smaller organisations, no less than in larger organisations, management
information and consultation mechanisms are influenced by product
markets, labour markets, technology and other institutional features
(Marchington et al., 1992). Where product markets are tight or suffering
short-term contractions, employers are more likely to invest in downward
communications in order to offer comfort to those survivors who will not
be losing their jobs; what we can refer to as ‘lifeboat democracy’. Further
in organisations where the application of so-called tacit skills and/or emo-
tional labour is of greater importance, mechanisms of consultation and
information appear to be more widespread, developed and central to the
philosophy underlying managerial behaviour. A further factor contribut-
ing to the existence and application of these mechanisms within smaller
firms appears to be the skill levels of the employees. Thus, in a small
garment manufacturer we are less likely to see mechanisms designed to
meet the requirements of the forthcoming legislation than in a high skill
setting where the workforce is composed of knowledge-workers.
Justification for the introduction of more formalised mechanisms of
consultation and information is rarely to provide employees with more
power in relation to decision-making. Classically, the argument is that such
schemes are introduced in a pursuit of higher performance and greater
Representation, consultation and the small firm 209
commitment to organisational goals (Marchington et al., 1992). So, they
are systems designed to provide education and information, which will
result in higher levels of employee contribution and a more efficient
method of dealing with conflict (Verma, 2000). In this respect, the
representation of the interests of employees is not a primary goal and
management strive to retain both the power and the authority to make all
decisions. Moving away from the face-to-face relationships, this style of
consultation is primarily concerned with communication rather than
representation of the interests of the weaker party.
In many ways, this trend towards a more formalised mechanism of con-
sultation runs counter to the development of individualised employment
relationships within UK workplaces and, notably, the familial relationships
within smaller businesses. In these situations, we can speak of an individu-
alisation, which is procedural rather than substantive. The organisational
tendency within this process is predominately related to the avoidance of
collective mechanisms to determine terms and conditions rather than the
differentiation of the terms and conditions for individual employees.
Whilst the latter may be visible in micro firms the sheer scale of the work
required as firms grow make such arrangements impossible, as they are
unrealistic, impractical and unworkable. In many firms, where such a
process of individualisation is the predominant culture, it has meant
increasing workplace expectations and difficulties arising in relation to
meeting the divergent needs of both individuals and organisations; often
this was driven by increased awareness of legislation (see Blackburn and
Hart, 2002).
In the workplace, as a social situation, the actors’ notions of the rela-
tionship vary in terms of effort level, working methods and rewards, so
much remains located within the domain of custom rather than the strict
legal world of contract. In smaller firms, owner-managers claim they are
entitled to determine the culture or norms, which are operationalised
within their organisation, for them voice as a medium to provide a pro-
tected means for employees to express collective interests which are con-
trary to, or in opposition with, managerial decisions is an illegitimate
intrusion. For this group of managers Human Resource Management
(HRM) as a policy initiative is a means of placing emphasis on the ‘superi-
ority of the individualistic treatment of employees as an alternative to the
eliciting of their organised collective voice’ (Brown et al., 1998:11). The
widespread application of representational mechanisms and formalised
procedures relating to grievance are seen as counterproductive within
smaller businesses.
Grievance procedures are widely regarded in one of two ways by man-
agerial staff. They are seen either as a centrepiece of labour management
relations and key elements in any process of representation or as a vehicle
for whingers and moaners to cause trouble. The introduction of a statutory
procedure is viewed by the government as a means of reducing the
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number of tribunal applications by (re)focusing industrial issues within the
industrial realm rather than the domain of legal disputes. Such procedures
are seen as being representative of the dynamics of the relationship, espe-
cially in organisations where union representation is not available to the
employees. Lewin (1999:138) suggests that grievance procedures ‘may rep-
resent a form of reactive conflict resolution and that alternative, preventa-
tive forms and mechanisms of workplace conflict resolution may exist and
be used by labor [sic] and management’.
From this perspective, such procedures can be seen in the light of
Hirschmann’s exit-voice-loyalty theory (1971). Following this theoretical
construct, we can suggest that workers, who file grievances because they
want more say in workplace decisions, are more likely to exit where voice
is denied, ignored or rejected. In this situation exit can be physical (from
quitting to regular unauthorised absence) or mental (from daydreaming to
working without enthusiasm). Indeed, on the surface, it would appear that
grievance filing is negatively related to loyalty and positively related to
intent to exit; feedback from the outcomes of cases being regularly a
sound predictor of subsequent behaviour (Eaton and Keefe, 1999). Alter-
natively, we can argue that in order to overcome some negative effects
managers could note that for Hirschmann (1971) loyalty is positively cor-
related with voice, so that relatively more workers that are loyal will exer-
cise voice rather than exit the organisation. It is common for managers,
especially owner-managers, to assume that workers in organisations where
union, or other collective forms of representation are absent, are more
likely to leave than exercise individual voice within the parameters of the
grievance procedure. This is partly because those who raise grievances are
generally seen to have ‘significantly lower job satisfaction, more negative
attitudes towards their supervisors, greater perceived pay inequality, and
stronger preferences for worker participation’ (Lewin, 1999:176); in short
are disenchanted troublemakers who fail to fit-in with the culture of the
organisation. In smaller businesses the relative closeness of management is
seen to allow for the informal discussion of problems and, therefore, to
negate the need for a bureaucratic mechanism of reactive conflict resolu-
tion. Marlow found that managers favoured open door policies, with 93
per cent of the sample making reference to ‘informal discussion and reso-
lution of workplace problems’ (2003:540).
From this argument, we can suggest that the new legislation will mean
smaller firms need to develop a more effective form of consultative man-
agement style. Toner (1987) suggests a number of elements that lead to
the improvement of a consultative management style, which is founded on
a strong non-union culture. Whilst some of these are out of the reach of
small businesses, others appear to reflect the descriptions given of rela-
tionships within such organisations. The argument put forward is that a
strong culture based on these elements will allow for the development of
higher productivity levels without necessarily leading to the demand for
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representation based outside the organisation. Simply the key element is
one of mutuality reflected in shared goals, shared norms and visible link-
ages between these two (Toner, 1987). These shared elements, it is sug-
gested, are promoted by the development of organisationally relevant
symbols, a team working ethos, good interpersonal relationships and
organisational pride. A consideration of these elements in relation to
smaller businesses, or so much of the literature would tell us, would result
in a high incidence of each being present. Further, we can argue that the
adoption of a managerial style which reflects these policies, to a greater or
lesser extent, will improve communication, promote a less adversarial
climate, enhance levels of production, reduce barriers to flexibility, and
eliminate any obvious platform for troublemakers. However, they come at
the cost of higher overheads because all these meetings are time consum-
ing, make change more problematic as such policies increase the organisa-
tional pain involved in the transformation of relationships, and may
encourage the expression of trivial grievances (Flood et al., 1996). It is
clear, therefore, that smaller business units, which choose to avoid formal
procedures relating to consultation and dispute resolution, do not
necessarily meet the worker demands for involvement nor steer clear of
the costs inherent in such procedures. As Verma (2000) argues there
appears to be a trade-off between equality and efficiency issues inherent in
the development of more participative managerial styles.
Whilst the introduction of UK legislation, based upon the requirements
of the European Union directives, is one reason for smaller organisations
to look at the introduction of consultation and information mechanisms, it
is by no means the only rationale for their introduction. As noted above, it
would seem likely that a worker-based trigger will operate the UK legisla-
tion and some employers may seek to side-step the statutory procedures
by introducing schemes of their own design. The introduction of such
schemes within smaller businesses may be less widespread because the
attainment of higher levels of commitment can be secured by the adoption
of paternalistic, rather than autocratic managerial styles. Nevertheless, we
can identify alternative rationale for the introduction of such schemes.
Marchington et al. (1992) suggest that underpinning other reasons is the
modern school of thought which views employee involvement (if not true
participation because it lacks the element of power) as ‘something of a
panacea for organisational ills’ (1992:x). From this perspective manage-
ment, correctly or otherwise, introduce their own schemes on the grounds
that it will establish direct lines of communication, enable managers to
make workers aware of the market, customer, legislative and other social
pressures bearing down on the firm. Such an educative function is, they
argue, vital in the process of increasing the perception of mutuality where
this perception encourages levels of employee contribution and commit-
ment by introducing elements of joint problem awareness, thus eliciting
the application of additional employee effort in identifying and solving the
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problems. As suggested, whether formal or informal in nature, the cre-
ation of effective information and consultation systems can be seen as an
attempt at the enhancement of both problem-solving mechanisms and a
means through which employees can let off steam in a managerial con-
trolled environment which does not challenge authority structures.
The widespread use of open door rhetoric, and arguably the associated
practices, within the small business sector indicates awareness that such
safety vents are needed and valued. The question, which remains unan-
swered, relates to the extent to which such managerial styles enable
greater job satisfaction rather than facilitate silent exploitation. In the
main, they adopt one of two approaches to the management of employee
relations based on the usual myth that, as smaller organisations are harmo-
nious the need for formal HR management system, including consultation
and information, is equally small. First, what we could call the Ostrich
Approach, which denies the need for such mechanisms in the tight knit
family organisation, or alternatively the Woodpecker Approach, which
postulates that all they need to do is work harder at current practices in
order to maintain high levels of commitment and productivity. Knowledge
management, or the Owl Approach, is seen to be too expensive for imple-
mentation by these smaller units and the need for any mechanisms
designed to share knowledge is seen to be negated by existing employment
relationships. Alternatively, some of the innovative new wave organisa-
tions in the contemporary small business sector are free of the problems
that face larger firms and those operating in older sectors of the economy,
relating to the loss of human expertise and loyalty. As many of these
newer firms are in high technology sectors or consultancy, they recruit
skilled labour from a differentiated market that allows for the develop-
ment of more personalised employment relationships, which rely on the
coordinated and connected dissemination of information. Such firms,
therefore, feel little pressure for formalised systems of interest representa-
tion and even less need for the involvement of trade unions.
Evidence would indicate that managers prefer to deal directly with
employees, trade unions being seen as interlopers, gatecrashers who bring
nothing to the party but trouble (Dundon et al., 1999). Operating on the
rhetoric, if not always the reality, of a family, team or clan environment
they indicate that the reason they are less confrontational and have fewer
formal disputes is to a large extent due to the lack of trade union involve-
ment. As many will have no human resource manager on site, and even
fewer will have an industrial relations specialist, the absence of trade
unions reflects and further strengthens a unitarist ideology within which
those at the top believe themselves to be in the best place to make
decisions (Wynarcyzk et al., 1993; Carter and Jones-Evans, 2000). Any
union involvement, even more than managerially designed consultation
mechanisms, is seen to dilute control from the owner to outside agencies.
These grounds alone are sufficient to indicate that most smaller business
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managers are resistant to union involvement in their organisations, what
also militates against such involvement is the traditional union wage mark-
up. From this perspective trade unions are seen as third parties that
‘depend on conflict and acrimony for their survival, are driven by internal
political dynamics to “milk the cow” (the company) for more, more, more
at the expense of future jobs, and company well-being’ (Kaufman and
Taras, 2000:35).
Size of establishment, as well as age, are regularly seen to be a determi-
nant of the propensity of the organisation to be unionised, with younger,
smaller firms being far less likely to be involved with Trade Unions (Cully
et al., 1999). As noted above, the legislative provisions relating to statutory
recognition specifically exclude smaller firms, although some smaller units
are included because of their relationship to a larger plant. Many of this
latter group find their HR policies, including representational policies,
influenced by previous or current links with major customers, suppliers
and parent organisations. Guest and Rosenthal (1993) note that some
managers deliberately keep the number of employees down in order to
make the organisation unattractive to union organisers, some moving pro-
duction around a number of smaller units, believing that smaller, non-
union plants reap the benefits of lower labour turnover, absence, conflict
and costs. It is argued, especially in relation to smaller new wave firms,
that they are characterised by flatter structures based on clan environ-
ments, high trust employment relationships, team working, open two-way
communications, and very careful selection policies. In such an environ-
ment, trade unionism would appear antagonistic, a denial of the ability to
fully exploit the knowledge, skills and innovation available within the
workforce.
A final characteristic, which limits the effectiveness of recruitment
drives by unions within the smaller business sector, is worker apathy. Cully
et al. (1999) noted that whilst smaller business units (under 25 employees)
reported the presence of union members within the firms in 28 per cent of
instances, the figure for other organisations was 36 per cent. Whilst the
points outlined above can explain some of this difference, the evidence
indicates that workers in smaller business units do not feel the need for
trade union involvement. Commentators (Dundon et al., 1999; Kaufman
and Taras, 2000; Dundon, 2002) have argued that this may reflect greater
job diversity, satisfaction with the outcomes of the wage–effort bargain
and an atmosphere of supposed harmony within smaller business units.
Employment relationships based on empowerment, smaller working units,
open door policies and high trust are seen to compensate for lower than
average wages within the sector. The opposite side of this coin is that the
employees are often unskilled, temporary and part-time seeing trade
union subscriptions, therefore, as an additional cost for which they receive
no benefits. Moving rapidly between different employers, these ‘butterfly
workers’ enter and leave unionised environments, never staying long
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enough in any one to view themselves as part of any collective interest
groups. Union membership for this group of workers is not, unless a family
tradition, of any importance nor can it be seen to offer the prospect of any
improvements to their working lives.
This is not, however, the case in all smaller business units, some already
operate with consultation and information mechanisms that are fully
developed and attempt to address the issues of any representation gap,
whilst not significantly addressing the influence gap. For these organisations
consultation forms part of their day-to-day operations, is seen as a vital
element of the familial culture and a required part of maintaining high
performance. We can also report situations where the very idea of collective
representation is seen as the antithesis of effective management. For these
organisations managerial prerogative is more important than representation
or consultation. The following discussion, with evidence drawn from a
number of case study firms, highlights the different practices which we can
find in organisations following the different ends of this spectrum. In organi-
sations like TexCo, for example, a small multi-site textile manufacturer
employing 80 mainly female staff with a major retail outlet taking some 85
per cent of available production, staff are unionised, although the branch is
moribund with no elected representative on any site meaning a full-time
union official provides representation. The union agreement is a policy
carried over from the firms previous position as part of a much larger
unionised organisation and the new management are ideologically opposed
to union involvement. Formal meetings with the union are few and far
between, although the managing director does give an annual address and
prior to the last downsizing exercise did arrange meetings with each line; the
union were not involved in these meetings and did eventually secure a
number of protection awards following Employment Tribunals.
The production manager, who has little experience in employment rela-
tions, is responsible for all personnel decisions and regularly dismisses
individuals without following any procedure. Neither party to the employ-
ment relationship views representation as a key issue because both view
the relationship as short-term (seasonal) and employee expectations are
determined by a desire to earn piecework payments rather than lose time
arguing about who has the authority to make decisions. Management
foster the idea that the customer knows best and will walk away if the firm
fails to maintain quality and quantity at the levels they require. The union
concerned manages to preserve low membership levels and has on a
number of occasions sought to generate interest in membership of a
branch committee. They find it difficult to sustain interest once manage-
ment arrange endless meetings, which take the workers off high paying
production lines and hence reduce average earnings, or workers move to
alternative employment along the road at a competitor organisation which
is non-union; interestingly when they switch back to this organisation they
join the union again.
Representation, consultation and the small firm 215
In contrast to this situation TieCo, also a unionised organisation of
approximately the same size and in the same area, actively encourage
representation of various interest groups and union representatives are
paid line averages when they are called to meetings, disciplinary hearings
or pay discussions. The managing director suggests that this means they
encourage better workers, who are already committed to the organisa-
tional goals to undertake the role. Membership levels are higher than
average for the sector and remain consistent over time. All branch com-
mittee roles are filled and the membership regularly raise problems, which
lay representatives are expected to handle. The organisation operates an
open door policy but managers report they normally channel information
and deal with workplace problems using the union. These two different
approaches to the representation of worker interests reflect the classic
problems faced by trade unions when trying to extent their influence
within the smaller business sector. Clearly the new legislation will impact
on each of these firms to differing degrees and in practice shine a light on
involvement mechanisms. If the government adopt the trigger approach
then the impact is likely to be far less on TexCo, as it will be if existing
arrangements are included as acceptable application of the European
directive.
Alternatively, we can note the differences between unionised and non-
union organisation operating within the same sector. GasCo is a small
manufacturer of auto parts in the UK, though part of a larger European
organisation. In the UK, they employ some 60 people, recognise the rele-
vant Trade Union, and operate a European Works Council. In many
respects, they are atypical in regard to smaller firms in that they have a set
of well-developed formal polices and procedures. A dedicated HR
manager handles all human resource and industrial relations matters; and
in this case, the manager is a member of the Chartered Institute of Person-
nel and Development.
HeatCo manufactures auto parts for a major UK car producer, as well
as providing a bespoke service direct to vintage vehicle enthusiasts and the
haulage sector. Part of a larger organisation until recently, they employ
some 130 workers and are, due to an ideology passed down from the larger
parent organisation, a non-union organisation. The firm operated a long-
standing works council arrangement in order to provide voice and
representation. The management accepted that the absence of a trade
union meant that the elected representatives lacked the organisational
back-up and training to express the views of their constituents effectively.
Recognising the counterproductive elements in this situation, they
arranged training with a local provider and agreed a mechanism of confi-
dential support and advice. A single owner recently acquired the organisa-
tion and whilst this resulted in no change in the non-union ideology, the
new owner cancelled the training and advice agreement and reduced by
two-thirds the number of meetings with the representatives. Some time
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before the take-over the works council had operated with two of the six
worker representative places remaining unfilled. Initially, the firm held
elections across the workforce for the roles and regularly secured 10
candidates and a turnout in excess of 85 per cent of the workforce, when
the most recent vacancy arose following the resignation of the incumbent
they could not even secure a volunteer to fill the role. When asked,
workers noted that the meetings had become forums for management to
make announcements, consideration of minutiae and an employer man-
dated ‘yes’ system.
We can argue from these cases that the forthcoming legislation will
have varying effects on each of the organisations. For those organisations
choosing the minimalist route currently, these changes threaten the intro-
duction of more intrusive, possibly extensive, procedures. Whether the
legislation requires triggers or is introduced with a standard fallback pro-
cedure, they will have to adopt procedures which are contrary to existing
culture and the feeling of rule by management not committee. These
changes, bearing in mind the size of each organisation, could result in
more active attempts by trade unions to gain access to the organisations
offering services to any employee elected/nominated to a consultation
committee. We could argue that the management at HeatCo is likely to
implement programmes aimed at re-invigorating the existing system in
order to repel such advances, things might not be so easily solved by
TexCo. However as TexCo currently recognise a trade union they may
find that their current unsympathetic attitude, practice and policy can con-
tinue without challenge; the legislation does not require consultation or
information procedures which are operated in good faith. Both TieCo and
GasCo offer a different prism through which to view the issues. Currently,
positively inclined towards involvement, if not influence, the legislation
will, it appears, have little effect on their practices. However, none of the
organisations operate, or would want to operate, procedures which offer
influence beyond the exercise of procedural voice, which leaves untouched
the key issue of power distribution. Perhaps there is no issue associated
with the employment relationship which causes so much controversy as
the exercise of power and authority. The granting of authority to
employees by the introduction of voice mechanisms is always conditional,
that which the employer gives, the employer can take away based on
ownership rights. Valid representation and consultation mechanisms are
an attempt to distribute intra-organisational power; they are attempts to
shift the focus away from adversarial relationships and towards coopera-
tion and mutuality. From this perspective, ‘Employee representation is
any organisational structure that has one or more employees in it and rep-
resents in an agency capacity the opinion and interests of other employees
to management’ (Kaufman and Taras, 2000:527).
For the smaller firm this twofold purpose is, supposedly, achieved through
open door policies and family environments without the debilitating
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distribution of authority and power and may be thought of as targeted at
securing the substitution of cooperation for antagonism. Any move
towards representation and consultation will only be entered into where
the project does not affect the existing system, under which it is manage-
ment that ‘establishes the rules and regulations that determine compensa-
tion, training, hiring and firing, and the administration of discipline’
(Kaufman, 2000:55). We can argue that if it is legitimate for management
to make these decisions it is equally their role to decide what, if any, form
of representation and consultation mechanisms to establish. The imposi-
tion of representative forums by an outside agency, be it trade unions or
government, will be resisted as the enemy of effective management. Argu-
ments that the existence of representation and influence gaps indicate a
deficit of worker trust in the ability of managers to arrive at equitable
decisions about the structure of the employment exchange are dismissed
as not relevant for the small firm sector. From this view, representation
and consultation must be direct, management driven, and non-union based
on what we might call the belief in a just management. The formality of
legislative imposition brings the danger of limiting the independence of
management even in relation to enterprise rights. As Marlow (2003) notes
many owners of smaller business units resist the use of formal policies in
order to avoid the risk of damage to the team environment, the same may
be true with regard to the involvement of trade unions.
Therefore, we can argue that regarding representation, consultation
and the application of voice in the employment relationship in general,
evidence (Millward et al., 1992; Cully et al., 1999) would indicate that there
have been some considerable shifts in recent years regarding how these
concepts are articulated in the workplace. However, whilst there has been
considerable debate and discussion surrounding such shifts, little
consideration has been afforded to how the context of the organisation
might affect such issues in the first instance. This chapter has focused more
specifically upon the notion of firm size finding that this will shape and
influence representation and voice. We saw that along with specific man-
agement styles, smaller organisations adopt approaches to consultation
and information which reflect the preference of the dominant party within
the employment relationship; be that the individual owner or the manage-
ment cadre. The legacy of the thesis put forward by the Bolton Report
(1971), involving the much debated harmony, continues in this area based
on the use of open door policies, face-to-face communication and all-
employee briefing sessions and infects the development of the debate. This
chapter has considered the manner in which the introduction of legislation
in the area of information and consultation will impinge upon the exercise
of managerial prerogative within the small business sector. In so doing we
suggested that, as with all legislation, the regulatory shock wave will, to
differing degrees, interfere with traditional ownership rights depending
upon existing practices. The wide range of current practice suggests that
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the costs of implementation will be unevenly distributed across the sector
and that smaller firms will, therefore, choose to implement consultation
mechanisms only where they can see clear cost advantages. The issue is
indivisibly coupled to the development of internal (organisationally based)
dispute resolution procedures, despite the fact that business organisations
and pressure groups have suggested that no change will be needed. Our
discussion indicates that such a position is utopian, denies the reality of the
situation in the sector and perpetuates a mythical image of the employ-
ment relationship.
Following the winding up of the Panel on the Monitoring of Labour
Legislation in 1983, research into the effects of regulation has been spor-
adic with reference to larger organisations and just beginning to emerge in
relation to smaller firms. Whilst the current regime of impact assessments
allows for analysis of financial implications there is a dearth of research
relating to the impacts in the realm of employment relations. As the field
of representation and consultation within the smaller firm sector is also a
neglected area in the literature, the introduction of applicable legislation
in this area will provide a stimulus for further, more detailed analysis of
the current practice linked to an investigation of the organisational effects
of labour legislation.
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